HENDERSON: All right, Governor. We’ve got it now.

ARNALL: All right.

HENDERSON: All right. Now let me ask you the question again, I apologize for that. Prior to being governor, had you ever advocated changing the constitution of 1877?

ARNALL: No, I had not. For the reason that I had a definite platform on which I was elected governor. And that platform contained the program that was popular with the people at that time. They were incensed that the University System of Georgia had lost its accredited rating by interference from the then-governor Eugene Talmadge. They were incensed about the so-called “Pardon Racket” and other such things. And these along with eight other platform planks were in my program, and I was concerned about not having too many things to talk about but to emphasize the things that were the pressing issues in Georgia at that time. So I did not mention or think about revising the constitution or adopting a new constitution to supplant the constitution of 1877, while I was a candidate for governor in 1942, and when I took office January the twelfth, 1943.
Later, after the legislature had enacted all of my program and they did it for the most part unanimously, I was concerned about what I would keep the legislature doing at the next regular session, which was to convene in January of 1945. So, toward the end of the 1943 regular session, I decided that it would be a good idea to bring forth a new constitution since the constitution of 1877 was outdated and was not in step with the times. And there were so many amendments that had been made to it, it was unwieldy and bulky. And I conceived the idea that it would be a good thing to adopt a new constitution to the state of Georgia. And so it was then that I had the legislature, at the close or toward the close of the 1943 session, adopt a provision setting up a constitutional commission. And there were a number of men, of members of the House named by the speaker. And there were a number of senators named by the then-president of the Senate. And I, as governor, had the privilege of naming quite a few who were outside of the legislative ranks. And the constitutional commission met and elected me chairman.

Now, there was a very interesting situation in my mind that was not talked about publicly and that was the constitution of the 1877, as I recall it, provided that it could be replaced only by convening a constitutional convention, which could draw up a new constitution and submit it to the people. There was no provision that the legislature could do this. But I was distrustful of a large constitutional convention. I was concerned that instead of me controlling what was going on, the special interests seeking special privilege would take over the convention, and I was worried about that. So, I adopted a unique program that had never been done before: to have the legislature create the commission that the commission work to submit a proposed new constitution to the next regular session the legislature in January of 1945. And let the legislature spend that session arguing about it and hopefully adopting the constitution to submit to the people. That had the benefit of letting me control what was going on as governor
and not let outside interests through a convention control it, and second, it would keep the legislature busy all that session and keep them from passing some non-necessary laws or getting into trouble. So, it worked out just splendidly. Now, here is the thing that was not understood by many. Since the constitution of 1877 said a new constitution would be adopted only through a constitutional convention, what we proposed through the commission that was going to write the new constitution and submit it to the legislature for adoption and then to the people for adoption, we proposed that the new constitution be submitted as an amendment to the constitution of 1877. And as I recall it, we maintained only the preamble of the 1877 constitution. And we put through the whole new constitution as an amendment to the old constitution. So the constitution of 1945 became in effect a brand new constitution, but actually the procedure to get it ratified by the legislature and adopted by the people was that it would be an amendment to the constitution of 1877. Now I was very much concerned as governor, although I didn’t talk about this, that the courts may hold that the unique and novel procedure that I’d hit upon and the constitution commission agreed to and the legislature agreed to, that it may be unconstitutional because we were amending—we were creating a new constitution through an amendment to the old, and there was no provision in the constitution of 1877 for any such procedure since we didn’t go through the constitutional convention route. And in order to be sure that no court was going to upset what we did, I resorted to a right devious device in recommending to the commission, the legislature, that all the judges in Georgia were underpaid, and we ought to fix our salary increases in the new constitution, which they did. They did it because they needed the increase; it was only proper and right. But the underlying purpose, on my part, was to disqualify all the judges in Georgia so they could not rule the procedure, unique that it was, that we had adopted that I’d envisioned that it was not unconstitutional. So since all
the judges had an interest in the new constitution since their salaries were increased, Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Superior Court, while we were safe in that and no one ever contested the procedure we used.

HENDERSON: In 1933, there was a resolution introduced in the legislature, [of] which you were a member, to establish a commission to revise the constitution. And Governor Talmadge vetoed that resolution. Do you remember voting on that resolution one way or the other?

ARNALL: I do not. I do not. What does the record show; did you look into it?

HENDERSON: No. I have not looked into it.

ARNALL: I don’t know, [telephone rings] I don’t recall whether there was a record vote on it [tape stops and starts]. You asked if in 1933, I voted against or for a proposal of the then-Governor Talmadge, Eugene Talmadge, to call a constitution convention?

HENDERSON: Well, yes, it was to have a constitutional commission.

ARNALL: Not like I did.

HENDERSON: Yes, sir. That was a resolution, but it was vetoed.

ARNALL: Who vetoed it?
HENDERSON: Governor Talmadge.

ARNALL: But I thought you say he asked for it.

HENDERSON: No, no. Somebody else, they were pushing for it—the reformers, the so-called reformers were pushing for it, and he said no, we don’t need it.

ARNALL: And he did not—they did not propose a constitutional convention?

HENDERSON: No, constitutional commission.

ARNALL: And he didn’t veto it on the theory it was unconstitutional, the procedure?

HENDERSON: I don’t know what his theory—I’ve got to check the records on that. What I’m getting at, I’ve seen some newspaper statements that said prior to ’43, you had long been an advocate of constitutional change, doing away with the constitution of 1877. And I’m trying to find out—

ARNALL: Well, since I am--have always been--as modern as the day after tomorrow, I can’t imagine me not being for change of the constitution. I think that the record will show, my guess due to my political philosophy and my attitude, that I voted for it. But you’ll have to check that.
HENDERSON: Right. OK.

ARNALL: But I’m surprised that a constitutional commission was proposed, because my recollection is that it was novel with me because I distrusted a convention. And it may be that Talmadge vetoed it on the theory that it was improper to go about changing the constitution. This I don’t recall.

[CD: Track 2]

One other thing. When we did the, at that constitutional commission, when I called it, I sought the advice of outside people who were preeminent in that field. I remember Hatton [William] Sumners, who was chairman of the House commission of the constitution in Washington came down, and I had the head of the state governments. And I undertook to put into that the input, the input of people who were experienced in constitutional concepts.

HENDERSON: Governor, some critics have charged that the commission, once it was established, was a pro-Arnall commission. Do you think that’s a fair assessment?

ARNALL: I do; without any doubt whatsoever. And had it not been a pro-Arnall commission, it would never have come into existence. I always--let me say this to you: I do not believe in an independent legislature. I do not believe in an independent congress. I remember when I was in the federal government once; some matter came up in Congress and [Harry S.] Truman was giving them hell and he told me, and I shall never forget it: that every man in Congress is
elected by a constituency; a senator by his constituency of the state, a congressman by his
constituency of a district. And he said I’m elected by all the people in the United States to look
after their business, and I’m accountable to them. And they look to me for leadership. And I
always felt that way about a governor. Today in Georgia, no matter how good the governor is,
he’s a captive of the speaker of the House and the president of the Senate, who is lieutenant
governor. And this is not right. I think the governor is elected by all the people, and it’s his job
to give the leadership. And so it was that we were able to accomplish so much while I was
governor because I did not have an independent legislature. I appointed the speaker of the
House, the president of the Senate then; they were my men. The chairman of each committee;
they put on who I told them to. And it was my legislature. And that’s why I could get laws
through without a single vote against ‘em. It was a leadership proposition. So I would say
without any equivocation or evasion whatsoever that the constitutional commission of which I
was chairman was my commission.

HENDERSON: All right now, you appointed three laymen. You appointed three lawyers. The
speaker appointed five members. The president of the Senate appointed three. Did you make
any recommendation to them as to who they should appoint? Or did they check with you?

ARNALL: Oh, yes. We conferred and they appointed people who were agreeable to me. And
when you say I appointed three lawyers, I don’t think that’s quite right. I appointed a woman
who was not a lawyer, a Miss [Beatrice Hirsch] Haas, and probably some others. I appointed
some lawyers. But if you’re going to deal with a matter of law, I think basically lawyers are
more prepared to do it than laymen, but I do think we needed the input of lay people, and I did put some laymen on that commission.

HENDERSON: Now, you appointed Mrs. Haas?

ARNALL: Yes.

HENDERSON: All right, now why did you pick her?

ARNALL: Well, she was head of the [Atlanta] League of Women Voters [Georgia], and she was a woman and had always supported me. And I thought we needed her on there representing the women’s concepts. And she was a good one, too.

HENDERSON: Now, one of the issues that you advocated during the commission session, the Georgia railroad had a tax exemption from state government and you wanted to change that. Why?

ARNALL: Well, I have never believed—well, first of all, the Georgia railroad had an agreement with the state that is longstanding that they were immune to certain taxes. And my feeling was that they should not get a special privilege and special treatment. They ought to pay taxes like everybody else. I had a hard time getting that through, and I’ll tell you the way I did it. I remember, particularly Roy [Vincent] Harris and the crowd from Augusta [Georgia] where it was kind of headquartered, and their leaders of the party were over here always trying to get it
done. And I told them this: I said Now, look. I know what I’m trying to do here and want the commission to do is unconstitutional. And you’ll knock it out. So, it’s meaningless, but it lets me go forward with this concept of fair treatment, equal treatment to all. So, we got it through.

HENDERSON: Well, there’s some things in the deliberation…

ARNALL: [W.] Inman Curry, from Augusta represented the railroad and he was a dear friend of mine. He was over here all the time. But I said Inman, you’re going to knock it out and make a big fee. What are you worried about?

HENDERSON: Was there some things during your deliberations that you felt like it was not worth the effort of the commission to deal with? For example, you had the perception of being a reformer. But yet, I, after reading the record of the commission, there’s nothing in there about an attack on the county unit system. Was that understandable?

ARNALL: To me it’s very understandable because being a politician, it would have been utterly foolish to come up with some proposal no matter how laudatory it may be that the public would reject. There were many things that I thought would have been fine if they had been possible of fulfillment. But why talk about doing away with the county unit system when you know that the people would repudiate it and the legislature never pass it. So that’s why some of the things that today we know are wonderful couldn’t have been done then. As a matter of fact, everything in life is a matter of timing. I came along as governor at a time when certain reforms were talked about, recognized, and needed. And I put them through. Yet, if you get too far
ahead of the public in timing, your bones will be on the beach, because they won’t go for it. Sometimes you can get things through by being adroit. For example, when I was running for governor, I had many reformers that wanted to do away with the poll tax, for example. But if I’d advocated doing away with the poll tax running for governor, they would have defeated me. But I said wait’ll until I get in office and I’ll do away with it, which I did. But I couldn’t do away with the county unit system because you had the legislature to buck and the public. So, there were many things that I thought would have been wonderful to do, but I couldn’t do. And I was realist enough to know that.

HENDERSON: One of the members of the commission, a senator by the name of Atkinson—

ARNALL: [David Scarlett] Dave Atkinson from Savannah.

HENDERSON: Right. He proposed that—

ARNALL: He was president pro temp[ore] of the state Senate. My friend.

HENDERSON: He proposed that each county should have a member of the lower House for each 25,000 people. And there was a vote in the commission on that and it was defeated by a voice vote. How did you feel about that proposal?
ARNALL: I didn’t think it was good. I did not think it was good. Why have it arbitrary? Why not say 20,000? Why not 30,000? Who’s going to say where you split the hair? No, I didn’t think it was realistic. But Dave was a dear friend of mine.

HENDERSON: But now, wouldn’t that allow the more heavily populated counties to have more representation in the House?

ARNALL: It would have, and it would have been defeated in the House of Representatives and the Senate, and it would have been defeated by the people because the country counties would have killed it. You know, they weren’t going to give up their rights that then existed, and I knew that. So—and the commission knew that. There were many things that were proposed that just wouldn’t wash, that you—remember, the commission wasn’t the final judge. All they could do was make recommendations to the legislature, and the legislature was dominated by rural Georgia.

[CD: Track 3]

And here let me say something parenthetically, and I’m making this statement on June nineteen, 1987. I think the pendulum has swung too far. I hate for Georgia to become urban Georgia. I still love rural Georgia and hate for their voice, voices to be so dampened that they can’t speak out. In other words, I think being dominated by rural Georgia is bad, and I think being dominated by urban Georgia is bad. Now don’t ask me how we going [to] equalize it; I don’t know. But the pendulum has swung too far. This is June nineteen, 1987. Just like I feel that
about the race issue. I’ve always believed in equality, first-class citizenship for all the people. I’ve always thought that justice was blind, and I’ve always fought for that. But I think the pendulum has swung too far now to where it’s—the dice are loaded in favor of a minority. And this brings me to another thing. I’m just sounding off here. I’m concerned about the government of the United States. We don’t have a majority; we have a minority that rules. A majority of the people don’t even vote. A majority of the people are not even registered. And this is bad. So, yes, you can split hairs all you want to but you finally get back to where you just do the best you can. And of course, under our voting system now, we vote by one vote one person irrespective of where you live in the city or the country. I think you heard me talk about I’m against consolidating counties. I’m dating this now June nineteen, 1987. I think the worst thing that happened was Milton [County, Georgia] and Campbell County [Georgia] being absorbed because we have to go way to the end of the world, almost to Gainesville [Georgia] now. I believe in local government. And the narrower you can keep the government to the people and the people to the government, the better off it is. We’re on the constitution, though.

HENDERSON: The commission supposedly completes its work on November the fourteenth, 1944.

ARNALL: Right.

HENDERSON: However, there’s a great deal of criticism towards the commission.

ARNALL: Right.
HENDERSON: You reconvened it on the eighth for two more days.

ARNALL: Right.

HENDERSON: Why?

ARNALL: To come to grips with the criticism that had been leveled against the commission. Just a minute. Just a minute. Cut it off. [tape stops and starts] As I stated earlier, the constitution of 1877 provided for a constitutional convention to be called by a two-thirds vote of each house of the legislature, the House and the Senate. And it further provided that this convention, the representation at the constitutional convention, would be according to population. Well, of course, I knew that the rural members of the legislature, which controlled the legislature, would feel that such a convention might take away some rights of rural counties or reapportion the legislature, and they might even go so far as to repeal the county unit system. And therefore, I knew that if we called a constitutional convention our efforts would come to naught. In addition to that, I was concerned that a constitutional convention would be dominated by special interests. So it was that I decided that a small body would be more effective in writing a constitution. And that I could dominate it by becoming head of the commission, which I did.

We held the first meeting January sixth, ’44, and I was unanimously elected chairman. There were seven committees appointed to handle various aspects of the commission. And one of the things that we came to grips with was trying to eradicate surplus material and provisions
of the constitution. Others didn’t want it dealt with at all. In any of these controversies, I was always in the middle, but finally we’d work it out to where we could get what I thought could be enacted and adopted by the people. We even came to grips with some of the constitutional boards that I had set up. There were those who thought maybe we’d gone too far, but I was not willing to retreat on the constitutional boards. When we finished our deliberations—and all of the deliberations of the constitutional commission was covered by the press in full—when we finished the work of the commission on November fourteen, 1944, actually, public reaction was not good. The press began to say we hadn’t done anything. And so, I undertake, as I always did to get along with the newspapers—I learned long ago that they print while you sleep and you can’t ever win an argument. So, I’ve always gone along with the mass media. But there was a great outpouring of criticism, and I believe thirty or forty newspapers and editorials denounced the fact that we had labored and brought forth nothing. And so it was then that I called the commission back into special session, constitutional commission. And the main criticism was on the merit system, that it was too weak. And then we got into the home rule proposition. And I announced at that time that it appeared that we on the commission had taken the course of least resistance, and we ought to reevaluate those things. So, we adopted a home rule plan, which was not all that we would have liked to have done, but it was the only thing that we could adopt with a chance of enactment and passage. And we came to grips with the merit system. We improved that. And so we spelled out the powers and programs that should be adopted and given to the state merit board. And that worked out. These were compromises, but they were improvements. So, we got a better home rule provision, a better merit system provision. We set up a constitutional board of prisons in that commission. Also, at my insistence, we put in a veterans’ service board in the constitution. So, instead of eliminating some of the constitutional
boards that I had created through the help of the legislature and the people, we created some more. And strangely enough, it’s worked well. We also came to grips with the governor’s salary. It’s interesting to know that at that time, as governor, I made $7,500 a year and we raised it to $12,000 a year, which went into effect before my term was over, but I did not draw the difference. I stayed on the $7,500 and that was a lot of money in those days. I opposed the increase in the governor’s salary because it would affect me, but they went on and did it. And my answer was that I would not draw the extra salary. Well, after that, we finished that extra session of the constitutional commission, the press thought it was much better and supported us in that. And then at the next session the legislature, the legislature adopted [it] with a few modifications and the people ratified it. And thus came about the new constitution of 1945.

[CD: Track 4]

ARNALL: Question?

HENDERSON: After the commission reports to the legislature in 1945, what kind of lobbying activities did you engage in to get the legislature to approve the commission’s work?

ARNALL: Every kind of lobbying—all kinds of lobbying. Whatever it took to get people to vote right. You know, I always tried to appeal to someone’s judgment. But if their judgment and mine didn’t coincide while I was governor, then I did not hesitate to talk about the job that Aunt Jane had and the road that somebody wanted through the peach orchard and all that. In other words, my job was that I was governor and I was going to get through what I wanted, and
I would do it either nicely or be tough about it. So, I did lobby to get it through, where it was needed.

HENDERSON: Now, reading through [Thomas] Elkin Taylor’s account, one gets the impression that the legislature pretty well guts the constitution submitted to them—or submitted to it. Do you think that’s a fair assessment?

ARNALL: No, I don’t. I think the legislature did not put a stamp of approval on the recommendation of the constitutional commission. But on most of the things it did, and even though the legislature didn’t go along with all the provisions that the commission had recommended, the 1945 constitution was a vast improvement over the 1877 constitution. No, I think it was a step in the right direction and [it] was in effect for many years.

HENDERSON: Let’s talk a little bit about the politics of ratification. How did you go about trying to get the people to approve of the—to accept the constitution in August of 1945? Did you play an active role in that process?

ARNALL: Oh, absolutely. Yes. It was my constitution. I was chairman of the commission that drew it. It was adopted at my recommendation, the legislature had. And I talked with all the mass media, with whom I was on friendly terms, and if they weren’t in accord, I tried to persuade them it was a step in the right direction. And I made speeches. I wrote letters. I resorted to every bit of stratagem that’s possible to resort to to persuade the public to ratify a provision that submitted to them.
HENDERSON: Now, your leading critic of the constitution was former Governor Talmadge.

ARNALL: That’s correct.

HENDERSON: And on one occasion he challenged you to a statewide debate where you could debate the pros and cons of the proposed constitution, and you refused to do that.

ARNALL: Absolutely.

HENDERSON: Why?

ARNALL: Well, first of all, I was governor and I defeated him. And why should I dignify him or elevate him to the extent of giving him a platform? And second, I didn’t want him to get the publicity. And third, I wanted the constitution passed and I didn’t want any debates about it. I wanted it one-sided. [telephone rings; tape stops and starts].

HENDERSON: All right. You were speaking that you were not going to give Governor Talmadge an opportunity to debate you.

ARNALL: No, I wanted the constitution ratified. I just wanted one side presented, not two sides. And actually, I was successful in that. I made speeches in over seventy counties advocating the adoption of the new constitution. I lined up support, and as I recall, it the League
of Women Voters, Miss Haas was head of that, supported it, and Junior Chamber of Commerce [Jaycees], labor organizations, and veterans’ organizations. And it was adopted. As a matter of fact, the vote was 60,000 for and 34,000 against. And it became the first state in the union, Georgia did, to adopt a constitution using the constitutional commission concept. Everybody else had done it with a convention.

HENDERSON: In addition to this public speaking, was there anything going on behind the scenes with the politicians to—

ARNALL: Oh, yes. I called every—in those days we had political bosses in the counties, pretty much. When I say bosses you had somebody who was head of the political setup. For example, in Richmond County [Georgia], we had the Cracker Party [Augusta, Georgia]; we had an organization in Savannah [Georgia] and if you could get the head of those for you, you got all the votes. If you didn’t, you didn’t. And I was on the phone talking to people all over the state. Remember, I’d appointed a number of people to public office and on boards and commissions. I called all them and put them active. So, there never was any doubt that we would have the constitution ratified by the people, whatever the legislature passed.

HENDERSON: Was there any roads promised or any jobs promised or anything of that nature?

ARNALL: No, not to the constitution. But in many situations, we worked on the theory of back scratching: if you scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours. And if a road—somebody needed a road and they show the need first and second, that they were entitled to special privilege because
they were doing to much for you, we’d give them the road, jobs, anything else. And it’s still true, although they go through all this hocus-pocus. There’s nothing in the world that takes the place—there’s more politics in business and in life than there is in politics. So it’s a back-scratching thing. [telephone rings] But we never gave a road where it wasn’t deserved or wasn’t needed, or a job that the people couldn’t do the job well. [tape stops and starts]

HENDERSON: Governor, your constitution lasted about two decades, and then it was replaced by another one.

ARNALL: It lasted longer than that. Let’s see, ’45…’55…’65.

HENDERSON: Well, maybe three decades.

ARNALL: I think probably three.

HENDERSON: All right.

ARNALL: Yes.

HENDERSON: Looking back on it, if you had it to do all over again, do you think it was worthwhile the effort?
ARNALL: Oh, absolutely. I think we made great progress in it. I think it was a step in the right direction. And of course—let me say about a constitution so that we will be in accord. We have a Constitution of the United States. It is changed everyday in the year. Every time a court decision comes down, they change the Constitution. The Supreme Court changes it all the time. But the duty of the federal constitution is the courts can change it to keep it in step with the times and the wishes of the people without having to go through all this rigamarole of amending the Constitution. Whereas in the state--[tape stops and starts]

[CD: Track 5]

ARNALL: …frequently you’ve got to change the constitution. That accounts for most of the changes. And therefore courts can’t change a constitution as frequently—the state constitution—as frequently as they change the—the federal courts change the federal Constitution. Because there’s so many restrictions about what can be done and what can’t be done. If you remember Robert [Augustus] Toombs who did the constitution of 1877 said he locked the treasury and threw the key away. Well, these constitutions we’ve got now, the one in Georgia now and my constitution of 1945, didn’t lock the treasury and throw the key away, but we went a long way to protecting the rights of the legislature to legislate through constitutional amendments on local matters. No matter how much home rule you talk about, it still gets to be a matter of constitutional amendments. Because the people are a little more distrustful, for some reason, of state government than they are of federal government. Maybe they’re a little closer to it, that I don’t know. [tape stops and starts] While the constitution of 1945 was a step in the right direction, I employed it to keep the legislature busy, to keep them out of devilment.
[HENDERSON and ARNALL chuckle] I had a program, and it was a good program, and this kept them busy. And that was why, really, I wanted a constitution. It was a step in the right direction. It was progressive, not progressive enough. It was reforming, but not reforming enough. But the beauty of it was it kept the legislature out of devilment, where they didn’t get into trouble doing things and messing with things they shouldn’t have messed with or done.

[HENDERSON chuckles] [tape stops and starts] ...constitution of 1945 making it more difficult to consolidate counties. The old constitution required two-thirds of those voting in the county wanting to merge with a contiguous county, whereas under our constitution it required two-thirds in all the counties, the one that was going to merge with the other county and the one that was being merged. And so...so, we had made it more difficult to consolidate counties. Cut that off a minute. [tape stops and starts]

...office of lieutenant governor. So far as I know, every state had one except Georgia. And Talmadge had tried to create the lieutenant governorship and the people repudiated it--wouldn’t go for it. DeLacy Allen from Auburn [Georgia] ran for lieutenant governor as a Democrat in the primary. He was head of the American Legion in Georgia, and he was nominated and he ran in the general election and was elected. But the people failed to ratify it. So he’d been elected to an office that never existed. But in our new constitution of ’45, we put in the lieutenant governorship and the people ratified it. And Melvin [Ernest (M.E.)] Thompson, who had been my executive secretary and revenue commissioner, ran for lieutenant governor and was elected. And that’s how he got to be acting governor after the three-governor controversy. So, we did create that. That was a good thing. We consolidated school districts, too, out of that new constitution. That was a good thing.
HENDERSON: The issue of the poll tax came up in the commission’s deliberations.

ARNALL: Right.

HENDERSON: What was your feeling on that?

ARNALL: Well, I don’t remember, Hal, about the timing here. But while I was governor, as I recalled it, before the 1945 session of the [Georgia] General Assembly, we did away with the poll tax the first two years of my administration. I think that’s right. Because I remember I came out for doing away with the poll tax and the legislature could have impeached me then, because it was so unpopular, and I went back to them and told them that if they didn’t do away with it, I had an opinion from the attorney general that I was going to suspend the poll tax until the next regular session, which I could do. And then when they ran—[tape stops and starts]—didn’t do it. My recollection is that happened before the legislature adopted the constitution of 1945.

HENDERSON: I think you’re right.

ARNALL: And I think the controversy about the poll tax was simply something that came up, wasn’t it in the constitutional commission, whether we were going to do away with it by…

HENDERSON: And that was an issue in the legislature, too, in the ’45 session.
ARNALL: Well, we’d done away with it.

HENDERSON: You had to do some lobbying with the legislature--

[End of Interview]
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