

Harold Paulk (Hal) Henderson, Sr. Oral History Collection
Series I: Ellis Arnall
OH ARN 13
Ellis G. Arnall Interviewed by Harold Paulk (Hal) Henderson, Sr.
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Cassette: OH ARN 13; 01:16:40 minutes; Sides 1 and 2

[Continued from OH ARN 12]

[Cassette: Side 1]

HENDERSON: ...runs against [Herman Eugene] Talmadge and in '50 [1950], he, again, enters the race against Talmadge and you stated at that time it wouldn't do to print how you felt about [Melvin Ernest (M.E.)] Thompson's candidacy.

ARNALL: Well, my reason was after M.E became acting governor, and by the way, it's acting governor although--

HENDERSON: Right.

ARNALL: Naturally, I supported him and [Eurith Dickinson] Rivers supported him. We got back together again...when he ran and Talmadge ran against him. But Talmadge defeated him. So then, the next thing we knew he ran for governor again, but having just been defeated by Talmadge, it was very obvious that he couldn't beat Talmadge. And my concern was to get another candidate that might have a better chance to defeat Talmadge. But M.E. ran again without clearing it with me and others that were interested in it. And therefore, he bottled it up to where we had a replay of the same race, which was a defeat for Thompson.

So I said it wouldn't do me to print, but I thought because I thought he was-- had done a disservice to the anti-Talmadge crowd in grabbing it when he was a losing candidate.

HENDERSON: All right. In 1954 Talmadge, of course, cannot run again [HENDERSON requests that ARNALL throw something away] and he has to leave the governorship. Did you think about running in '54?

ARNALL: No. Although, there are those who say that every governor's race I was always playing around with it. But I never seriously thought of running for governor again until I did run for governor. When the fortune cookie gave me a bad stiff [HENDERSON laughs]. But I always would talk about it because the press would come to see me, and the news media, and I just kept the thing going. I'm looking at it and whatnot. But I never had a serious thought of running for governor until the things that I had fought for came into what I thought was actuality. And then I ran because I had been out nineteen years, and I'd rested up good. And I'd been a lot of successful at that time in business and law, and I thought it may be fun to be governor again.

HENDERSON: Did you ever have any aspirations to be the Democratic vice-presidential nominee in 1948?

ARNALL: I would say that it was inevitable, that I was flattered and occasionally took seriously some of the nice things that were said about me. And I remember the state of Washington—no, the state of Oregon—there was a great movement for me as the

Democratic vice-presidential nominee, and I didn't know anybody out there. There were several states that did that, and many of the national writers and news media and magazines and whatnot talked about that I was--some of them even talked about me being president. And naturally, some of this stuff, I thought that would be nice if they talked about it. But of course, I knew, and anyone must have known, that the more favorable comment I got over the rest of the nation, the less favorable comment I got at home. Because only, in those days, only a southerner could be popular at home. He couldn't be popular in another part of the country and still maintain that popularity at home, because they'd look to it with suspicion at anyone who was bragged on by the northern or western press. They'd say uh, uh, something must be wrong. So, I never seriously considered that because I had no control over Georgia machinery. Had I had my governor in, then he could have delivered the Georgia machinery. And to some extent other parts of the South, I could have been a real factor. I will say this, that I think that much of the pioneering work I did in national politics and letting the people of the nation see that we in the South wanted to be readmitted to the union, that we were part of it. And the more I talked about having one common country and so forth, the more responsive they became. And I think much of the plowing of those fields, inure to the benefit of [James Earl] Jimmy Carter [Jr.] when he ran for president. Much of that was built on the concepts that I'd been able, as a pioneer, to develop to where we were part of the union again and wanted to be. As a matter of fact, it would interest you to know that, may interest you that...[pause while ARNALL flips pages; Tape stops and starts]

While Jimmy Carter ran against me in 1966, and had he not run, I would have gotten his vote, I led the primary, [Lester Garfield] Maddox was second, Jimmy was third, and the others behind. But the next thing after several years, in '70, I believe it was, Jimmy ran for

governor. He licked his wounds from that '66 campaign and ran for governor. I did not participate in the primary—let's see, who ran against Jimmy then? Carl [Edward] Sanders?--

HENDERSON: Carl Sanders.

ARNALL: Yeah, I suppose Carl Sanders. But on September twenty-fifth of 1970, I wrote Jimmy Carter a letter [Telephone rings; tape stops and starts]—I wrote Jimmy this letter that claims: “Dear Jimmy: Congratulations on your smashing victory in the Democratic primary run-off. I am enthusiastic in supporting you and the straight Democratic ticket in the general election. Let's decimate the Republicans. You have my very best wishes for a fine administration as governor of Georgia.” He wrote me on October the fourth, 1970: “Dear Ellis. Of all the letters and the telegrams I received, yours was the one I appreciated most. I've wanted to have your friendship and the benefit of your counsel and advice. I trust that we can get together often during the next few years. If my administration could come close to matching the achievements of your own, it would be very gratifying to me. Sincerely, Jimmy.” Next, skipping a few years, May seventeenth '75: “Dear Ellis Arnall,” written in longhand. “I am running for president with a total commitment and I need your help. People from many parts of the country have expressed to me their admiration for you and their confidence in your judgment. When usually convenient, perhaps I could meet you to discuss my campaign. Your advice and your active support could be very valuable to me. Jimmy.” I wrote him: “Dear Jimmy. Thanks for your note. Of course I am for you for president and wish you good luck and success. Everywhere I go I hear nice things about your candidacy.” Then I wrote him on August seventh: “Thanks so much for taking time out to visit with me

yesterday. I appreciate your friendship. Best wishes.” Then February twenty-ninth ’76, I campaigned for him in Florida and Pennsylvania...not really believing he could be elected president. [HENDERSON chuckles] It was a miracle. But miracles do happen. I remember—here, let me stop and say that [Charles Hughes] Charlie Kirbo and Philip [Henry] Alston [Jr.] called me and wanted to have lunch with me one day. [They] said they couldn’t do a thing with the Atlanta papers or the press. That everybody was laughing about Jimmy running for president. And so, I met with them and I said Look, I’m going to work to see if I can help line up some support for Jimmy Carter, and I think maybe we can do it. So, I went to see some of my friends in the newspapers, and television, radio, whatnot and told them that Jimmy Carter is running for president. He has no chance of being elected. It’s a waste of time and money, but he is a Georgian, and he’s the only Georgian we’ve had as a *bona fide* candidate for president. And I think we owe it to him and our state to be enthusiastically for him. Whether he wins, lose[s], or gets anywhere, that’s our job. And everybody finally got in there. I was the first fellow of any prominence who came out for Jimmy Carter in Georgia. And guess what he wrote me in February of ’76: “I really appreciate your help to me in Fort Lauderdale [Florida] Saturday evening and your support throughout the nation. Your superb reputation adds a very beneficial aura to my campaign. Your friend.”

Now getting back to the original thing, I never seriously thought of running for president. Although had I had my hometown, home state support, I probably could have cut a right good figure. There were several surveys made by *Fortune* magazine and others, which had me listed as probably the second most prominent man for the Democratic nomination. And many influential people, teachers, presidents of university and all said that I was the one man that could win the presidency and so forth. But how can you run a nation-

wide campaign when your popularity at home is not as high as it might be? But, I still say that by being a Georgian and by blazing the trail the national interests that I brought about in the South and in Georgia, and in Ellis Arnall, inure to the benefit a few years later to Jimmy Carter.

HENDERSON: There's some that would say that even if you desired the vice-presidency in '48, [Harry S.] Truman would never have let you have it for a couple of reasons. One, you opposed him at the convention in '44 when you supported Henry [Agard] Wallace. Two, you'd been critical of his domestic policy. Three, [James Vinson] Carmichael had been defeated and you had no power base in Georgia. And four, the southern conservatives were skittish of you.

ARNALL: I think the last two points are valid points, that the difficulty was that I had no administration in Georgia to give me the Georgia delegation. And the fact that I was somewhat looked on with suspicion by some southern leaders. For example, my good friend Claude [Denson] Pepper, who was a great liberal, but he was real skittish because he was so committed to keeping the blacks in their place, you see. But the other things...[Telephone rings, Tape stops and starts]. The other thing that you mentioned, though, are not valid. For example, Truman and I were good friends, and he would have had no possible objection to me being vice president on the ticket with him. As a matter of fact, we became very close. I became much closer, if it's possible, to Truman than I was to [Franklin Delano] Roosevelt. He and I saw eye to eye. We didn't give a damn what somebody said, we did what we thought was right. And he was the greatest fellow on that that I ever saw. Later, as you

know, well, first of all, [Robert Emmet] Bob Hannegan was post-master general and head of the Democratic Party. And one day he called me to come down to Warm Springs [Georgia], he wanted to see me. They were issuing a Roosevelt memorial stamp, and he was postmaster general. And he told me there that Truman wanted me to be solicitor general of the United States with the commitment that he would make me attorney general as soon as he appointed [Thomas Campbell] Tom Clark, who was then attorney general, to the first vacancy on the Supreme Court. Anyway, I went up to see him, as he requested, and he laid out the program of what he was going to do and wanted me to be his attorney general. But this was the first step, and I accepted and bought a cut-away coat and striped pants, came home, told Mildred [Delaney Slemons Arnall] we were going to Washington [D.C.]; I'm going to be solicitor general. And she said Nothing doing. [She] said I'm pregnant. This is with Alice [Slemons Arnall] at the [mansion house?]. And said Second, I don't want to move to Washington; I've had enough politics anyway. She was tolerant of politics, but she said it was all sham and hypocrisy. She didn't like it. But in any event, I declined that. If I'd accepted it, we'd [would have] had Talmadge back in Georgia again, you see. He'd immediately would have run for the vacant seat, see. And Frank [Cleveland] Gross, who was a lieutenant governor, would have been active governor. But anyway I didn't accept that—

HENDERSON: Well, now, was it because of the pregnancy or because of your fear of Talmadge, or both?

ARNALL: Both. But basically because of my wife. [HENDERSON laughs] You want the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. The other was very important, but my wife's

decision was the dominant one, the one that controlled it. Then later, Truman was always after me to do something. He wanted to appoint me--I know there was a dispute that had gone on for years between Pakistan and India, on the boundary line over there. And he wanted me to go over there and settle that, and I told him I wasn't thinking of doing that. And so he got me to give him somebody and I gave him Frank [Porter] Graham, who was president of the University of North Carolina, who was a friend. He went over there and worked for a couple of years. He wanted me to be governor of Bavaria [Germany]--that's the biggest province in governing Munich and so forth, you know. And I went up there-- Kenneth [Claiborne] Royall was secretary of the Army and he flew the plane down here and got me--the presidential plane--and I went to the Pentagon and then went over to the White House. They wanted me to be civilian governor of Bavaria, and I thanked the president and Ken Royall and said I appreciate it but I'm tired of governing. I've governed four years and it was hard enough with even people can understand half-way English, much less German. [I] said, I don't want that. [HENDERSON chuckles] They said We want you to pick us a man. I said OK, I'll get Murray [Delos] Van Wagoner. Who was friend of mine, governor of Michigan. He and I were friends. And they named Murray, and he went over there and was civilian governor of Bavaria. And later, there were several situations in Africa, where they put in new governments in some of the African republics, and they wanted me to go down there representing this government. And I thanked them but I said I'm not interested in that. But, he was always after me, until finally, the price control job came up. And this time he really twisted my arm. [Michael Vincent] Mike DiSalle was head of the price control, price stabilization. And he was from Ohio, and he resigned to run for the Senate. And then he got me to agree to come up there for six months and we had a lot of fun.

But to show you the kind of guy Truman was—one day—well, let me go back. We got into a hassle about the steel prices. We had a division where we had an economic section and we gave any industry we took five years, the last five years, and we let them pick three of the best of the five and whatever average profit they made reflected their price. We would let them have [the profit] or increase it depending on whether they could make it at least that much profit, whether it was increase taxes or inventory costs or labor costs or what not. But if they could still make as much money on that average, and absorb this increase cost, we did it. So the first thing that happened, the wage board, which I didn't control--this was a public industry and the employees'--gave the steel workers an hourly wage increase. And so the minute they did that the steel barons came to me for a price increase. We applied the economic standards, I had not, Congress supplied them. They could have absorbed twice that much, you know, increase in price so the answer was no. But they were very persistent. Every weekend when I went to Newnan [Georgia], they'd be sitting out in my front yard waiting for me [HENDERSON chuckles]. Then the rail president of Bethlehem Steel [Company], the president of U.S. Steel [Company], all of them were out there in the yard, waiting. And I had to entertain them and be nice, but the answer was always no. I didn't do it. And it rocked along, it rocked along for several weeks and finally when they were persuaded I wasn't going to give them a price increase, even though no matter how much pressure they put on me, they said they would go stoke the—no, close the furnaces, shut down the furnaces on steel mills so they couldn't make any steel. We were at war, alleged war, wasn't called war but we were at the Korean situation; we needed steel. The next thing I knew I stayed at the Lee House in Washington, which was an offbeat hotel so I didn't run into people always trying to get me to raise prices and all that. I got a call at the Lee House

from Charles E. [Edward] Wilson. This is not the General Motors [Corporation] Charles [Erwin Wilson], who said anything's good for General Motors is good for the country. This is Charles E. Wilson, president of General Electric [Company] who was price stabilizer—I mean economic stabilizer. So, Charlie Wilson called me at the Lee House and he said I'm down here in Miami [Florida], I just met with [Benjamin Franklin] Ben Fairless, president of U.S. Steel, the rail and all of them and I promised them five dollars and sixty cents a ton price increase. And I want you to draw it up and give it to them and sign it in the morning. And I said Charlie, I'm not going to do it. I said My rules are that we apply the same standards to everyone. Just because someone is big and exerts force, we're not going to break the rules for them. The answer is no, I'm not going to sign it. Well, he said I've done exactly what President Truman asked me to do and I want to—I'm going to call him and set up an appointment if its convenient, and can you meet us there in the morning? I said Sure, call me back.

So he calls back and said President Truman would meet us at his office at eight o'clock the next morning. So we go over there and when we walk in the oval room, his office, he said Boys, what's the problem? And I said Mr. President, there is no problem. There's a clash of ideology and philosophy between Charlie and me. He said What's that? I said He's for the big man and I'm for the little man. Well, Truman never heard another word. I mean that fixed it: big man, little man. We sat down and Charlie turned white and said Mr. President, that's not it. He said I went down to Miami, met last night, flew all night to get back up here. [I met] with the steel presidents, and I gave them, agreed to give them, a price increase of five dollars and sixty cents a ton and Governor Arnall won't pass all of it. And he said I did exactly what you told me to do. Well, President Truman unbuttoned his

vest and pointed his finger at him and said Charlie, I want to ask you a question. And Charles E. Wilson was a devoted church man, he wouldn't think of playing poker but Truman said Do you play poker? He said No sir, I don't play poker. And then Charlie said Well, that's your trouble. [HENDERSON laughs] And Truman said to Charlie, Well, that's your trouble right there. You don't play poker. I didn't tell you to roll over and play dead. Thereupon Wilson turned green, white, and yellow and jumped up out of his chair and said You can have my resignation, Mr. President. And Truman said I accept it. And he turned to me and said I want you to be economic stabilizer, Governor. And I said I'm not going to do it. I feel badly enough to get this good man out of the government, and I'm not going to take the job. He said Will you get me someone? And I said Yes, I'd be glad to. So we did.

But I tell you that, now I was over there, so then the next thing Truman said—so then the steel mills banked their furnaces. That's what they call it, banking the furnaces. And we had no steel pretty much, and then Truman called me and said Come over here. [He] said What are we going to do? And I said Well, I've been thinking about that. What we're going to do. You're going to seize the steel mills. He said How will we do that? I said Well, you pass an order, get the attorney general to tell you, but the way I think you ought to name the secretary of commerce, Charles Sawyer, put him in charge of the steel mills. And in the morning run up the American flag on every one and just continue to work right on, to hell with the presidency and the hierarchy. So that's what he did. Well, the country got up in arms. There was all kind of ruckus about it. But we stood firm and one day I was over there during the steel strike helping him write a speech. He was going on the radio, television, to the public about the steel prices. And I was there and he said Governor, I've got to excuse myself a minute. He said I'm going out here to the Rose Garden [White House, Washington,

D.C.]. We've got a meeting, a convention of the newspaper editors here. And they're in the Rose Garden and I'm supposed to go out and speak to them, which I will, shake hands with them. But I'll be back in a minute, so I'm not leaving. So when he came back, he sat down and said Whew, I really wound up one little ol' newspaper editor's clock. [HENDERSON chuckles] I said What do you mean, Mr. President? Well he said You know these newspaper editors. They think they know everything in the world, and they live above the world in sequestered offices. And yet they tell everybody what the problems of the world are and the solutions. He said They think they know everything in the world. This little editor, smart, pass fellow that he was, said Mr. President, you seized the steel mills. Do you think you can seize the press? [HENDERSON laughs] And he said I looked at him and said Friend, if the press needs seizing, I'm the fellow who can seize 'em and will. Well, I said Oh, they going to give you unshaded hell. And he said Look, they ain't nothing to me. He said Do you know I am the only man with executive authority, elected by all the people of the United States. [He] said Senators and congressmen have their constituencies; mine is a constituency of the whole nation. And I'm going to do what I damn well think is best come hell or high water. And he did. This is the type man he was. But our friendship was very close and we were very good friends. And I think he made a very, very great president because he never considered the political consequences. He didn't stick to them. He did what he felt was right. And he had loyalty. You know he grew up out of the [Thomas Joseph] Pendergast machine, but when Pendergast died he went to his funeral! And most people would've run. But he was a courageous fellow and a good man. He was a great guy, and I loved him very much. And I knew his wife [Elizabeth Virginia Wallace (Bess) Truman] well. I escorted her to some World Series games and things like that. We were always—it

was a good group. I say as much as I was devoted to Roosevelt, the man in my own heart was Truman who was a man who had the courage, irrespective of consequences, to do what he instinctively believed was right.

HENDERSON: Governor, let me change directions again. There's been several reasons put forth for your decline in Georgia politics. And I want to go through some of these and let you respond to these.

ARNALL: All right. OK.

HENDERSON: The first one that usually comes up is that you were too liberal on the race issue, and this undercut your popularity in Georgia. How do you deal with that?

ARNALL: I would agree with that. I think that was the beginning of the loss, or rather the blow that caused my loss of political prestige and popularity was the fact that I supported the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States that the blacks, as citizens, had a right to participate in the white primary. There is no such thing as a white primary, [to] deprive them of their constitutional rights. And second, that the courts held that they were entitled to first-class citizenship, which I believed. And if I had wanted to take the other position on race and say you're either white or black and I'm white, as [Eugene] Gene Talmadge did, and said the place of—I know how to treat a “nigger.” Let him come to the back door with his hat in his hand and say yes, sir—had I done that, I could have dominated Georgia politics for many

years to come, but I couldn't because it's just my nature not to. I'll play politics on little things, but on fundamentals I can't. I'll attribute the loss of popularity basically to that.

HENDERSON: All right. Now another argument that's used, and particularly this was used by the Talmadge faction. They always reminded Georgia voters that you supported Henry Wallace at the '44 Democratic [national] convention.

ARNALL: Well, I don't think that had—that was a very insignificant thing, in my judgment. I supported Henry Wallace for vice president because Roosevelt asked me to. I went to Washington when the political situation was heating up and asked President Roosevelt if he was going to run for the fourth term, and he told me he was. He said I'm in the position—we're at war—as a soldier in the ranks. I carry out office and if the people want me to run, I will run. I will not deny them the right to have me run. And said Mr. President, can I announce that when I leave the White House. And he said You can. So, that was the first definite statement ever made about Roosevelt being a candidate for the fourth term. I announced that at the White House after I had left his office. At that same meeting, I said Now Mr. President, who do you want for vice president? And he said I want Henry Wallace for vice president. So, I said, OK. You've helped me in my politics. I'm going to help you in yours. I'm going to go back home and line up the Georgia delegation for you and Wallace. Well, in those days as governor, I was chairing the delegation and I named the delegation. They did what I wanted done or else they got off the delegation. We didn't have all this voting. It was a unit group, majority or whoever it was that was it and I was the majority. [HENDERSON chuckles] So, he said he wanted Henry Wallace, so I started.

Now, nobody in Georgia was for Wallace, maybe a few serving on the delegation, but I made 'em, 'cause I had the control, come along with me. And not only were we for Wallace but I made the seconding speech for him, second speech at the national convention. Had they let us vote that night after my speech and after the procedure, Wallace would have easily been nominated. Samuel [Dillon] Jackson was the chairman, and he adjourned the meeting, although the vote was almost ninety percent for continuing, but he said the other had it and it would quit and that was the end of it.

The Wallace people, me and the Wallace people, had the auditorium of the convention hall stacked with labor union people. We had all the galleries stacked and they were hollering. We had all the [HENDERSON chuckles] crowd with us. But when they adjourned, Samuel Jackson adjourned the meeting, until the next day, that night they quick twisted arms and made commitments and whatnot until in the next vote Wallace led the next day, but then gradually they switched over until they switched to Truman. I think [James Francis] Jimmy Byrnes was a candidate... But in any event, Bob Hannegan called me down under the stage in the little office kind of thing and he showed me a letter from the president that if he were a member of the delegation—a delegate—he would vote for Wallace. But then he showed me another letter [that] said that either Truman or I've forgotten whether it was Byrnes, who else it was, would be acceptable to me as a vice presidential running mate.

HENDERSON: Was it [William Orville (Bill)] Douglas?

ARNALL: I don't know if it was Bill Douglas or not, I've forgotten, but it's in the records. So he said You see, he's not a delegate to the convention, so he wouldn't vote for Wallace.

But here's where either one of these—and I said Listen, Bob. Roosevelt asked me to vote and support Wallace. Now, if he wants to call me and tell me not to, I'll quit. He was in the Pacific. He said You know, he said he can't get you. I said Well, I'm not going to do it. I'm going to stick to my commitment, which I did. And Wallace was not elected.

When the president returned from the Pacific, he called me asked me to come to the White House. He wanted to talk to me. First thing, he wanted to apologize or try to explain how I was left on the limb for Wallace, that his—and I said Look, don't—it's perfectly all right with me. I did what I told you to, what you asked me to do, and I am perfectly happy. And then he went into a long song and dance about how people change their minds and how he as president, if he gets information or changes his conclusion about who would be the most acceptable, that he'd have to do it no matter what commitments were and all that. And I said Sure. He said For example, if somebody makes a political pledge and promise and later they find information that would make the carrying out of that pledge or promise detrimental to the welfare of the nation, they've got to change. I said I agree; no problem. I believe in a representative government. No problem. But I said You ought to do something for Wallace. He said Well, what do you think I ought to do? I said I don't know. He said Well, he can have anything he wants. You go see him and let me know what he wants. So I ran down Henry Wallace and talked with him, and he said he'd like to be secretary of commerce. So I went back to the White House and told the president that Wallace said that he would like to be secretary of commerce. And I remember it as though it were yesterday. Roosevelt did this: he said There goes my good friend Jesse [Holman] Jones.

[HENDERSON laughs] And he went.

Wallace later visited me at the mansion. We got along fine. But my break with Wallace came when he began to speak well of Russia. And I was of the opinion that this was a terrible thing to do. And he was against the Truman Doctrine, which I was strong for. So, we broke. I do not attach great significance, however, to any loss of popularity I had to the Wallace escapade. It didn't help me with popularity, but that was not the thing that cost me the strong position of leadership in politics and prestige and authority and support that I had. It was purely the race issue.

HENDERSON: Will it be fair to characterize what happened in 1944 as your first major defeat as governor? Up to this time, you had had very great success with the legislature; you seemed to be—everything you did wound up turning out OK...

ARNALL: Well, now wait. '44 was in the middle of my term.

HENDERSON: Um-hm.

ARNALL: Was that my first defeat on what?

HENDERSON: Would you consider this your first defeat, political defeat?

ARNALL: Oh, the Wallace thing?

HENDERSON: Um-hm.

ARNALL: Yeah, it was the first time I didn't win, but I carried out a request of the president, and I didn't feel I'd lost anything. As a matter of fact, I endeared myself to the president, who really mattered.

HENDERSON: But...

ARNALL: Yes, the answer is yes. That's the first time I ever lost a great public issue.

HENDERSON: All right. You say you don't think it had any impact on you in the state?

ARNALL: No, I didn't say that. I said, it had some [impact], but the race issue, supporting the courts, was a primary thing. It had some, yes.

HENDERSON: OK.

ARNALL: What was the third one?

HENDERSON: All right, the third one was, and this is—I'm not debating the merits of it—this is what it is: that as you began to look toward national office you began to forget about your grassroots contacts that you'd build up over the years and eventually that led to your demise.

ARNALL: I am amazed at any doubt that as I began to go all over the country speaking and whatnot that I had less time to devote to local contacts. I don't think there's any doubt about that. You can just be so many places at once. And I thought that I had fulfilled my preordained destiny of being governor of Georgia and now it was time to move into other things; yes. I do think that was one of the things that was—[unintelligible]—didn't have time to engage in local politics and keep my local support alive and contacts and friends; yes.

HENDERSON: Do you think the fact that you wrote those two books and went on the nationwide lecture tour and whatever you said outside the state was perceived back in the state by a lot of people as derogatory? Did that hurt you?

ARNALL: I've never [had] any doubt many people who criticized my books [had] never read 'em. [There isn't] nothing in there that is heresy; they're good books. And if I was going to write them today, I wouldn't change a word of 'em. But I do think that the more publicity I got in the magazines and newspapers, radio, television, the more that I got from outside the state which was favorable, the more suspect they were in the state that I was teaching heathen doctrines.

HENDERSON: Now I want to make sure I understand you correctly. Are you saying that when you engaged in the lecture series, that it was not for the intent of trying to build you up as a vice-presidential candidate, but that it was primarily to make money?

ARNALL: It had two—well, that was right. But also, if there were other benefits, such as increased public esteem here, there and yonder, or a build up for some public office, that came with it. But I started out because it was a financial arrangement.

HENDERSON: Well, let me ask you this--

ARNALL: You'd be interested in one other thing perhaps, getting back to my lecture and stuff. I began this lecture business when I was in the governor's office. And I would be out quite a bit speaking and whatnot, and they paid me well. And some of my critics said that it wasn't right for me to be governor and be out speaking making honorariums and lecture fees and whatnot. So I came back in one day and we had a press conference, not about that, but generally, somebody in the press corps asked me, said Do you think it's right for you as governor to be out speaking and making money? I said Of course I do. I said I'm giving the state a good name, good image, helping that. And second, all the money I make, after I pay expenses, I give to charities. And they said What charities do you give it to? I said My wife and children. [HENDERSON laughs] And the papers said hooray. Instead of being critical, they thought it was funny.

HENDERSON: Let me come back to your reputation as being liberal on the race issue. Besides allowing blacks to vote in the white primary, where were you liberal on the race issue? You supported segregation. You came out against the poll tax, but Gene Talmadge and [Richard Brevard] Russell [Jr.] and various other people were also against that.

ARNALL: Well, Hal, I was a progressive, liberal, conscientious, call it what you will on the race issue, in that I wanted first-class citizenship for all our people. And first-class citizenship embraces all the rights and privileges of the citizens, not restricted to voting. Such as holding jobs, such as pay, such as economic welfare—as a matter of fact, my concept of the problems we had in the South was purely poverty. And the reason we had poverty here was because the freight rates were so jettisoned that we could not be industrialists here. We couldn't compete; the freight rates were so excessive. And so we were agricultural. As I like to say we were draws of water and hewers of timber. And because of the lack of income property, we lacked adequate education. We lacked adequate job opportunities and so forth. I think the greatest thing that happened to the South was the fact that we were able to bring about the equalization of transportation rates, which enabled the South and the West to become industrialized. No longer were we just an agricultural economy. I think that was good and that brought with it jobs. So when I say first-class citizenship, probably one of the great freedoms we have and privileges is economic welfare. You know, you may have asked someone in a soup line kitchen in the—kitchen line in the Great Depression, Are you free? And they're the hungry. I'd say No, you're not free, you're not free. So I would not restrict my belief in first-class citizenship for all the people simply to voting. That's *one* of the privileges of first-class citizenship, but economic welfare is another. And being regarded as an integral part of the economy—

HENDERSON: Well, now, did you see—

ARNALL: With Georgia, with a third of our people black, we could never have a successful economy unless they participated in it.

HENDERSON: But now, nowhere in your books is there--and I could be wrong--but I don't think there is any attack on segregation; it's a denial of the first-class citizenship.

ARNALL: No, No.

HENDERSON: Now, how do you reconcile that—the first-class citizenship?

ARNALL: Well, if you'll read *Inside U.S.A.* by John [J.] Gunther, you'll see how one night I took him--he was visiting me--and I took him down to Auburn Avenue and all we saw there were black citizens. And then we rode down Peachtree [Street], up in front of Davidson's [department store] along there, and all we saw were white. And I said Now, John, why aren't these blacks over there with the whites and the whites down here? There's no law against that. I said The only conclusion I can reach is that most whites would rather be with whites and most blacks with blacks. And I still think that's true today. We've got black undertakers; they don't go to white undertakers. We've got black preachers; they don't go to white preachers. I've never understood, for example the drive for Negro colleges. I want all blacks to get a good education, but I don't know why there should be black schools or white schools. There ought to be colleges, I believe. Now, there's a little of that, you know. I don't think that integration is the answer to anything. I think it ought to be the *right* to integrate. But whether you pick your own friends today, I don't pick them for you. The

government's not going to pick them for you. So, and another thing that you asked me to say on the race issue--if there is an issue, which there is--I'm concerned that when I talk about first-class citizenship and equality of opportunity and equality of the good things in life and so forth, I'm talking about the scales of justice being blind. And I'm a little concerned, today, that maybe justice is not blind. Maybe at one time there was a discrimination against blacks. I'm concerned, sometimes, that there may be discrimination against whites. I think that should have nothing to do with it, whether you're white or black. It ought to be your qualifications and so forth and so forth. But I'm afraid, sometimes, that it isn't true today. I'm concerned about that. The pendulum may have swung too far.

HENDERSON: So, coming back to this question about you being a liberal on the race issue. After the *Brown [v. Board of Education]* decision in '54, you made a statement in November '54 that the state could engage in delaying tactics through the courts to preserve segregation of the South for a hundred years.

ARNALL: But we didn't.

HENDERSON: No, but my question is—

[Cassette: Side 2]

ARNALL: ...any sentence from a lot of conversation and blow it up out of all proportion; you can pick out any sentence in a book. Blow it out of all proportion. The test came out of

the *Brown* case, when I had available to me access to the courts--all I had to do was tell the attorney general to file a suit and delay this and delay this or call the legislature into special session and pass a law delaying it. But I didn't do it because I took the position that as far as I'm concerned, we're going to follow and abide by the edicts in the courts. So, no matter what I said that it could've been done, maybe it could have been done. Herman tried to do it; the Talmadges tried to do it; Vandiver tried to do it. And I could've tried, but that was foreign to me. So I don't think that that sentence, taken out of context, if it is, are asserted[?] to my actions. You know and I know and everyone knows who's familiar with Georgia political history, that I was crucified because of the—of my position in getting—in favoring first-class citizenship. All the other stuff is peanuts.

HENDERSON: Well, would it be fair to say that you believed in racial segregation and that you would not do anything to bring about its demise?

ARNALL: Well, I think it's fair to say I grew up, as everybody in the South did, I suppose, in a segregated society. And no man can rise completely above his roots. These inborn, ingrown, inherited prejudices are there. And I'd say that the evil of segregation groups telling any group of our citizens [that] you cannot mix or mingle with another group of our citizens, you cannot have access to this or access to that... But given the right to mix and mingle or to have access, most of us don't want to mix and mingle beyond what we're used to. So, I don't think anybody that I've ever heard of comes into this world with set views and stays with them all the time. We change, conditions change, and attitudes and education

changes, and we are more educated and more cosmopolitan in our views. I think we've changed.

But, let me tell you this story and then I'm going to get off of this for a moment. When I was attorney general--you may have heard me tell this story-- it was my job among other things to draft legislation for members of the legislature. And there was a man that came into my office one day from a rural south Georgia county who said he was elected to the legislature on one promise: that he was going to do something to agriculture to make it more prosperous, that they were having a hard time down there. And he asked me to draft him a bill so he could introduce it, about wanted to get it in twenty minutes, introduce it, and pair up a committee. So I asked him how he proposed to do it and he said Well, [he] said You know more about drafting laws than I do. You know what I want. I just want to fix it to where farm business will be prosperous, farming, and agriculture. So, [he] said I'd sure like to get it and introduce it. So, I'm not to be outdone. [I] called the secretary in and dictated the bill and it went something like this, "The bill will be entitled enact to make agriculture in the State of Georgia prosperous and for other purposes. If enacted by the General Assembly, it is hereby enacted on authority of the same section one and on and after the passage of this act, agriculture in the State of Georgia will be in the same. We hereby declare to be prosperous. Section 2: All laws and partial laws in conflict with this act, being the same, I hereby repeal." Now we laugh about that, as how ridiculous it was, but now let me move into the race situation. We pass laws in the Congress and in the legislature and in the city council designed to remove hatred from the human heart, to remove bigotry from the human heart, to remove prejudice from the human mind. Can these things be done without an attitude that is inborn, inbred, ineducated [*sic*], and individual? I think not. And this is

probably the mistake I made in '66 in believing that bringing about first-class citizenship for blacks was accepted. I found out then and I say now, it's not accepted, generally. In the public press, yes. In the public laws, yes. But in the individual, heart and mind, in the ballot box, in the booth, I'm not yet certain it's accepted.

HENDERSON: Am I reading you right--Would you be, say, opposed to the Civil Rights Act of 1960?

ARNALL: No. No.

HENDERSON: Did you ever speak out or speak against it?

ARNALL: No. No. No.

HENDERSON: Did you ever have any relationship with Martin Luther King [Jr.]?

ARNALL: Yes.

HENDERSON: What was your relationship with him?

ARNALL: It was very good. In '66, we talked a lot and I am of the belief that he used his influence to help me in the relationship. And later on, as you know, Jimmy Carter became very close to [Martin Luther] Daddy King [Sr.], but Martin Luther—let me shock you when I

tell you this—the black leadership appreciated what I had done. I wore for years the coat with nails in it. I wore for years—felt the lash, the whip of public opinion. I’m the guy who blazed the trail. [Tape stops and starts] “Helen Douglas Mankin and I came along in the transition period when we were fighting for those things that have now come to pass. There was a time when the things for which we were speaking out were an anathema to the south. The more popular you were in the South, the more unpopular you were in the rest of the nation, and vice versa. But we have overcome this provincialism and the second-class citizenship, which kept the poor white down in the ditch with the black man because they were economic competitors. During that period, we were bravely condemned because we were upsetting what had always been the accepted southern pattern. Today a candidate for office no longer condemns the black man. But there was a time when that was the only way a candidate could get elected. Helen was one of the trailblazers in this transition period and therefore her bones rest on the beach. This is always true of anyone who leads a fight for change, no matter when the change comes. You cut your own throat because you buck what is accepted. And this, historically, has always been unpopular. But if that’s your nature, you’re going to do it anyway. Helen didn’t wait to see which was the big end of the political stick. I don’t mean she was completely oblivious to politics, but her downfall came because she didn’t wait out nor care which side was a big political side. She just did what she thought was right. The powerful turned on her, as they always do when you’re not servile to them. She was dangerous to them. She was an iconoclast who couldn’t be controlled. The powerful have traditionally supported someone from the other side of the track, only so long as they would do their bidding, the bidding the powerful. And Helen wouldn’t do anybody’s bidding. She was independent. Anyone in this world who takes strong positions as she did,

has many strong admirers and many powerful enemies. The conditions that led to Jimmy Carter's acceptance and election as an American president were conditions Helen Mankin Douglas played an important part in bringing about. Carter came along when these changes were accepted. They had been accomplished. The people who ought to get accolades employed it so those who fought to bring about the conditions which are now here. Not those who now simply enjoy these conditions. It takes no courage to do that." And that's saying what I'm—all I'm talking about her, but I'm talking about me there too. Anybody can—you know, it's the trailblazers that get the hell knocked out of them. [HENDERSON chuckles] But that's the thing of it. If I had to do it over again, I'd do it that way. What fun would it be just sitting there holding public opinion and having I think two good guys, George [Dekle] Busbee and Joe Frank Harris. They're good guys, but what fun did they have?

HENDERSON: [Laughing] You're right.

ARNALL: And there, when history's written, what have they accomplished? That's what I want to tell you. Now you can show that tape to state government, go to the capital and everything over there is not better. They haven't changed it any. It's just like it was. We reorganized the same, talked about creating all the constitutional boards, agencies, merit system--everything. You know what I'm saying? And that's the fun I get out of it. And that's what I want told. With all the criticism, but still I want to talk.

HENDERSON: Let me come back to King for one moment. His tactic was civil disobedience.

ARNALL: Right.

HENDERSON: And sometimes when you bring up the word civil disobedience among lawyers, they have high blood pressure because they say “no, no, no.”

ARNALL: Right.

HENDERSON: What kind of reaction did you have to that?

ARNALL: Let me hasten to say, let's not get confused with the project and the means which are employed to accomplish the project. I am not a believer in civil disobedience. I was a believer in the project, the goal, of first-class citizenship for all the people. Sometimes one person will carry out a group, a procedure to accomplish a goal that another group owns. I do not believe in civil disobedience. If that were true, we would have no law, we would have no order in the United States. I do not believe in it. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s fight was for his people, first-class citizenship. And the civil disobedience was merely a prong of the discrimination and the imbalance of law used against them. But on the other hand, if a law is wrong, I think the way you change it is through political influence and not through civil disobedience, and strikes, and sit-ins and all that stuff. I don't believe in that; that's a method. So don't confuse the goal, the accomplishment of the goal, the goal with the way

you proceed. One other thing I—the reason that used to be so popular in the South and we grew up in that era--I did--to kick the black was because we had him handcuffed to a tree. He couldn't vote against you, couldn't do—what'd you have to lose by kicking him? But now they don't kick him publicly; they may privately, but they don't do it publicly.

[Telephone Rings. Tape stops and starts]

HENDERSON: ...Benjamin [Elijah] Mays' autobiography?

ARNALL: No, sir.

HENDERSON: He's got a page or two in there about you, and he's sympathizing with the liberals in the South but he's saying that even back then they were still part of the problem. He's quoting that you were writing him a letter—

ARNALL: --and said I didn't use "Mister" to him. Yeah, yeah, I'm familiar with that.

Well, that was at a time when, that would have been sacro--that would have been violating all the rules of sacrosanctness, because you didn't refer to a black man as a Mister or a black woman as a Miss or Ms.; you do now. But that was just another of the... If I as governor had written something up before I took my position and the courts acted that way, they would've, they'd photocopy that and put it in the paper. You didn't do that. And let me hasten to say one other thing. I've got a pet peeve against the word "spouse." I think you either have a wife or a husband, if it's a woman. And spouse sounds like to me a mouse, a roof, or something. I don't know what in the hell would do that. I raised hell in here the

other day. Some of my people came in wanted to have my spouse's name. I said Hell, I don't have a spouse. I've got a wife. [HENDERSON chuckles] Another one that—what were we talking after dinner?

HENDERSON: Benjamin Mays.

ARNALL: Oh, another one that I don't say much about it, but I think it's the lowest damn term you can use: "Mister." Anybody's a mister. [I don't know] why in the hell we don't eliminate it. It's either a man or a woman and the women are getting around it pretty good. They doing away with "Miss" and "Mrs." It's M-S [Ms.] and you don't have any problem. But, back in those days—I'm familiar with what you're quoting because I've seen that quote in many places and I knew it too--no, you didn't do that. However, I'm going to add one other thing and this is not in any justification that today you wouldn't think of doing it, but then you did. You did a lot of things then you wouldn't do now. A lot of things now you wouldn't have done then. Who would have thought about going into a restaurant and eating with a black person? They'd have cow-hided you; run you out on a rail. Now you don't think anything of it. Times change. The only thing that's unchangeable is change; it changes.

But getting back to the letter writing. You would remember this and know this: the governor doesn't write letters. He has a big staff. He don't ever see one out of a hundred letters. He'd never have time to sit down[?] and read. If it's something urgent, important they'll bring it to you, but normally you don't know what is done in your name. But I'm sure if I'd done it I would have done it that way. So there's no excuse. It gets back that I don't

ever remember that and I doubt if I ever saw it. But still, I would have done it because that was the system then. Or, I may have called him “Doctor” [HENDERSON chuckles]. He [Mays] was a good man, and we were good friends.

HENDERSON: OK. Did you ever have any ambitions to go to the [United States] Senate?

ARNALL: No. None at all. The two places I have never had any ambition to fool with and wouldn't: Congress and the Senate. I think [as] governor, you're the head of the state. You don't have to ask permission; you can call the shots. If you are in the Congress or in the legislature, you're just one of a group. In Georgia, you're one of 205, I believe, in the House or something. And then in Washington, [if] you win the Senate, you're one of 100. And if you're in the House [of Representatives], you're one of what, 450, something like that. No, I hate to say this. But I will say it. Ninety percent of a congressman or senator's duty is running errands for his constituents. Some years ago, and I won't say who this congressman, then from my district was, but many years ago, someone asked me when we started this law firm why we didn't have an office in Washington. We have one now. And I said Because, what do I want an office for? I've got a senator and a congressman who'll run errands for me. That's what it amounts to. And they are judged by representing their people there, getting things done, and whatnot. They don't have much time to fool with legislation. They have to, but they don't have help. They have a staff that does that [unintelligible]. No, I've had no ambition to go to Washington as a senator or a congressman.

And second, as you know, under our system of government, if you want to go to Congress or the Senate to have great influence, you have to have seniority. You got to be

there a hell of a long time. If you're there long enough you can cut some figure, but I've never been impressed with the Senate. Although they're essential, I wouldn't discount them, but I've never had any ambition.

HENDERSON: Now then, two institutions that we've already indicated: One of them was segregation that a Georgia politician [who went there was attacked?]. The other was a county unit system. How'd you feel about the county unit system?

ARNALL: I would not have raised my voice against it--and didn't--but I knew it was ultimately going down the drain, just like I think the electoral college ultimately will go down the drain--national electoral college. Now, having said that, I hasten to add one other thing. Maybe in retrospect the unit system is not too bad after all in that it gave people in the small towns and rural communities much influence in legislation. You see, at that time, we had each county had representatives, too, not on the unit system, I'm talking about that. Today with all these districts, very few of us know what district we're in or who our senator represents. As knowledgeable as I am in politics, I don't know. It's all crisscrossed and I don't know how the court could knock out the unit system and keep the electoral system, in fact. Now, I hasten to say this: I'm opposed, although you hear a lot about consolidating of counties; I'm opposed to that. If the people in Tift County [Georgia] want to give up the county, that's their privilege. But as far as somebody in Atlanta telling them to consolidate their counties, I'm against that. I think the more local government we can have, the better. And I think the more people can be identified with their government, the better. One of the terrible ordeals of living in the city—you've probably heard me say this. I live on the North

side [of Atlanta?] but we have to go out to vote or anything, or register or get tags or whatever you do--way up to the end of the county, nearly to Gainesville, Georgia. I like local government. The unit system had to go, but I had no deep feeling. Let me say this: in '42 when they had a unit system, I ran under the unit system. [I] got elected. In '66 when they didn't have the unit system, I ran on the popular vote system. [I] led the ticket in the first Democratic primary. Whatever the rules are, you have to follow. This business of representation, getting one man-one vote so his vote will not be diluted gets to be awfully technical, awfully technical. It's not a simple question.

HENDERSON: Was one of the reasons you decided to end with the '66 election was the demise of the county unit system?

ARNALL: No.

HENDERSON: That had no bearing on you?

ARNALL: No, not at all, not at all. It had to do purely with the proposition that I thought the great reforms that I had spearheaded had come to reality. And I missed my guess because I'd been reading the metropolitan papers, television, *Newsweek*, and had not been in as close touch with the rural sections as I should have been. You see, irrespective of the unit system, the strength Maddox had on the race issue was in rural Georgia. So, they're still powerful. The cities are powerful, more powerful, but still they had a lot of political strength--no, the

unit system was just the method. If they'd had a Kubash[?] system, I would run under that if the time came. It wasn't the unit system. I didn't think it helped or hurt me either way.

HENDERSON: Well now, looking back on it in '62, [Samuel] Marvin Griffin [Sr.] whose administration was tainted with corruption--

ARNALL: Right.

HENDERSON: --seeks a comeback. One could make the argument, [it] looks like it had been better for you to make the effort to have a comeback in '62 rather than '66.

ARNALL: It may have been but I wasn't interested. I didn't draw the fortune cookie 'til '65. [HENDERSON and ARNALL laugh]. I showed it to you. You just get, in this book, get out of your mind I'm dedicated to this belief. Whether anybody else believes it or not. I'm a great believer in fate, chance, circumstance. And maybe something happens and we construe it as we will, maybe it does. But the governorship was just as certain to me as tomorrow is another day. And I worked along and the '66 thing, I'd always played with it. I thought it would be nice to be governor again after fifteen, twenty years, nineteen years. To see the machinery still there I put in, the state, see what's happening and so forth. But the thing that really cemented my mind to go on and do it was this damn fortune cookie. It said I was going to be placed in authority. So, I said OK, I'll accept the challenge, but I misread that one. That was the time we got bad luck. Although, maybe this is being a Pollyanna-- maybe we're all a Pollyanna, maybe if we have bad luck we accept it and say well, it was

really good luck. Maybe it was a wonderful thing that I didn't get elected in '66--see this is being Pollyannaish. What did it have to offer me [that] I hadn't had? And second I was reasonably well off in business, law. I was enjoying life. I'd been governor. Why in the world did I want to do it again? I wonder about that, except that I kind of subconsciously wanted to believe that I could collect the fruits of the fights that I'd made. That these things had come into reality, and I thought it would be nice to harvest the crop.

HENDERSON: Governor, one of the problems that I think we people are trying to look in to you people that have been in power is that sometimes we don't know the right questions to ask. And sometimes—I think there's a lot that goes on back there that we're never exposed to.

ARNALL: Right, that's right.

HENDERSON: And maybe it's because the people involved don't want to bring it up.

ARNALL: Right.

HENDERSON: Let me ask you a very loaded question.

ARNALL: All right.

HENDERSON: Is there something about your administration that hasn't been brought out in any papers or anything that you think should be discussed or is there anything that—any skeletons in your closet?

ARNALL: I don't know a thing. We had an honest administration. Whatever the critics said, I never heard anyone say that we had any scandal or dishonesty in the administration. I ran it that way. As I told you earlier, I was very selfish. I didn't want my reputation tarnished by somebody else's misdoings. And if I got a wind that somebody wasn't straight, out they went, you know.

HENDERSON: Does some of that go back to the problems Ed Rivers had with his administration?

ARNALL: Of course.

HENDERSON: Or if it was at your own place?

ARNALL: Of course. I've seen, I've seen how somebody didn't control their people and how they got in the ditch. He was indicted, you know. Oh, no, yeah, sure. That had a hell of a lot to do with it. I'd seen it, and I made sure to stay away from any appearance of wrongdoing or any wrongdoing of anything. Though, I don't know of any skeleton in the closet. It was wide open. As a matter of fact, I will say this. I know that many businessmen distrust politicians. Sometimes the word politician is used with a sneer; it's a term of

aversion. And yet I say this: that I've been in business; I've been in politics. And I will say, in my experience and observation, there is less corruption and wrongdoing in politics than there is in business. This doesn't mean we don't read more about corruption and misdoing in politics, but the reason is the spotlight's on the politician. And the news media is quick, probably, to expose them. Whereas the spotlight is not on business to the same extent. I've had business people come to me and say that they wanted something done in the legislature, something. And [they] said now You know anybody we can bribe, you let me know. I said Good God, we don't bribe people in the legislature. But that's the concept many business people have of people in politics--that they are to be bought and sold. That's not true. I think the press does a good service in keeping the spotlight on them. Today, when I was governor, we had a reception room, then we had my office, and then behind that we had the bathroom. And if people waited an hour to get to my office, they got there, they thought they were going to see me but they had to wait another hour to get in the bathroom to see me. And that's the way we did it. [HENDERSON chuckles] Well, I frequently said today, with mass media such as it is and television and all, that if a politician goes to the bathroom they have a TV camera there, taking his picture. Life has gotten complicated. But from my standpoint of administration, let me say this: I thought we had a good administration. We left our imprint on the state. As [Ellis Merton] Coulter says in his *History of Georgia*: "No one could come to Georgia where the South—Georgia's always been ridiculed and held up to contempt. No one could come to Georgia now without plans or praise because of the youthful government who was [unintelligible]." It was not perfect, but how can politics be perfect? Politics is compromise, quite a bit. But I think that my own footnote would be that if I had to do it over I wouldn't change it a bit. That playing with running for governor again,

it was essential to keep it dangling there. Or I'd be a dead duck. And that, yet, not have to be governor.

The only thing I—well, the '66 game plan, whether I should have run for that and whether or not we should have had the write-in vote or whether I should have stopped it. Lester Maddox, one night, called me in Newnan and said Governor, if you don't stop this write-in vote, they're going to beat me. And I said Lester, I didn't start it and I'm not going to stop it. I think it elected him, although he would probably say other things. The '66 game plan—I had been out of touch with the grass roots politics too long. In politics, the politicians still run politics. But I still have no regrets about doing it. And it probably, from a Pollyanna standpoint, it was best that I didn't win because it was an acclaim to nothing. I would have always been competing against my other administration. And there wasn't as much to do. See I came along at a time when these changes were ready. But now do I need a change? I don't know. Now, what do you need Hal?

[End of Interview]

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