RICHARD RUSK: Our interview is on the Dominican Republic situation. Doing the
interviewing are Tom Schoenbaum, Rich Rusk, former U.S. Ambassador to the Dominican
Republic [William] Tapley Bennett [Jr.]. This is June 1985.

DEAN RUSK: We might begin with the collapse of the [Rafael Leonidas] Trujillo regime in the
Dominican Republic. One could say a great many things, mostly negative, about the Trujillo
regime. It was corrupt, rather brutal.

RICHARD RUSK: Extremely brutal.

DEAN RUSK: There were times when we thought that Trujillo was blackmailing some of our
own people because he had caught them in compromising situations during vacations to the
Dominican Republic. I won't go into that. But anyhow, he was overthrown, killed.

SCHOENBAUM: That was May 30, 1961, just for the record, when he was assassinated.

RICHARD RUSK: Pop, can we back up just even further? Mr. Bennett, when were you
appointed as Ambassador to the Dominican Republic?

BENNETT: I went there as U.S. Ambassador in March of '64, and had been there just over a
year when the shooting and the disorders broke out. But it was my second tour in the Dominican
Republic. My first post in the Foreign Service had been there from 1941 to '44. I went back
twenty years to the month from when I'd left, so it was a very interesting case of Rip Van
Winkle. When I was there the first time, of course, Trujillo was just getting going. He'd been in
office a number of years, but the war came along. And I was there when Pearl Harbor happened.
We had a lot of submarine activity in the winter of '41, '42 in the waters around the island, and
the sailors would come ashore from torpedoed ships. There are not many beaches there.

RICHARD RUSK: We need some background on the Dominican Crisis.

BENNETT: Well, a little background on the place: the south coast there except for some small
beaches is coral rock about fourteen to twenty feet straight up out of the water. These poor
fellows would have to climb up that stuff, and you know coral is very jagged. They'd come out
all cut and bleeding, and it always festers. That was just part of their war. I remember the Fourth
of July of '42; the Germans had earlier sent a submarine off Costa Rica near the Panama Canal
and landed one shell there at the port on the Atlantic (Caribbean) coast of Costa Rica. We
seriously discussed whether to have the annual July the fourth ball, with all the lights, at this
clubhouse which was on a headland over the sea. We had, I guess, some self-drama, but we thought they might shoot at us that night. They didn't. Anyway, I was there during those years. And I went back as Ambassador in '64, less than three years after Trujillo's assassination. The place was really in a shambles after more than thirty years under that kind of strong man. He was really a dictator in the modern sense. He had massive police and intelligence operations, and when this shooting broke out his communications was like a Hydra head: every time you'd chop out one radio sender, another one would pop up somewhere else. He was a man who had talents in the wrong direction far beyond the size of that small island. He was a small Hitler: could have been.

RICHARD RUSK: Really? And he first came to power in what year?

BENNETT: In 1930.

RICHARD RUSK: So you were there after he was well established?

BENNETT: Yes, he came to power as the result of a great hurricane which pretty well blew away the place; the cathedral and a few others of the colonial buildings were all that was left. He was a colonel, I believe, in the National Guard. He organized things, and he was a tremendous organizer. He did have great ability. And our Marines thought he showed such good promise that they had earlier groomed him for leadership; and he did this so well, handling the debris of the hurricane, that from then on he was the man. Then he had these fake elections and--

DEAN RUSK: There was one unfortunate little side bit at the time of Trujillo's death. Pierre [Emil George] Salinger tells about this in his book. We learned that Trujillo was dead before it was announced in Santo Domingo.

RICHARD RUSK: So they held up the word?

DEAN RUSK: That's right. And President [John Fitzgerald] Kennedy was then in Paris. So I called Pierre Salinger, who was with Kennedy in Paris, and told him that we had received word that Trujillo had been killed and that President Kennedy ought to know about it. I cautioned Pierre that this was confidential because it had not been announced. But then, Pierre Salinger, in meeting with the press, through some slip of the mind or the tongue referred to the assassination of Trujillo, which was the first public statement that had been made anywhere. Well, this concerned us because Trujillo's son was then in Paris, and we were a little nervous that if Trujillo's son got the word from Pierre Salinger that he would think that we had had something to do with killing Trujillo, and his son might take it out on President Kennedy in Paris. Anyway, I gave Pierre Salinger unshirted hell about that later, and we both laughed about it later. But it was an unfortunate little piece.

BENNETT: I was just going to say there were seven associates, seven conspirators who vowed to do away with Trujillo. They had all been his men, but they did carry it out. They were then called the Ajusticiadores, "the bringers to justice." They were made heroes. But his secret police--and that's one reason they held up the story of the news--hunted them down. And five of those seven were killed very quickly and very brutally, only two survived.
SCHOENBAUM: What did we know, Mr. Rusk, at that time? What did you know? What were your reports telling you about who was responsible at that time for the death, for the assassination?

DEAN RUSK: I personally don't recall, now. Do you Tap?

BENNETT: What's that?

DEAN RUSK: Who actually killed him?

BENNETT: Yes, there were these seven, and there were only two survivors who figured in the events of '65. One was [Nicholas] Pano Pichardo, who had been Secretary of State for the presidency under Trujillo. He had been one of Trujillo's henchmen, but he was a cut above some of the other thugs that were involved. The other survivor was Imbert. In the last two or three years of his reign Trujillo became--well, he obviously was deteriorating mentally, and things got bloodier and bloodier. It was really touch and go as to who was killed each day, that kind of thing.

DEAN RUSK: Tap, what happened between the death of Trujillo and the election of Juan Bosch? Who was in charge there?

SCHOENBAUM: Well, Ramfis Trujillo was--

BENNETT: I was going to say, Ramfis, the son, tried to hold on, for a while, but he wasn't strong enough to do it. And then I believe we--didn't we help escort him out of the country or encourage him to leave?

SCHOENBAUM: Yes, and we tried to encourage free elections at that time. We tried to encourage and prepare the way for the elections.

BENNETT: And the elections were actually held in the fall of '61, were they not? No. Fall of '62.

SCHOENBAUM: December 19, 1962, was the election, and that's the election that Juan Bosch won.

BENNETT: Yes.

DEAN RUSK: Well, when Juan Bosch was elected and he was looked upon as left of center in his general orientation. After his election, before he took office, we invited him to Washington. We wined and dined him and tried to get him off to a good start, assured him of support and things of that sort. But, Tap, I don't know whether you ever knew this, but three of his closest friends in this hemisphere, [Luis] Munoz Marin of Puerto Rico, [Romuilo] Betancourt of Venezuela, and [Jose] Figueres of Costa Rica all told us at that time that Juan Bosch would not last a year. They said that he was a poet, a dreamer--
BENNETT: Visionary.

DEAN RUSK: Visionary. That he had no capability of organizing an administration and running a country. Well, we tried to get Juan Bosch to turn to those three friends of his for help, but he wouldn't, apparently didn't, do it, and he lasted a lot less than a year, just a little less than a year.

BENNETT: Less. September of '64 that he was overthrown. And he was completely feckless as a leader.

DEAN RUSK: Yeah, that's right.

RICHARD RUSK: What was the reaction of the Kennedy administration to the assassination of Trujillo? Do you recall how we specifically responded?

DEAN RUSK: Oh, we pretty well took it in stride. I mean, he was one of those fellows like [Fulgencio] Batista in Cuba. I don't think we shed many tears. But, I have never seen anything indicating that we had any hand in the assassination of Trujillo. We were aware that during the fifties the Organization of American States had imposed sanctions upon Trujillo's Dominican Republic because of his meddling around and--

SCHOENBAUM: Efforts to overthrow the government of Venezuela.

DEAN RUSK: Venezuela. Trying to overthrow the government of Venezuela.

RICHARD RUSK: Were you aware of any CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] involvement to attempt to supply any weapons that were used to kill Trujillo?

DEAN RUSK: I'm not aware of it, no. No.

RICHARD RUSK: Wasn't it a policy of the Kennedy administration to try to prevent the Trujillo family from reestablishing themselves after the assassination of Trujillo? Did we take active steps to discourage them from returning and re-imposing their rule?

DEAN RUSK: Well, we wanted a better alternative, but we weren't prepared, ourselves, to march in there and take over the country in order to insure that. Now let's come to the--

BENNETT: May I just say one more thing. Former Ambassador and Assistant Secretary of State Bob [Robert Forbes] Woodward could give you the facts of that interim period after the assassination. He was then Assistant Secretary for Latin America, and I remember his saying we, I think, pulled up a warship or something to help Ramfis [Rafael Leonidas Martinez Trujillo] out of the country. I was assigned in Greece at the time. But if you ever wanted to call Bob Woodward, he could give you the facts.

SCHOENBAUM: Well, I think the record is that we were very much against Ramfis establishing himself and that we also put the pressure on before the December nineteenth
election. And we also Juan Bosch was not our candidate, although I don't think the United States took an active role.

BENNETT: It was a free election.

SCHOENBAUM: It was a free election, yeah.

BENNETT: It was so testified by all the observers and all the rest.

DEAN RUSK: Right. Well, now Juan Bosch was overthrown, and in the spring of '65, complete disorder was the situation in the Dominican Republic. There was no effective government in operation, battle lines were being drawn among the various groups for control of the country. From where I sat in Washington, the Dominican affair involved two, to me, quite separate phases. Phase one had to do with the protection of American and foreign nationals in the Dominican Republic. As I remember, Tap, the head of the armed forces and the head of the police both told us that they could not accept responsibility for the safety of American and foreign nationals.

BENNETT: And you had the incident, on the morning before we took action, of Americans who were on their way to evacuation being rounded up by--Now these were not revolutionaries. I mean, they were revolutionaries, so-called, but they were just a gang of thugs who were going around with machetes and rifles and looting and taking anything they could find. And they separated the men from their families. These people were staying at the Embajador Hotel. And this gang came in with their submachine guns at the ready, separated the men, lined them up against the wall of the hotel, and shot above their heads. Well, you can imagine how that comforted their wives and children who were watching, so we thought it was pretty serious.

DEAN RUSK: Yeah.

RICHARD RUSK: You know, this is a fascinating story. The whole thing is. And I hope you don't try to zip through it. Are you under some time pressure as far as you--Or Pop, how about you?

BENNETT: I'll be here tomorrow and Wednesday also.

RICHARD RUSK: Okay. Can you talk for just a little minute more about Juan Bosch in power and our relations with him? Were we trying to help him in any way?

DEAN RUSK: We tried to get him off to a good start. Like I say, we brought him to Washington, and--

SCHOENBAUM: Did you meet with him personally?

DEAN RUSK: Sure.

SCHOENBAUM: Do you remember any specifics of the conversation?
DEAN RUSK: I think I gave him a luncheon, an official luncheon. But we tried to get him off to a good start. Certainly he was a kind of person we could support much more than we could possibly have supported Trujillo or anyone like that. He was not a dictator in his demeanor, in his attitude.

BENNETT: Didn't President Kennedy, himself, say, "This is the dawn of a new era in the Dominican Republic."

DEAN RUSK: Yeah, we had pretty strong hopes.

RICHARD RUSK: What were your personal impressions of him?

DEAN RUSK: Well, more or less that of Munoz Marin, Betancourt, and Figueres, that he was a poet and a dreamer. TS - What did he do to stimulate this, though, in your mind? Any incidents? DR - Well, he had been a writer, he had no governmental experience of any significance. He wasn't in any sense an administrator. He did not have around him a group of people who knew any better than he did about how to run a government. Our hopes were somewhat diluted by what Munoz Marin, and Betancourt, and Figueres.

BENNETT: As you say, he seemed to resent his friends and he didn't want any advice.

DEAN RUSK: That's right, that's right. He did not want any interference from outside or anything of that sort.

RICHARD RUSK: You say he was left of center back then. Was there some evidence that communists were involved?

DEAN RUSK: No, he wasn't a communist in my judgment. No, he was--

BENNETT: We never alleged that.

DEAN RUSK: No.

SCHOENBAUM: Now, on September 25, for the record again, September 25th 1963, there was a military coup against Juan Bosch. These were the generals led by [Elias] Wessin Y. Wessin, and the junta was set up. And this, of course, presents the classical dilemma for U.S. foreign policy that you all faced in the sixties and is still being faced today. What do you do? There's a military coup. Do you--overthrowing a constitutionally elected government, do you--we as a nation are committed to constitutional governments yet we choose to work as a pragmatic matter with a military coup, with perpetrators of military coups. Do you remember your position at this time? Did you agonize over this?

DEAN RUSK: Well, for many years we had been drawing away from Woodrow Wilson's supports to recognition. He took the view that we would not recognize a government in this hemisphere that did not reflect the express views of the people, or government regimes that had
come to power through unconstitutional or illegal means. Well, that's all very well as a holier-than-thou policy, but that soon means that you are not dealing with the real world. Because in this situation, the junta was there, the only authority that was there, and if we wanted to deal with the Dominican Republic, we dealt with them. Many years later, the Senate passed a resolution expressly affirming that we, that recognition should not depend on our judgment as to the quality of the government being recognized, that we simply should take the more pragmatic view. Matter of fact, the Mexican government doesn't even let the question of recognition in such situations arise, they just deal with whoever's there.

BENNETT: That's the Estrada doctrine.

DEAN RUSK: Yeah. The Estrada doctrine.

BENNETT: You let relations continue. It's a continuing relationship.

DEAN RUSK: Yeah.

SCHOENBAUM: It's a recognition policy, but surely there's more to it than that. When you see one of these things coming, you can either, depending on how much leverage you have, sometimes you have more leverage, sometimes less or almost nil, you can take some actions. Were we involved in this coup at all? Did we--I mean even by--in a sense did we kind of wink and say that it would be all right or we wouldn't mind, that type of thing?

DEAN RUSK: I don't recall that we were involved in the overthrow of Juan Bosch.

BENNETT: I've never heard any allegations of that.

DEAN RUSK: I mean, he had prepared for his own overthrow.

BENNETT: He really brought it on himself.

DEAN RUSK: In spades, he brought it on himself.

BENNETT: I think that part of John Bartlow Martin's book is excellent in showing the breakdown under Bosch. Other parts of the book are not so strong.

DEAN RUSK: You see, we have not appointed ourselves to be the "den mother" of the universe with respect to coups d'etat. During my eight years as Secretary of State, there were eighty-two coups d'etat somewhere in the world: about ten every year. When the first two or three of them occurred, I got pretty excited, but I very quickly got bored with them because they were happening all the time. But in any event, the junta did give way to national elections, and--No, I'm sorry; I'm sorry, no, no. This was after Juan Bosch.

BENNETT: This was the junta I confronted when I went there in March.

DEAN RUSK: That's right.
RICHARD RUSK: How about the response of the Kennedy administration to the coup d'etat? How did you fellows choose to deal with the new regime?

DEAN RUSK: Oh, I forget the details, I think we--

BENNETT: [John Bartlow] Martin was called home two days after, and I don't like to--But I think the facts are--

SCHOENBAUM: Please do.

BENNETT: It was considered in the State Department at the time that he was not the man to go forward with because he was too identified with Bosch, although he had seen Bosch's inadequacies. So he was called home and no one was appointed; they just left charge d'affaires to show disapproval.

RICHARD RUSK: Of the coup d'etat.

BENNETT: And then, shortly after, I believe they were beginning to recommend--you can correct me, Mr. Secretary--to Kennedy that it was time to restore relations, put an ambassador there, so you could have some influence on the situation. Then Kennedy was assassinated and that threw it off. At the time, I was serving as minister in Greece and I got a personal telegram from [Lyndon Baines] Johnson himself in late January saying, "I want you to go to the Dominican Republic as Ambassador." By the time I got there it was March.

DEAN RUSK: And when we have a messy situation in a country like that, we normally turn to a professional career officer to go as ambassador rather than send an inexperienced political appointment.

SCHOENBAUM: Wasn't this kind of unusual for the telegram to come from--

BENNETT: It was, but that was Johnson.

SCHOENBAUM: Were you involved in this Mr. Rusk?

DEAN RUSK: Oh, I knew that he was doing it, we talked about it. But--had you known him before?

BENNETT: No, I had not.

DEAN RUSK: Right.

BENNETT: But I will never forget the first time I went to see him.

RICHARD RUSK: Kennedy's response was, I believe, to not recognize the new regime right away, and to not reappoint an ambassador.
DEAN RUSK: Well, when you have a coup d'etat in Latin America--

RICHARD RUSK: And we also cut off economic aid to that regime for a period of time.

DEAN RUSK: I think that's correct.

BENNETT: That's right.

DEAN RUSK: But, normally on these recognition problems resulting from coup d'etat, United States tries not to be among the first one or two to extend recognition. We usually drag our heels and wait until we see what the reaction of the other governments in the hemisphere would be, and we would usually be along fourteen or fifteen, something like that, in terms of extending recognition. But there is one exception to that, in the coup d'etat in Brazil when we recognized the new regime, military regime, almost immediately because we were trying to prevent a civil war in Brazil, and we didn't want [Joao] Goulart to think that he could go down, go off to some corner of the country and find some armed forces that would support him and launch a civil war. So, in that case we recognized almost immediately.

RICHARD RUSK: You were going to say?

BENNETT: I was just going to say, the weight of the United States is so heavy in those countries, particularly the small ones and the Caribbean situations, that whatever we do influences. If we don't recognize, that's a form of intervention; if we do recognize, then it shows that we are trying to set up the people that have done it.

DEAN RUSK: Right. Well, now in the spring of '65--

BENNETT: '65.

DEAN RUSK: '65. We were--

RICHARD RUSK: Back up just a minute. I hate to nit-pick this thing to death, but Lyndon Johnson took office after the assassination of John Kennedy. And shortly thereafter, I believe within a month of the assassination, he decided to reverse policy and extend full recognition, resume economic aid, and he decided to have his own policy rather than continue Kennedy's plan of non-recognition?

DEAN RUSK: I think, myself, that Kennedy would have recognized.

BENNETT: I had always understood that the papers were in process to Kennedy recommending recognition.

DEAN RUSK: Right. So this was not a dramatic shift in policy because of the difference between Kennedy and Johnson. This was already in the works.
BENNETT: I agree with you.

SCHOENBAUM: Wasn't there at that time a new head of the Inter-American affairs office appointed, Thomas [C.] Mann? Wasn't that a slight shift in policy, or wasn't that at least a new departure, Thomas Mann?

BENNETT: Yeah, I--Oh, I know Tom Mann, but I'm trying to remember when he moved up. Yes, he was Assistant Secretary at that time. And then, by the time the disorders broke out a year later, he had moved up to be Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and Jack [Hood] Vaughn had been called home from, I believe, Panama.

DEAN RUSK: That's right.

BENNETT: --to be the Assistant Secretary.

DEAN RUSK: That's right. But Tom Mann was personally known to LBJ, and LBJ had--

BENNETT: He was a Texan.

DEAN RUSK: And LBJ had a good deal of confidence in him. And Tom Mann was sort of a hardliner in a good many of these questions: not insanely so, not irrationally so, but he was pretty firm in his attitude toward some of these Latin American questions.

BENNETT: I think it's fair to say that he later made one of the most successful ambassadors to Mexico we've ever had.

DEAN RUSK: That's right. That's right.

BENNETT: Was so regarded by the Mexicans.

RICHARD RUSK: He was not a career appointment, though?

BENNETT: Yes.

DEAN RUSK: Yeah, he was a career officer.

RICHARD RUSK: Oh, he was? Was he LBJ's appointment?

DEAN RUSK: Yeah.

BENNETT: Yeah.

DEAN RUSK: Now, I'm not sure, Tap, that I recall exactly how the disorders of the spring of '65 got started. But there were sweeping disorders; the government itself could no longer function. The armed forces and the police at least lost control of the situation to the point that they told us that they could not protect American and foreign nationals there. And the reports
coming in from Santo Domingo, including from you, indicated the situation was deteriorating very badly and that there was indeed a threat to the safety of American citizens. So, Lyndon Johnson, using a contingency plan which had been prepared on the personal direction of President Kennedy, decided to put the Marines ashore for that limited purpose of protecting American and foreign nationals, including those who had been gathered at the Ambassador Hotel, there.

RICHARD RUSK: Pop, I was in the Marines at the time, and we all let out a hell of a cheer. That was before Cornell had its antiwar faction.

BENNETT: We evacuated people from forty-four different countries. If this had happened out in Bangladesh, it would have been a tremendous international thing. Down there, this was America: heavy foot, but we saved a lot of lives.

DEAN RUSK: So, we also put in a substantial Marine force, more than were necessary just to get the Ambassador Hotel.

BENNETT: I learned that when you ask for Marines you get the whole package.

DEAN RUSK: There were a good many groups of Americans out in different parts of the country. And we didn't know whether after the Marines landed we'd have to organize groups to go out there and rescue these people because they--

BENNETT: This was one of the achievements of the operation that we confined this disorder to a few square blocks in the old city of Santo Domingo. But it was touch and go out in some of the provincial towns because the revolutionaries had their groups in every community.

DEAN RUSK: As I remember, Tap, LBJ received a message of thanks from the papal nuncio who was dean of the diplomatic corps for this action in support of American and foreign nationals. The diplomatic corps, foreign diplomatic corps in Santo Domingo was very much in favor of what he had done.

BENNETT: Oh, indeed, they were imploring me as the American Ambassador. They would come in every ten minutes: "Get somebody here to help us out," because the place had fallen apart.

DEAN RUSK: Well then after the Marines got--

RICHARD RUSK: Can I follow up here as an ex-Marine? You had made a statement that when you send for the Marines you get the whole package. What do you mean by that?

BENNETT: Well, you got not only a good group of sharpshooters and men, because we had to dispatch--There were eight snipers on the Embassy walls that the Marines took care of over the period. But you got these enormous APCs, the armored personnel carriers, rumbling down the streets. And you really didn't need anything that big in that small a place. That's what I meant when I said you get the whole package. And the Marines complained because they came in--
When they landed it was—you know dusk comes quickly; there is no twilight in the tropics: six o'clock, ten after six, it's dark. We were burning documents because things had really fallen apart that last afternoon and we were using oil drums out on the embassy lawn, and the Marines complained that the flames from the oil drums silhouetted them as they came to the embassy.

DEAN RUSK: Well then we began to move into phase two because as soon as the Marines got established ashore, then various and sundry people came out of the city of Santo Domingo, out to the suburbs where we were, to tell us about the situation there inside the city. Apparently a number of gangs had been able to seize arras. There was fighting for control even within the left wingers. And among those that came out was the Secretary General of Juan Bosch's own party. And they pretty much described the situation in the city and left, very strongly, the impression that unless something were done, there would be a bloodbath and that we'd have another dictatorship either of the Trujillo type or of the [Fidel Ruiz] Castro type. And that was not a very appealing alternative for us because, among other things, the Organization of American States had imposed sanctions both upon Trujillo and upon Castro, so we looked with strong disfavor on either solution. And so that initiated the effort to put together an interim government which would be there for the purpose of holding elections. And then we'd let the Dominican people once again have a chance to elect their own president. Tap can fill in a lot of these details, but from where I sat in Washington, the effort was to—and we involved the OAS in this. There was an OAS peace force, I believe. The OAS took an active part in trying to organize an interim government and so forth.

BENNETT: Had an ambassadorial committee of three--

DEAN RUSK: Yeah.

BENNETT: Of course, Ellsworth Bunker dominated that, because he was very much the one.

DEAN RUSK: Right.

BENNETT: But we converted the American force into an inter-American peace force, and there were six, seven countries, with the Brazilians sending over a thousand men.

DEAN RUSK: Right. Matter of fact the Brazilian was actually commander for a period, wasn't he?

BENNETT: We had a wonderful American general, Bruce Palmer, who was later deputy chief of staff of the Army and acting chief for long periods under [William Childs] Westmoreland and [Creighton Williams] Abrams. And he was the kind of man who would step back. And so this rather feisty Brazilian general was the head of the force although eleven, twelve the bulk of the international force was--

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DEAN RUSK: During the election [Joaquin] Balaguer stepped forward as a candidate, as a moderate conservative, and Juan Bosch was also on the ticket.

BENNETT: Oh yes, he ran.

DEAN RUSK: But Juan Bosch stayed out of the country. He did not come back to the Dominican Republic to campaign as I recall.

BENNETT: He did eventually come back, but he went into hiding right away.

DEAN RUSK: Yeah, he wanted American forces to escort him during the campaign. Well, we couldn't very well send American forces around with him during his campaign.

BENNETT: He was a most curious man really, because the election was coming up just after Easter and he went through a charade on Easter week leading up, in effect, to his crucifixion on Friday, and his resurrection on Sunday. I'm not making this up. The whole analogy was Bosch's to dramatize himself, who all the time was cowering in his house and insisting on American protection because he was afraid of being killed.

DEAN RUSK: And he spent a good deal of the time, I believe, in Puerto Rico during that period.

BENNETT: Oh, he was there. He didn't come back until very late, just a few weeks before the election. Oh, no, he was mostly in Puerto Rico.

DEAN RUSK: And so Balaguer won the election.

BENNETT: And this again was a full and fair election.

DEAN RUSK: Yeah.

BENNETT: There were even more observers at this one than there were in'63.

RICHARD RUSK: You had something like eighteen international observers at this.

BENNETT: And he won with, was it fifty-three or fifty-seven? I think fifty-seven percent of the vote.

RICHARD RUSK: Fifty-seven percent of the vote?

BENNETT: Yes, which would have been hailed as a great democratic victory in most countries, 57 percent.
RICHARD RUSK: Was there a big turnout of people?

BENNETT: Oh enormous. Oh yes.

RICHARD RUSK: Far more than Americans turn out for their national elections.

BENNETT: Oh, that certainly.

DEAN RUSK: I think Balaguer had a fair amount of support in the rural areas, if I recall.

BENNETT: He was very strong in the rural areas. He was a bachelor, he'd never married, but he had great appeal to the women. They all flocked to him, and they felt he could protect them and look after them. Now he had been a Trujillo confederate and had served under Trujillo, but he had never been tainted by the corruption or the brutality of the Trujillo period.

RICHARD RUSK: He was Trujillo's vice-president at one time.

BENNETT: Yes, he might have even been president. No, he'd never been president.

RICHARD RUSK: Never been president. He had been vice-president.

BENNETT: Prime Minister, or whatever. No, he was very much an administrator under Trujillo.

DEAN RUSK: I had the impression that Bauguer was a man of some parts,--

BENNETT: He was.

DEAN RUSK: --that he was pretty able, and--

BENNETT: He'd been in exile. He lived in New York, up in the Bronx and then came back after these disorders. And he was obviously the man to put the country back together again. I think he was the best transition you could have had.

DEAN RUSK: Now there was lots of give and take in putting together an interim government that could supervise those elections. Now that required protracted and sometimes delicate and frustrating negotiations to see what could be put together. Ellsworth Bunker did that with an attempted effort of assistance by McGeorge Bundy, but McGeorge Bundy's part in it didn't turn out to contribute very much.

SCHOENBAUM: Why is that?

DEAN RUSK: I don't know, just somehow it just didn't quite accomplish what--

BENNETT: Well, they came down right in the middle of all this. We were still in the embassy. We had stripped everything down because we had been under fire and so forth, and had to be on the run. McGeorge Bundy, and Tom Mann, and Cy [Cyrus Roberts] Vance, who was Deputy
Secretary of Defense, the three of them came on this mission, and they stayed with me in the residence, no lights at night, and all that kind of thing. Mac was determined to find a way to put Bosch's man in and there was a man up in Santiago, Antonio Guzman, a perfectly good, honest, law-abiding citizen. People had questions about his wife and her influence. But, again, he was not a man to be head of a government. He wouldn't have been as bad as Bosch, probably, but he would have been ineffectual, I'm afraid. Well, Mac was determined that we were going to see the Bosch stream continue, and he tried all he could to put it together, and it just obviously wasn't there. It wouldn't work.

RICHARD RUSK: Didn't Cyrus Vance have that same point of view?

BENNETT: To a degree. But Cy and I did some midnight maneuverings. I remember we went to see [Antonio] Imbert [Barrera] one night, who lived in his own fortress-style house, because he was one of the two survivors of the people who had assassinated Trujillo. He was very ambitious himself; he wanted to be head of the country. He wasn't the man to do it, but he was one to negotiate with.

RICHARD RUSK: Herero? Was that his last name?

BENNETT: No. Imbert Barrera. Imbert is his last name; Barrera was his mother's name. In Spanish--

RICHARD RUSK: Okay.

BENNETT: And these people had their own private armies to protect themselves, and you went to his house under peril of being shot at by some guerilla in a bush. And he lived in a little upstairs room over his house, and Cy and I went--I remember going out there one night: pitch black dark. It was mid night, and he, of course, was trying to jockey himself into position to be the chosen man. We never did choose him, but this was part of it. But I think Cy came to the logical conclusion that the other business wasn't on.

RICHARD RUSK: I take it there were some reports at this period saying that there was a split in the mission itself, that McGeorge Bundy had had his views, Thomas Mann definitely did not want Juan Bosch in any form to return to that situation.

BENNETT: Well, Tom, of course, was not for Bosch.

RICHARD RUSK: And there was a split in the mission.

DEAN RUSK: Well, LBJ himself was not inclined to the McGeorge Bundy point of view. He was much more inclined toward the Tom Mann--

RICHARD RUSK: Where were you on this particular mission? Did you have any particular instructions to give to the mission?
DEAN RUSK: I was in Washington and kept very closely in touch with it, I forget many of the details now, but I kept very closely in touch with it.

BENNETT: That mission also stopped in Puerto Rico on the way and picked up and brought over Jaime Benitez, who had been Chancellor of the University of Puerto Rico. He was a Bosch friend and intimate, and he was an influence on Mac. And this was, you know, political persuasion, no need to explain that. But now, I'll tell you one more thing and I don't tell it for self-aggrandizement, but this is actually the way it happened. I was the Ambassador, of course, so every telegram had to go out under my name. Well, I was not--I didn't have any illusions of grandeur when I had the national security man and the Under Secretary of State, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense sitting on me, a rookie Ambassador. I didn't know--but one night, this was about two in the morning, Mac Bundy came to me with a telegram. And he said, "This is what I'm going to send to the President." And it was a long list of recommendations, one, two, three, four, of his entire view. Well, I simply didn't agree with it. And I read it and I said, "Well, Mac, you can send this. Obviously I'm not to tell you that you can't send something to the President. But if you do send it, since it has my name on it, I will have to send a telegram saying that I don't agree with it."

SCHOENBAUM: And you did that?

BENNETT: This took Mac aback, and he said, "Oh." He thought a minute and he said, "The President doesn't like having separate opinions come to him." He said, "If you will give me your views, I will weave them into the telegram." And I said, "All right." So he did that, and he put down, I think there were seven or nine alternative choices. And when it came back, the President had chosen mine in each case.

SCHOENBAUM: That's interesting. We need to get that message.

BENNETT: Well, I wish we could get that telegram, because that was--

DEAN RUSK: Yeah, those won't be available from the foreign relations series yet.

RICHARD RUSK: Pop, what was your role when this mission left Washington and headed down there? Did you recall giving them any instructions? Did you bring those three gentlemen into your office?

DEAN RUSK: Well, we had a meeting with the President before they went down. But I was pretty leery, myself, of the Juan Bosch approach, simply because of incompetence and inability to run the country. And so I was hoping we could find somebody who could put together an administration and, with the approval of the people of the Dominican Republic, who could make some sense out of the situation.

RICHARD RUSK: Go ahead, this is fascinating.

BENNETT: This is again just purely personal. But by that time I was under full attack in the New York Times and the Washington Post and all that. I never had any trouble with the Secretary
of State or with the President, at least they didn't indicate any to me but my cavalry was strictly on the outside in the public arena. Some of my friends got very upset--Senator [Richard Brevard] Russell was one of them--and said, "Aren't you worried about having all these experts come down there and shove you aside as the Ambassador," and so forth, I said, "It doesn't bother me a bit. The more people who come down here and conclude for themselves that this can't be solved, the better that makes me look." So I didn't ever object to anyone coming. (laughter)

DEAN RUSK: By the way, what's the name of that New York Times reporter who was reporting out of there?

BENNETT: Tad Szulc.

DEAN RUSK: Tad Szulc. Well now, Tad Szulc, we learned, was, for all intents and purposes on the staff of Juan Bosch.

RICHARD RUSK: Paid by Juan Bosch?

DEAN RUSK: He was actually advising Juan Bosch on his political tactics and things of that sort. He spent a lot of time with him over in Puerto Rico.

BENNETT: Oh yes.

DEAN RUSK: And when the New York Times themselves learned about that--I don't know how they learned about it--they transferred him to another assignment.

BENNETT: Really?

RICHARD RUSK: Was he on his payroll?

DEAN RUSK: He was a New York Times reporter, on the New York Times payroll. I don't know whether Juan Bosch paid him anything or not. I rather doubt that.

BENNETT: And while Szulc had more influence, the Washington Post man was worse: Dan Kurzman. He was so bad that Mrs. [Katherine Meyer] Graham spoke to Ellsworth Bunker later in the summer and asked, "Is he really as bad as we are told he is? As inaccurate?" And Ellsworth said, "He certainly is." And so he was fired.

DEAN RUSK: Yeah.

RICHARD RUSK: Huh! He was fired by Katherine Graham? Wow. Pop, this mission that went down there--Well, I'm glad you told me that.

BENNETT: From my little experience, if all of history is as inaccurate as this case in the way it was reported and written up and the learned theses that have been done since, then I don't have much faith in history.
SCHOENBAUM: We want to get this on the record.

RICHARD RUSK: I have to say that I did read this. But I also read LBJ's book *The Vantage Point*.

BENNETT: There's a chapter in there that has a--

RICHARD RUSK: So, I've tried to come in with a relatively open mind.

BENNETT: I would say those were the straight facts.

RICHARD RUSK: *The Vantage Point*?

DEAN RUSK: Well, in retrospect, I must confess that this Dominican affair wound up pretty well.

BENNETT: And the *Washington Post*, about a year later, wrote an editorial to that effect.

DEAN RUSK: Yeah, they got a pretty good President, by election, and he managed to put the country together. And from that time forward there has not been that kind of violence in the Dominican Republic.

BENNETT: No, it's been one of the stable places, relatively speaking. Now, I remember after I was Ambassador to NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], and I was at home, and I was--Well, it was this Washington summit in 1978. And [William] Averell Harriman came over to me at the White House. You know he was involved and was very helpful, and you all enlisted him to go--Didn't he go around and speak to various governments?

DEAN RUSK: I think that's right.

BENNETT: Anyway, he was very helpful. He saw the picture and saw it clearly. This was just after the present man, [Salvador Jorge] Blanco, had been elected Dominican President. He was from the Bosch group, and he's made a good President. You see, it took time after the vacuum of a Trujillo for the country to be able to go forward. And I remember Mr. Harriman coming across the room to me at the White House and saying to me, "Can this man make it?" And I said, "Yes, Mr. Harriman, he can now. He could not have ten years ago." So I think the Dominican case is an example of the United States helping a neighbor back on the road who had fallen off. And with careful handling it has proven successful.

DEAN RUSK: Now, one of the distortions that have entered this picture from the point of view of some of the professors and others has to do with their idea that we put the Marines in there originally to be sure that Juan Bosch did not come back to power. Now that's just a mistake. The Marines were put in there initially for the protection of American and foreign nationals. And when they went ashore, that was their mission. It was not until we began to hear from all these elements in Santo Domingo about the prospect of a bloodbath and a new dictatorship, either of a
Trujillo or a Castro type, that caused us to move through the OAS to try to work something out there.

SCHOENBAUM: Now this is interesting because George [Wildman] Ball and his memoirs of this same time says that Dean Rusk, when LBJ went on, just before LBJ, in connection with a speech to the nation, that Dean Rusk advised LBJ to justify the American intervention not only in terms of protection of American lives, but also in terms of preservation of free institutions. But this is George Ball talking. George Ball says, "LBJ rejected that advice, and kept preservation of free institutions out of it." Is that--do you remember making that.

DEAN RUSK: I don't recall, because I thought that the distinction between these two phases was a very important distinction, and that--

BENNETT: This may be something in Ball's mind. Because of all the people, in my recollection of the period, and on the phone, the most excited person to me was George Ball, because he called me in the afternoon. And I was holding back. I had refused to ask for the Marines the night before.

SCHOENBAUM: Yes, he mentions that.

BENNETT: And Ball called me. It was about 1:30 in the afternoon. And he said "Are you all right down there?" And I said, "Yes, we're holding out." And he said, "Now don't hesitate to ask; don't be nervous, don't be nervous." And I'm trying to be accurate: "Don't hesitate to call for the Marines."

RICHARD RUSK: That was George Ball saying that?

BENNETT: That was George, and--

RICHARD RUSK: Funny, that wasn't in his memoirs. (laughter)

BENNETT: And a couple of hours later, then the time had come.

SCHOENBAUM: Oh, Okay. George Ball says that he, that you at first refused on the morning of the April 28. You refused. You said--

BENNETT: That's right.

SCHOENBAUM: We didn't need them. And then he says that Rusk, McNamara, Bundy (that's McGeorge Bundy), [William Don] Moyers, and Ball were in a meeting with LBJ in the small retreat off of the Oval Office, and a critic message came in from Ambassador Bennett

BENNETT: That was what, in the afternoon or something like that?

SCHOENBAUM: Yeah. Do you remember that, Mr. Rusk? A critic message coming in when you were meeting in the Oval Office?
DEAN RUSK: From him?

SCHOENBAUM: From him, on the Dominican. And that was the message in which he said that we want a military rescue.

DEAN RUSK: Yeah, that the-

BENNETT: I said, "American lives are in danger," something like that.

DEAN RUSK: --shooting tommy-guns all over the place around the Ambassador Hotel--

BENNETT: Yeah, it was that morning when they lined up the people at the hotel and shot above their heads.

SCHOENBAUM: I see.

BENNETT: And I have pictures of all that. If you'd like to see them I'll bring them down next time.

RICHARD RUSK: That would be nice.

BENNETT: They were taken by the assistant rector of the Episcopal Church.

DEAN RUSK: This is a very good example of how important it is to have a man on the spot that you have confidence in, because only a man on the spot can make that kind of a judgment. You can't make that kind of judgment sitting around in Washington. By the way, I was not, perhaps as excited as I should have been, but I don't recall that I telephoned you personally very often.

BENNETT: No.

DEAN RUSK: If at all. I don't remember.

BENNETT: I heard from the President quite frequently after--

DEAN RUSK: Yeah sure.

RICHARD RUSK: This is interesting, talk a little bit about that. I understand that after several days of the crisis, Lyndon Johnson more or less became his own desk office to take personal control of the crisis. So, you would hear directly from him.

BENNETT: Well, he was a man who cared. He called me, well, several days, every day in a row, and would say, "How many did you get out today? How many--", you know, the evacuees.

SCHOENBAUM: Yeah, he was concerned with how many evacuations had taken place?
DEAN RUSK: Well, when American troops are involved anywhere, the President is almost automatically the desk officer. He's the action officer. But, I had--you know, I'd lived through a good many crises before, and I perhaps was not quite as excited about this one as some of the others were. But--Go ahead.

BENNETT: If I may say so, the President gave way to some hyperbole and some extravagant language in my press conference. But that was the Johnson manner. He said, "There are 1200 people down there killed, and they cut off their heads and they're lying in the streets." And, well, if you knew, you knew that was an exaggeration. But some of it happened, you see.

DEAN RUSK: Yeah, I remember when LBJ made that remark about people being decapitated, we sent a message down to Tap, "For God's sake see if you can find some people who were decapitated!"

BENNETT: Well, as the President said to me personally when I was in Washington later in the summer, he said, "I don't like people calling me a liar. I want you to go back down there and see if you can find some of those people who were beheaded." We did find two or three very grisly cases. I sent the pictures up, and to my regret I think he still has the pictures.

DEAN RUSK: LBJ also spoke to, I don't know if it was a group of Congressmen or who it was, about his talking to Tap Bennett, and Tap Bennett was under his desk because the bullets were flying and the windows were being broken. Well, apparently he was under his desk on an earlier occasion, when he was talking to the Argentine Ambassador, but not when he was talking to LBJ.

SCHOENBAUM: There was an element of truth in everything that he said, but the facts got a little mixed up. The edition writer at the Washington Post wrote and said, "We know that's not true because Tap Bennett's too big to get under the desk." (laughter)

RICHARD RUSK: That's good!

SCHOENBAUM: You at no time were under fire yourself?

BENNETT: Yes, we were.

SCHOENBAUM: Oh, you were?

BENNETT: And when I hit the deck--I was just telling Dean Rusk earlier--I was talking to the Argentine Ambassador who was imploring me to bring in the Marines, or bring in somebody. The Colombians came over to see me and the Ecuadorians. They were all wanting help. And I heard this plane come as though it were diving for the Embassy. And the Marines had told us to take cover in case of anything like that. It turned out they were trying to bomb the radio station which was in the hands of the revolutionaries about six blocks up the street. But it came right over our front door. And I said to the Argentine Ambassador over the phone, "I'm just about to hit the deck," and I went down by the desk from my chair, still holding the phone and still talking to him.
SCHOENBAUM: Oh, I see. That was after the Marines came, or before?

BENNETT: This was--I believe this was just after, because there were some Marines. Because Tad Szulc was standing on the front steps of the Embassy and he almost dislocated a Marine's shoulder pushing him to get out of the way to take cover himself. And then of course, he made great light of the fact that I was diving under the desk.

DEAN RUSK: One amusing little bit here: Tap, I don't know whether you remember this or not, but President [Charles Andre Joseph Mario] de Gaulle was very critical of what we were doing with the Dominican Republic. But--

BENNETT: Although his Ambassador had asked us specifically for protection.

DEAN RUSK: Privately they came to us and asked that we move our troops over four more blocks to pick up the protection of the French Embassy. And we did, and de Gaulle didn't thank us, he just went ahead criticizing us publicly.

SCHOENBAUM: To return to that: I'm fascinated by this. When on April 28, you said we don't need Marines, and then the critic message--

BENNETT: The night of the 27th, I remember sending a telegram saying, "The time has not come, I will not hesitate to recommend it if we reach that stage."

DEAN RUSK: Well, our ships were offshore and could be seen.

BENNETT: Oh yes. In fact, I had them moved in on the afternoon of the 27th because the rumor went out that we were bombing the town from an aircraft carrier. Well, the carrier was the Boxer, and it didn't have any aircraft. It was a small one. It had helicopters. And I said, "Move the thing in so the people can see there are no airplanes taking on and off our carrier."

SCHOENBAUM: And what were the facts, the exact facts as you saw them then, on why you changed your mind from the night of the 27th to the critic message?

BENNETT: Because things fell apart. You see, I had been in Washington. I was up on consultation because we thought things were about to break. And I had said to the Department, "This is the last time for me safely to be away." I flew up on a Friday I think, perhaps Thursday. And on Saturday the thing began to break out. I was still in Washington over the weekend, and in the operations room, whatever they called it in those days. I was with Tom Mann constantly because he was taking charge of it. And then on Monday we went to the White House, and I have that picture of all of us sitting at the White House at noon. McNamara was there, and Walt Rostow, and so forth. We discussed this a little bit, and the President turned and said, "Mac, I think you'd better set up a plane and get the Ambassador back to his post." So I left at five that afternoon in a little jet, a little plane, Jet Star. And we flew to Puerto Rico, and the plane had to refuel. It couldn't quite make it to Santo Domingo, and so I spent the night there. The next morning I was very anxious that the President had said, "Get the Ambassador back to his post." I
was anxious to get there. They kept putting me off, and I couldn't understand why they wouldn't take off. So we really didn't go until about noon. It turned out the airport had been under fire; that's why they didn't want to risk trying to land the plane. When I got there, I got out of the airplane and immediately into a helicopter which carried me out to the Boxer. Then I came in--

This was the 27th, about two in the afternoon. From the Boxer, I went out to Hainan, a small port seven miles west of the capital. That's where I met the Americans on their way to being evacuated: cars, people, finally coming away from the hotel where the shooting had taken place that morning. So, you see, I was not in the country when that happened that morning.

RICHARD RUSK: Incidentally, your mother was ill, and that was one of the reasons you came back. Did she recover?

BENNETT: No, she died later. And part of it was that she suffered mightily with her one chick being so criticized. But that's the way of life. I think her time would have come anyway, but--

RICHARD RUSK: Did you have a chance to see her again?

BENNETT: I did, yes. I came back once later in the summer when I had to come up and testify for [James William] Fulbright. But she, of course was in such a state then, she never--And then I saw her again just before she died, but she didn't remember.

DEAN RUSK: One thing, Tap, that I might mention, sometimes--

BENNETT: And I always felt angry about Tad Szulc because of that and people like him who wrote some of the things they did.

DEAN RUSK: Sometimes when a career foreign service officer functions in a role like that that you had in the Dominican Republic, there are a good many liberals and others in the Senate who get very cross. Did you find that this in any way got in the way of your confirmation for later posts?

BENNETT: Oh, Fulbright held it against me for years.

DEAN RUSK: Yeah?

BENNETT: He tried several times; he always failed, but at that time he was chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and he held up my career minister nomination. I was on a list, and he held that list from January to August. And I was told by one person, "You'll never get confirmed." Well, it did finally go through.

DEAN RUSK: Bud [Bourke Blakemore] Hickenlooper, the Republican senior member of the committee muscled, that one.

BENNETT: I had known him in Greece, and before in Latin America. But, may I tell this? This takes a little time.
RICHARD RUSK: Go ahead.

BENNETT: I was by this time at the U.N. I went there as the number three Ambassador. And then there was a change, and I was to move up to number two. There were five Ambassadors on our staff there. By that time [John Alfred] Scali had replaced George [Herbert Walker] Bush as head of the U.S. Mission to the U.N. I had gone up with Bush as number three, then I moved to number two. This went before the committee, and there were four of us. Four of the five Ambassadors were reported on this list. Well, I was number two and already had the title of Ambassador to the U.N. Security Council. Number three was to be the Deputy Ambassador on the Security Council, and number four was to be on the Economic and Social Council, but with the title of Representative to that Council. So, Mr. Fulbright took the position that, since I was only a Deputy, I shouldn't have the title Ambassador. I already had it and was moving up one, whereas the number four man, who was a good man, could be Ambassador since he had the title of Representative. That reasoning did not go down with the committee. There, with a maneuver that was really chicanery, he adjourned the committee and they all went to lunch. He and Senator Frank [Forrester] Church stayed behind and approved his version of the report for the floor. When other members of the Committee learned of this action, there was an uprising on the committee. The report was called back from the Senate floor and the Committee voted, I think it was thirteen or fifteen to two, to overturn the Chairman. There was a case where I was nominated, I believe it was in April, and we didn't get confirmed until October. But that was the last time. But by the time I was nominated for NATO, it was all love and kisses. By that time, in 1977, both Fulbright and Church had been retired by the voters. Senator [John Jackson] Sparkman was chairman then. Sorry for all this personal business. It shows how the system works.

RICHARD RUSK: See how this type of thing can follow a man.

BENNETT: Well, Senator Russell got very agitated about Fulbright's behavior. And you remember, he made a special trip down to the Dominican Republic.

DEAN RUSK: Well, Russell could deliver twenty-five votes on any subject whatever, and so he was quite a power. And Fulbright was taking on quite a giant when he tried to take on Dick Russell.

BENNETT: Well, Russell never forgave Fulbright. Russell told me, "This broke like an explosion to on me," he said. "I'd seen Bill Fulbright a few days earlier and said to him, 'I know, Bill, you're not happy about the Dominican situation.' "Well, that's true," said Fulbright, "I'm not, and I'm going to make a big speech next week." But he said, "Don't worry; I'm not going to jump on your man Bennett." But when he made the speech, I was the principal villain, and Russell never forgave him for the deception.

DEAN RUSK: Yeah. Yeah, yeah.

SCHOENBAUM: I think the speech had been written by one of those left-wingers on Fulbright's staff.
DEAN RUSK: He had some of them.

BENNETT: He sure did. I'm glad to see that my little memories accord with those of the Secretary of State.

DEAN RUSK: Well, anybody have any particular question you want from me or is this about as far as--

RICHARD RUSK: I've got gobs of questions, and I'm just thinking that rather than pursue them now, maybe we ought to eat and then come back, or eat and try it again tomorrow--

[break in recording]

RICHARD RUSK: Continuing this interview with Ambassador Tapley Bennett, and we'll pick it up with Dean Rusk at a later date. Go ahead.

BENNETT: Well, from the day I went there in late March of 1964, the situation was highly unstable and was seen to be and recognized to be. You had very serious problems in that small but tortured country whose history has been a constant succession of either no government at all, with general chaos, or strongman dictatorship-type government. If my memory serves me correctly, in all of their long history since 1492, because [Christopher] Columbus landed there on his first voyage over. The Dominicans like to call themselves the land Columbus loved best; his brother was there as Governor, and it goes back to those early days. By the middle of the sixteenth century, their moment in history had passed, because the Spaniards were going on to Peru and Mexico, much richer places. But the Dominican had the first cathedral and the first university and the first hospital in the Western Hemisphere. But, they never have had any government worthy of the name. In all those long centuries they'd only had one elected man who served for about five years; good government. And then he was killed, assassinated. And so what's happened since '65-'66 is really the longest period of stability and orderly government and reasonably competent administration that they've ever had. But now, when I went there as I said, less than three years after the assassination of Trujillo, the enormous vacuum that, after thirty-one years of strongman leadership with the accoutrements of a modern dictatorship in the sense of secret police, listening devices, that kind of pressure which was different from the old strongman gunman type of Latin American leader. Trujillo was a very sophisticated man in the way he did things, most of them evil, but he did make it a very functioning economy.

RICHARD RUSK: Did he make the trains run on time?

BENNETT: There was certain prosperity, but they didn't have any trains. Well, they did actually have a little train when I went there in '41; they didn't have it still in the sixties. Anyway, in 1964 you'd had the assassination of Trujillo less than three years before. The two surviving members of the assassination plot were sequestered in their houses, sort of fortresses with their own private police to protect them.

END OF SIDE 2