Vandiver: We had some real distinguished people that served in the Senate during those four years. That was back in the years when you had rotation. The counties and the district would rotate their senators, and usually they would pick out one of their better people to run. It was just a pleasure every day, really, to work with them. We had no friction, even with the Griffin people over the road fight because it never did get to the Senate for one thing. I'm sure Peyton [Samuel] Hawes [Sr.] was glad that it didn't get to the Senate, because he would have had to present the governor's side as floor leader, but we had people like Jim [James Dunn] Gould from Brunswick, who's [from] an old family down there, one of the most distinguished men I ever met. We had three or four rowdies in there, [and] some of them would go out and start drinking before the session was over and that sort of thing, but nobody ever really got out of line so that you had to admonish them, or tell them to be quiet, or . . . It was one of the happier parts of my political life. I enjoyed it. I didn't have all the responsibilities that I had when I was governor.

Henderson: Did you have any difficulties? You're relatively young; you're the presiding officer. Does that have any influence at all?

Vandiver: I don't think so. I think a lot of them were old enough to be my father and grandfather, but working with them like we did it was just a pleasure to work with most of them. I think every one of them was my friend. The last day of the session, before the
campaign, my friends had gotten up a little button with a "V" on it. I looked around the Senate
and, I think, of all the senators, I think only about two didn't have that little "V" on their lapel
the last day of the Senate.

Henderson: What was your relationship with the House Speaker, Marvin [E.] Moate
[Sr.]?

Vandiver: Marvin and I sort of got along because we had to. I didn't have a lot of
respect for Marvin. People in his hometown didn't have a lot of respect for him. I knew some
of the people in his hometown, but he was a Griffin supporter, and he was the speaker, he was
there, and I had to work with him, but we were not close at all. We kept at arms length--both of
us did.

Henderson: Did Governor [Samuel Marvin] Griffin [Sr.] ever have a meeting with you
and talk about policies or politics, or was it sort of standoffish, you never came into contact
with each other?

Vandiver: Not very often did we come in contact with each other. He had his own
group that he dealt with mostly, and we'd find out in the newspaper what they were planning,
usually, or from some friend that was a member of the committee, or the group that heard what
they were planning and would come tell you. But we didn't work together, particularly the last
year. The last year was. . . . Bobby Lee Cook, who was in the Senate that year, I made him
chairman of the investigating committee, and he really did a job on Griffin's political
machinations. He is probably now the most prominent criminal lawyer we have in Georgia. He
came to the legislature when he was about twenty-one years old. He was just a kid, but he had
run for the Senate while I was lieutenant governor, and we always got along very well, good friends, and he headed up that investigating committee.

Henderson: As lieutenant governor you serve on the State Program Study Committee. What did that do, and what was your role on that committee?

Vandiver: It wasn't much. That was under the aegis of the governor. He had his programs, and the governor, of course, when he has a program of his, they get priority. I didn't have much to do with that committee.

Henderson: Governor Griffin forces Jim [James Lester] Gillis [Sr.], who's chairman of the State Highway Department, out of office. What was your opinion of that affair?

Vandiver: Well, Jim had been chairman of the Highway Board under Herman, and Marvin wanted somebody in there that he could control, and he couldn't control Jim Gillis. He knew he couldn't. So he used all the powers of the executive department to get him out of there and appointed his own people, so that they could handle giving out the roads to whoever they wanted to and use it politically. Jim was one of the finest people I ever knew. He was just as honest as the day is long. He never took--he drew his salary, but he gave it all away. He didn't need it. He was a very wealthy individual. As long as he was chairman of the highway board, his salary was always given away. But he enjoyed politics; he just loved politics, and he got involved in politics when [Franklin Delano] Roosevelt was president, and [Eugene] Talmadge, of course, was having difficulties with Roosevelt, and so Roosevelt somehow picked out Jim Gillis for all his patronage. And Jim made friends all over Georgia through that patronage that Roosevelt just let him name people. He started the forestry program, the Roosevelt administration did, and Jim bought land, and planted trees down there, and, God, he must have
been worth a hundred million dollars, just in pine trees. He just loved politics. He'd get up, four or five o'clock in the morning, and get over there at the office; people'd come to the highway department. He was there before anybody was there, and he'd stay as long as there was somebody there at night. You had to love it to do what he did. He just had people who worshipped him, really, and when Griffin threw him out, that was. . . . He threw out a lot of people who had supported him, because they were Jim Gillis people. And Jim managed my campaign too. He and Bob [Robert Lee] Russell [Jr.] were the two behind me, and Roy [Vincent] Harris helped too.

Henderson: In 1955 Governor Griffin calls a special session of the legislature, and the purpose of that special session is to raise about sixty-five million dollars in new taxes. How did you deal with that issue?

Vandiver: Well, 1955 was his first year as governor. He was at the height of his power, and he was smart enough to know if he was going to do it, he had to do it then. There were certain taxes that I came out definitely against, the sales tax on services. Go down to the barbershop and get a haircut and you had to pay a sales tax. He had that in his program, and I came out definitely against that, because I think--still think--it's absolutely wrong, and there were two or three other items that I opposed him on, and they were all defeated. But that especially was that sales tax on services was the main one that would have brought in so much money. It would have been the big money maker.

Henderson: Were you opposed to any new taxes, or just some specific taxes?

Vandiver: No, I thought the state needed some revenue. Of course, I didn't vote. I didn't have to, unless it was a tie, but I could have opposed them. Now when I ran for governor,
I ran on the basis of no new taxes, and we didn't raise taxes during the four years at all, not a dime. My four campaign planks were preserve segregation, preserve the county-unit system, no new taxes, and to give back to the legislature some of the powers that had been taken away, and as my nephew said, "Two out of four ain't bad." [Laughter]

Henderson: Governor Griffin gets in difficulty with Georgia Tech in 1956. Georgia Tech is supposed to play a football game.

Vandiver: That's right, the Sugar Bowl.

Henderson: The Sugar Bowl, and there's a black player on Pittsburgh's team.

Vandiver: Pittsburgh’s team.

Henderson: What was your thoughts about all of this?

Vandiver: Well, in order to be consistent with what he was saying, he almost had to oppose it. I didn't make any comments about it. If somebody had asked me about it, I guess I would have said, "Well, I don't like integration." But there's not much you can do about integration in another state, and the people at Georgia Tech just went up in arms. I think he lost most of his friends at Georgia Tech on that one, and the less said about it the better, so I didn't say a whole lot.

Henderson: He came out also in favor of a strong libel law that got the press of Georgia upset with him. What was your position on his libel law?

Vandiver: I was opposed to that. He went too far on it, and in the best I can recall, I felt like that it was wrong to have a law that was that strong. Of course, I believe in a responsible press, and I guess Griffin thought the press was irresponsible as far as he was concerned, but, at the same time, I thought he went too far on it.
Henderson: All right, let's go to the 1958 session of the legislature. One of things that you advocate in that session is reducing the price of automobile tags to three dollars.

Vandiver: That was a political maneuver. He came out with all this other business about the rural roads, and Gene [Eugene] Talmadge had made a lot of hay with that three-dollar tag, and when I came out in favor of the three-dollar tag, it shook them to their foundations. They were afraid that'd pass if it ever got on the floor, and it probably would have. [Laughter] But it was a political maneuver to try to counteract some of his business of the Rural Roads Authority that he was going to use as a fund to elect Roger [Hugh] Lawson [Sr.].

Henderson: What happened to that proposal? Did it die a quiet death, or. . . ?

Vandiver: After we defeated the Rural Roads Program, it died a quiet death.

Henderson: Okay, Governor, let's discuss a little bit more the big fight in the 1958 legislative session, the Rural Roads issue. How do you talk with lawmakers and tell them, "You don't need to vote for this"? How did you lobby the lawmakers?

Vandiver: I told them what they really already knew: that it was a political bill, that the object of it was to use the millions of dollars in a political race. I thought I was going to be the next governor, and I'd have my own road program, which I did. I think they, the final decision was that they figured that I was going to be governor, and they'd rather deal with me because I was going to be [around] longer than Marvin was. [Laughter]

Henderson: How active a role does Senator [Herman Eugene] Talmadge play in this fight?

Vandiver: He didn't take any part in this fight as far as I know. He stayed away from local fights as much as he could.
Henderson: Now did you discuss this in any way with him, as far as strategy, who you should talk with?

Vandiver: No, not who I should talk with, but I did discuss the fact that he [Griffin] was going to introduce this bill and what it was for, and he [Talmadge] agreed that it was for political reasons, and he knew that I had to fight it, and he agreed with that premise. I do remember that we did discuss it.

Henderson: Do you remember the time when you decide that "I will run for the governorship of Georgia"? Is it early while you're lieutenant governor, is it midway, is it prior to you becoming lieutenant governor?

Vandiver: I didn't make any announcements, but privately I had. . . . Everybody in the Senate and probably everybody in the House knew that I was going to run. If you make a formal announcement, that prohibits you from being on these programs, where they ask you questions that are of some political help to you, and so the formal announcement you delay as long as you can, and after you make that, of course, then they give equal time to all of your opposition.

Henderson: Who played the major roles in your campaign, and what did they do?

Vandiver: Jim Gillis was my campaign manager. Bob Russell had managed my campaign for lieutenant governor, and Bob and Jim worked very closely together. I'm sure that Senator Talmadge, without making any open endorsement, was supporting me. I'm sure that Senator [Richard Brevard] Russell [Jr.] was without making an open endorsement. In fact, in my last speech that I made up in Gainesville, I asked Herman to come and be there, and he said, "No, I won't come, but I'll send my mama." [Laughter] Well, Miss Mitt [Mattie Thurmond
Peterson Talmadge] was up there, and on the platform at Gainesville, and Bobby persuaded Senator Russell to come, and I think it was about the only time he ever took part in somebody else's political campaign, and he didn't do anything except be there. He was there, and he was on the stand, and was introduced, of course, but didn't make any remarks. Everybody--dignitaries were introduced.

Henderson: Now after Governor Griffin is defeated in the legislature, is it in the back of your mind that you're not going to have any major opponents, and you're going to be the next governor?

Vandiver: I didn't ever. . . . I wouldn't have dared to make that statement, but I felt like we had the best chance of being governor. We got into a situation really, after that fight, where Marvin Griffin's friends were coming over and supporting me in counties that you wouldn't expect. Sometimes, if you'd go in a county and deal with this group, it'd make the other group mad. We had a difficult time trying to stay out of counties where both factions were supporting me. I think everybody felt like I was going to be elected, and they didn't want to . . . they all wanted to take credit for it, so they could come and see you after the election. And if you go and deal with one crowd and don't deal with the other one, or if you deal with both of them, you're in trouble. So we had to watch that very carefully.

Henderson: How much money were you able to raise, and how did you spend the money for your campaign?

Vandiver: We were able to raise close to a half million dollars. I'm not sure exactly how much it was, but which was a lot of money back in those days. I know, George [P.] Whitman [Jr.], who had been one of Marvin Griffin's closest friends, he was the son of Judge

George [P.] Whitman [Jr.], who had been one of Marvin Griffin's closest friends, he was the son of Judge
Whitman, Judge George [P.] Whitman [Sr.], and was head of the school board, State School Board, he came and offered his support, and financially offered his support, and I said, "I appreciate it." And so every month during that last year he'd bring by a thousand dollar campaign contribution. After the election, George Whitman, Jr. took over and told him what we were going to do during the next four years, without talking to me about it, and I called George. Well, the first thing I did, I went to the bank and borrowed twelve thousand dollars, at the C&S [Citizens and Southern] bank, which was right close to my headquarters, borrowed twelve thousand dollars, and when he walked in I handed him a check for every penny that he'd given me. And I said, "George, we both can't be governor, and I've got my own plans for the State Board of Education, and you are not included in them." So he gave me his resignation and took his money back. [Laughter] And I had another one, Earl Cocke [Jr.], who was then president of what was Fulton National Bank, Earl Cocke called me after the election. He said, "I've been looking for you everywhere." He said, "I just haven't been able to find you. You've been so busy." He said, "I've got three thousand dollars here I want to contribute to your campaign." I said, "Well, Mr. Cocke, I appreciate that very much, but we've got enough money to take care of our expenses, and I just don't need it, but thank you very much." It gave me a lot of pleasure to do that, particularly those that came in late.

Henderson: In 1958 what do you spend most of your money for? Television time?

Vandiver: Television and radio. Radio was a big expenditure back then. We'd have every weekend, we would have a big campaign in some area, and we'd have it over a hundred stations, or as many stations as we could get almost, and that was a big expense. And television, we were on television every Monday night. Monday was the day you set aside to be
in Atlanta so your friends could come in and make contributions to your campaign. Everybody knew you'd be in Atlanta on Monday; the rest of the time you were out over the state.

Henderson: Well, now, were there any strict campaign expenditure laws back then? Did you have to keep up with who made contributions and report that?

Vandiver: I kept up with it, and I wrote letters to every one of them who contributed. I think, the law—at one time they had a law, and I think Ellis [Gibbs] Arnall proposed this law to keep campaign expenditures twenty-five thousand [dollars] or below. Well, nobody was paying any attention to that, and finally, the legislature got tired of fooling with that thing and repealed it. And so there wasn't any. . . . Everybody was lying about how much campaign money they'd gotten. I know Herman had run several races; all of them were just under twenty-five thousand dollars. [Laughter] Anyway, they repealed that law because it was ridiculous, and everybody knew it was ridiculous. At the time that Ellis proposed it twenty-five thousand was a pretty good figure, but when television came in, and when . . . all the radio time you had to buy, and all of your other expenses: letters, campaign materials, and everything like that, twenty-five thousand wouldn't have gone very far.

Henderson: Why was Red [Truman Veran] Williams so opposed to you, and one of the major supporters of [William Turner] Bodenhamer [Sr.]?

Vandiver: Red, I had known Red a long time. He'd been part of the Talmadge administration. He'd been an assistant attorney general under Herman, and then Marvin appointed him revenue commissioner, which was one of the worst mistakes he ever made really. Red was not honest. Red was a crook. And, I guess that he conferred with Marvin, and the only thing I can surmise is that he conferred with Marvin Griffin and told him he was going
to fight me all the way, because his real allegiance was to Marvin because Marvin had appointed him to a big job, and Herman had appointed him to assistant attorney general, which wasn't considered very much. But he and I never did--I never did like Red, frankly. I guess it must have showed, because I thought he was a crook. In fact, I had pretty good evidence he was a crook from what, some of the things he'd done with these liquor people.

Henderson: Mr. Bodenhamer runs a rather strong campaign against you. He raises a lot of issues against you, and I wonder if you'd discuss those issues and just Mr. Bodenhamer in general.

Vandiver: Well, Mr. Bodenhamer probably was a well-educated man. He was a Baptist preacher. He preached all over south Georgia. He preached in Early County. When I went to Early County to campaign, I think he married everybody in Early County, and, of course, he'd been Marvin Griffin's pick to be head of the States' Rights Council. I had more Baptist preachers to tell me, apologize for Bodenhamer than almost anything else. They disowned him almost for that kind of campaign that he ran, in which he tried to tie . . . because Bob [Robert Henry] Jordan was my friend, and Clarence Jordan was head of Koinonia farms, which in Americus, they had terrible fights down there, I guess you're familiar with those. That was the main thing that he talked about, and just because Bob was my friend, I was in favor of integration, because Bob's brother was in favor of it. "Guilt by association" I guess you'd call it. That was the meanest thing that he did, and what hurt me so bad was I felt like I wanted to answer him, and yet I determined that I just was not going to answer him, no matter what he said. As it turned out there were enough people that appreciated [my] not getting into really a gut fight that I think [it] made my election bigger that it would have been, 'cause he was
slinging mud, and I wasn't slinging any. I don't think I mentioned his name during the campaign.

Henderson: Now during the campaign, you're going to make a statement that will be brought back against you later on, the "no, not one" statement. Now I understand, when your advisors got together, that there was great division among them about whether you should make that statement or not.

Vandiver: There was indeed. I got together with some of my closest advisors. That included Bob Russell, Peter Zack Geer [Jr.], Henry [Getzen] Neal, Bee [Walter Odum] Brooks [Jr.]. . . . I guess there were eight or ten of us that had been our closest knit group. We were working on my opening speech. One of the things in this speech was that neither your child nor my child will attend a integrated school, no, not one. About half of them felt like I ought not to say it, and about half of them felt like it was necessary to say it, 'course, I made the final decision, and it was a mistake. I shouldn't have said it. It's been brought back many times since then.

Henderson: Of those advisors which one wanted you to make that statement?

Vandiver: Bob Russell wanted me to make that statement, he and Peter Zack. 'Course I listened to Bob more than I did Peter Zack or anybody else because Bob and I had been so close. Bob thought I ought to make it. I think Henry Neal had his doubts about it, and Bee Brooks, I know, was opposed to me making that statement, and he was writing, helping write most of my speeches at that time. He'd written speeches for me and had written speeches for Marvin Griffin and Herman Talmadge and on back to Gene Talmadge.

Henderson: Why did they want you to make that statement?
Vandiver: The main reason was I made that speech that I referred to earlier out in Decatur, in which the headline of that speech says "Vandiver is in the middle of the road." And nobody that was in the middle of the road was going to be very popular. And that's one thing Bodenhamer talked about time and time again. The speech didn't say that, but the headline writer did, and what they did was they splashed the headline all over the campaign literature. They felt like I ought to contradict that very strongly, and I made the decision, final decision, and it was a mistake I shouldn't have made.

Henderson: Did you consult with either Senators Russell or Talmadge about making the statement before you made it?

Vandiver: Not with them, no, I didn't.

Henderson: Later on, did they ever discuss with you whether you should or should not have made that statement?

Vandiver: Senator Russell didn't, but Herman did. [Laughter] Herman said it was a mistake, and I agreed with him that it was a mistake. I'll tell you something that never has come out in any of this business about integration and segregation. After the election, Herman called me up and asked me if I could come down to Lovejoy and meet with some leaders. That's what he said. And I said, "Yeah, I'll do that." When I got down there, the leaders were all black, every one of them. At that time, Herman had begun to court the black vote some. In fact, he had some black people on his staff, and I think they had come to him and asked him if he would try to help ameliorate the situation, make it not so strong, so that there wouldn't be any riots and bloodshed and the sort of thing you saw in Mississippi and Arkansas. But I was surprised when I walked in and saw who those leaders were because he didn't tell me before I got there. And I
didn't make any statement that they could've taken to mean that I was going to change, but I did listen to them. One of them was a druggist--I've forgotten his name, Dr. Somebody, who was one of the leaders of the black group; one of them was a banker, a black banker; and one of them was the head of the YMCA [Young Men's Christian Association], the black YMCA. These were the men that really were the black leadership. I just listened to them and told them that I appreciated their interest, and I didn't how the situation would turn out.

Henderson: Were you surprised when you walked in Senator Talmadge's house, and there the black leaders are?

Vandiver: [Laughter] Frankly, I was. I didn't know what I was, who I was going to see. I would have thought it would have been another group, but Senator Talmadge was making contacts with the blacks during that time for his own political survival, really. He knew that he had to make contacts with the black leadership, and I think he was talking with them at the time. Anyway, he thought that I made a mistake by saying the "no, not one," and I agreed with that. That was a mistake. If I had left that out, I think the speech would have been much better.

Henderson: What was your campaign strategy, to ignore Mr. Bodenhamer?

Vandiver: Yeah. Yeah, my strategy was to not even answer anything he said, just ignore him, just like he wasn't there. And it was hard. It was hard to ignore [unintelligible] things he was saying about you.

Henderson: I believe you carried 156 counties.

Vandiver: I carried 156. Tift, Early, and Seminole were the three that I lost.

Henderson: What accounts for that overwhelming victory?
Vandiver: I think that the fact that most people thought I was going to get elected. Most people like to vote for a winner. The fact that I had both factions in most of these counties for me. . . . People got disgusted with Bodenhamer I think before the campaign was over, and they just felt like that wasn't the way to go about it. As I said, we had both factions in most counties and it's hard to get them both together, particularly when they fought each other for years and years, old state politics. Ellis Arnall was for me. He pledged his support to me. I could feel it. His friends were for me. I knew who they were, a lot of them. But anyway he was for me.

Henderson: Did Roy Harris play a role in your election?

Vandiver: Oh yes, yes. He was behind the scenes, and Roy knew every political faction in Georgia. He knew how to talk to both of them. 'Course he'd talk to them with Ellis and he'd talk with them with Herman.

Henderson: Why did you want to be governor?

Vandiver: Frankly--this may sound trite to you, Hal, but I have always wanted to be in public service. I felt like that I had, if I had any small talent, that I wanted to be in public service. And I wanted to be in a position where I could do some things for people that I couldn't do if I were not in public service. 'Course the governor's office is the number one spot where you can be of service to the people. As I told my mother, I was going to be an honest politician and I cleaned that state government up just as clean as it's ever been. There [are] some friends that haven't gotten over it yet. [Laughter] Friends that supported me. You know some of them in Tifton. I had to clean out some of the people who'd been friends of the Talmadges and with Griffin and back on into the politics before that. Some of them that were old Gene Talmadge
people that had just got set up in government and they thought they were running it. You had to let them know that they were not running it, and as long as you were governor you were going to be governor.

I had a man that was president of the biggest bank in Atlanta, C&S, Mills [Bee] Lane, you may know Mills, may have known him. Mills sent his two vice presidents who had been very friendly to me. One of them was from Swainsboro [Georgia], who later went up to Chattanooga [Tennessee] and was president of a bank up there, but anyway they were two very close friends. I knew who they were and what their relationship with Mills Lane was. And Mills had them give me this message, that he would go all out and have all of his banks in the state support me and contribute to my campaign if I would let him name the banking superintendent. And I sent the message back to Brother Lane, I said, "I'm running for governor, and if I give up my right to appoint who I think would be the best man then I ought not to be running for governor, and I won't make such a promise." Mills had really not taken much interest in politics up until that time. He tried to get in it but he got in it with me with the wrong way. I told him, I said, "If I have to give up my appointments of people who I want to be in my administration, I'm not much of a governor and I'm not going to do it." But he sent word back, "Well, I'm going to vote for you anyway." [Laughter] And he did, and he got all of his banks to support me, and when I did name the man that I wanted to be State Banking Superintendent I named Bill [William Davis] Trippe from Cedartown who was an independent banker. He was not connected with Mills Lane at all, but he was a fair man and a good man and a qualified man, and Mills was very happy with the appointment although he had nothing to do with it.
Henderson: I want to go through and talk about or mention some people who occupied positions of authority in your administration. Tell me what they did and your relationship with them.

Vandiver: All right.

Henderson: The first one was George L. [Leon] Smith [II].

Vandiver: George L. Smith had been a longtime Talmadge supporter. He had been speaker pro tem of the House of Representatives. He had an ambition to be the speaker. That was his highest ambition. He thought that I was going to get elected. I had had some association with George through bills that we were trying to get through the legislature for the National Guard and for civil defense and things like that. But never any real close association. But he had been a Talmadge man. He didn't like Marvin Griffin because Marvin Griffin appointed Marvin Moate; back in those days you appointed really. You said who you wanted to be the speaker and they elected whoever you said you wanted. And he didn't like Marvin Moate, and then, like I told you before, the captain of the National Guard unit in Swainsboro told him, said, "You don't support Vandiver, I'm not going to support you." He was part of a little group that always stayed together. It was George L. Smith; it was Phil [James Philander] Campbell [Jr.]; it was Frank [Starling] Twitty; and a few others that don't come to mind right off. But they always stuck together, and when they made up their mind they went all out to support whoever they decided upon. And Phil Campbell at that time was agricultural commissioner. He had a whole lot of influence with the farmers of Georgia.

Henderson: Did you have a good relationship with Speaker Smith?
Vandiver: I had an excellent relationship. I never asked him to do a thing in my life except one thing. When he thought I was going to resign and go to Washington as Secretary of the Army he got upset because he didn't want Garland [Turk] Byrd to be governor. He and Frank Twitty and Phil Campbell and all that crowd, they were the ones that got up that appropriations fight; they tried to take over the appropriations. And I had to fight like hell to beat my own friends.

Henderson: Was that to strip Garland Byrd from having that kind of power over appropriations or was that aimed at you, the appropriations fight?

Vandiver: It was aimed at Garland Byrd. They figured that if I didn't accept it now I might go and accept it later, accept some other appointment and leave office and let Garland Byrd be governor and they didn't want that.

Henderson: Now Garland Byrd is... ?

Vandiver: And no matter how much I told them that I wasn't going to do that, they still thought I was going to do it because the newspapers were mainly to blame for that. Hal, Bobby [Robert] Troutman [Jr.] was the man that started it. I don't know whether you knew Bobby Troutman or not. He was a son of a man who was a senior partner in King and Spaulding [law firm] who used to be Troutman and Spaulding and so forth. Bobby was the one, he was so close to John [Fitzgerald] Kennedy. He went to Harvard and he roomed with John Kennedy's brother and he was very close with all the Kennedys. Bobby decided that because I'd been adjutant general and was familiar with the military that I ought to be secretary of the army, and he came out and talked to me about it and I never did say yes or no. I didn't tell him no and I didn't tell him yes. So Kennedy called me and asked me if I wanted to be secretary of the army
and I said, "Mr. President, I've got a job to do and it's going to be a tough job and a rough. . . .

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End of Side One
Name Index

A
Arnall, Ellis Gibbs, 10, 15

B
Bodenhamer, William Turner, Sr. (Bill), 10, 11, 13, 14, 15
Brooks, Walter Odum, Jr. (Bee), 12
Byrd, Garland Turk, 18

C
Campbell, James Philander, Jr. (Phil), 17, 18
Cocke, Earl, Jr., 9
Cook, Bobby Lee, 2

G
Geer, Peter Zack, Jr., 12
Gillis, James Lester, Sr. (Jim), 3, 4, 7
Gould, James Dunn (Jim), 1
Griffin, Samuel Marvin, Sr., 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 15, 17

H
Harris, Roy Vincent, 4, 15
Hawes, Peyton Samuel, Sr., 1

J
Jordan, Clarence, 11
Jordan, Robert Henry (Bob), 11

K
Kennedy, John Fitzgerald, 18

L
Lane, Mills Bee, 16
Lawson, Roger Hugh, Sr., 6

M
Moate, Marvin E., Sr., 2, 17

N
Neal, Henry Getzen, 12

R
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 3
Russell, Richard Brevard, Jr., 7, 8, 13
Russell, Robert Lee, Jr. (Bob), 4, 7, 12

S
Smith, George Leon, II, 17

T
Talmadge, Eugene, 3, 6, 12, 15
Talmadge, Herman Eugene, 3, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14
Talmadge, Mattie Thurmond Peterson (Miss Mitt), 8
Trippe, William Davis (Bill), 16
Troutman, Robert, Jr. (Bobby), 18
Twitty, Frank Starling, 17, 18

W
Whitman, George P., Jr., 8, 9
Whitman, George P., Sr., 9
Williams, Truman Veran (Red, T. V.), 10