RICHARD RUSK: --Former Secretary of Labor Mr. Willard Wirtz, who was secretary of labor from 1962 through the end of the [Lyndon] Johnson years, and this is Rich Rusk doing the interviewing. This is November 1985. Let's try that (unintelligible)--oh, okay. Am I correct in assuming that you were secretary of labor '62 to '69?

WIRTZ: That's right. Yeah. Came in as undersecretary in 1961 and became secretary when Arthur Goldberg went on to the Supreme Court in fall of '62.

RICHARD RUSK: Either ask you--uh, why don't we start with your earliest memories of Dean Rusk. Did you have any contacts with my dad prior to his appointment as secretary of state?

WIRTZ: I don't--no, prior to his being secretary of state, I did not.

RICHARD RUSK: Didn't know him at all?

WIRTZ: No. I knew of him, but, uh, but I don't believe that there was a previous acquaintance, and if there was an acquaintance, it wasn't sufficiently close to give you anything to work on.

RICHARD RUSK: No impressions of his appointment as secretary. I believe you were rather close to Adlai Stevenson at the time.

WIRTZ: That would be the pickup point. There would have been, I would have known about the situation because of the very close association with Adlai Stevenson and because the questions that, and because of the questions that arose at the time about who would be appointed secretary, so that I would have known about Dean Rusk, but would not have known him personally.

RICHARD RUSK: Mmm hmm. 'Course Mr. Stevenson was the very logical and potential candidate.

WIRTZ: There was a question about that. And, uh, I remember the Stevenson end of it fairly closely, but I don't believe that I thought that there was any possibility of Adlai Stevenson's being appointed secretary of state. It wouldn't, it wouldn't have made sense politically. There had been a fairly strong political strain in the difficulty sense between [John] Kennedy and Stevenson.

RICHARD RUSK: Right.

WIRTZ: Stevenson had campaigned for him, for Kennedy, all through the 1960 campaign and had gone very hard for him. But there was a residue there of animosity.
RICHARD RUSK: They weren't the same type of men, really.

WIRTZ: It was more than that. There was a, there was a stronger possibility than some people realize of Adlai Stevenson's being the candidate, and that's so long ago now, twenty-five years, that, uh--

RICHARD RUSK: Yeah. Mmm hmm.

WIRTZ: It's hard to remember the details. But I was very close to Governor Stevenson, and if that convention had deadlocked, then there would have been a real prospect--

RICHARD RUSK: Right.

WIRTZ: --of returning to Stevenson, and there isn't any question in my mind but that Adlai Stevenson wanted it--(laughter) for a third time. And so, so there developed through the spring of 19--what is that?--1960, that's right, there developed quite a political strain, so that I didn't think the prospect was at all real as far as a cabinet (unintelligible) was concerned. In fact, I was surprised that the United Nations thing developed.

RICHARD RUSK: Now, my dad was, made that call to Adlai Stevenson with John Kennedy at his side from West Palm Beach, I believe, and the two of them together more-or-less talked Adlai Stevenson into taking that job at the UN [United Nations] or at least persuaded him heavily to try to take it. And, uh, is there anything in that exchange?

WIRTZ: Well, I remember now knowing about that. I don't suppose I was present at the conversation, but, uh, but, uh, did know about it, and I heard it referred to comparatively recently by [McGeorge] Mac Bundy, as a matter of fact, as being an instance of, of oh, bad judgment, I guess, on Adlai Stevenson's part.

RICHARD RUSK: For taking that job?

WIRTZ: Yeah.

RICHARD RUSK: Really?

WIRTZ: Yeah, I couldn't understand that. My recollection is that he wanted it like he wanted a hole in the head. He was really not the least bit interested--

RICHARD RUSK: My dad's recollection of the conversation was that after he and Kennedy had gotten through, he wondered what was left for both himself and John Kennedy in the field of foreign affairs, you know, they had sold that job so extensively. (laughter)

WIRTZ: I don't think Adlai Stevenson took it under any misapprehension (laughter) about the situation.
RICHARD RUSK: Do you know enough about, uh, the relationship between my father and Adlai Stevenson, perhaps, to comment, uh, in some meaningful way?

WIRTZ: No, as a matter of fact, we were talking a little last night, your father and I, and he was, uh, he was referring not to this in particular, but to that general situation. We even mentioned the fact that he had urged on the president elect, well, he had urged earlier the consideration of Adlai Stevenson as, a, uh, as a possible secretary of state and that he had urged, too, the desirability of trying to get him to—I don't believe he said that. It would follow from that that he would have urged the appointment to the United Nations, so that all I'd know about it involves all that I remember about it, involves or implies in answer to your question that relationship would have been a quite amicable one, characterized by respect on both sides. But I'm kind of piecing that together. That would be my impression.

RICHARD RUSK: Maybe we can talk about your own relationship with my father. Obviously, you came to know him as a fellow cabinet officer. Maybe you could tell me something about your contacts with my dad more on an official basis and perhaps on a personal level.

WIRTZ: Well, first they wouldn't have started until after the fall of 1962. As undersecretary of labor, I would have had no occasion to be a part of the conversations that went on. And, of course, that leaves out, as a consequence, the, uh, the, uh, well, it leaves out the Cuban Missile Crisis, doesn't it, entirely?

RICHARD RUSK: That's right. Mmm hmm.

WIRTZ: And so, uh, that perhaps most, I started to say "heated," and that's as good a word as any, that whole chapter I don't know a thing about. So that my relationship in personal terms would have picked up after that, would have started with the fall of 1962 and would have been limited at first to the formal cabinet meetings which I (unintelligible) your father will already have (unintelligible) and not nearly so important as the country thinks they are. In fact, most of them are a kind of kabuki dance. I guess the country sleeps better at night thinking that fifteen or twenty people get together once a week and talk over problems of great import. Well, the truth of the matter is that the important problems are too complicated to be served by weekly, hour or hour-and-a-half meetings, and a good many of the cabinet meetings became just, oh, reports by somebody or other on something or other. So that as far as the cabinet meetings themselves were concerned, that was a superficial process. Now, let's carry on beyond that in a way to disqualify myself as a very good witness, the, well, two or three things to be said. First, the cabinet role at that point was in general, I think, quite different from the cabinet role today and involved a good deal more close relationship between the president and his cabinet members than I understand to be the case today. But that relationship took place not through the cabinet meetings, but through much smaller meetings of two or three, of [a?] one-on-one situation or a meeting in which the president and one of his close advisors there would be talking with one or two cabinet members. Now, that kind of thing happened frequently. But, and now I come to what makes it hard. There would be very few occasions upon which those conversations would include both the secretary of state and the secretary of labor. There would be very few cases in which there would be occasion for that kind of meeting. In fact, as I try to think, I remember only one specific instance that involved the official role of both the secretary of state and the secretary of labor. There was
a case involving a fellow named Hal Banks, who was a Canadian, a Canadian union official, who had gone very far in rooting out Communism of some of the Canadian, one of the, I guess it was the Seaman's Union, gone very far in rooting out Communism from the Seaman's Union and, well, perhaps hadn't known where to stop because before he was through he was cracking heads and so on and so forth. And there was an indictment of Hal Banks in Canada, and he escaped to the United States, and a serious incident, the details of which I don't remember, developed in connection with the Canadians trying to get him extradited, and there was in connection with that, there were in connection with that parallel conversations between the Department of State and the Canadian foreign ministry, whatever you call it, that'd be on the one hand, and on the other I had a fairly extensive series of conversations with the minister of labor in Canada. Now, there was that one case in which there was a commonalty of interest between the Department of Labor and the Department of State, and, yet, that's the only one I can think of.

RICHARD RUSK: Is that right?

WIRTZ: Sure. There would've been another--

RICHARD RUSK: On that particular case, did you get involved with my father?

WIRTZ: Yes. Yeah.

RICHARD RUSK: Personally?

WIRTZ: There were direct conversations there. I can't remember the detail of it. It seems to me that the, and you could check with him, although it would've been a very small item on his calendar. My recollection is that it was determined that there was not a basis for extraditing the, the, uh, Hal Banks. And so that it, and I know that it was my own view. I felt that he was not going to get a fair deal. Although I didn't like Hal Banks, that wasn't the question. I remember feeling he was not going to get a fair deal if he was removed to Canada, and I think that was the position that was taken by the Department of State. There was a conversation, a phone conversation, I remember, with your father about it. That case had an unpleasant afterglow because it turned out later that the, there had been a political contribution by--I wish I could remember his name, the head of the Seamen's Union in this country. It doesn't make any difference, there'd been a political contribution by that union, and there was a charge that that contribution was a payoff for the action that we took in not (unintelligible). Well, uh, it'll say something of who [?] you're looking for that I knew that that kind of thing would no more affect your father (laughter), that he didn't think in those terms. And that never became a great big case, although there were some, I remember, Congressional hearings of some kind on it. It doesn't make any difference except when you're asking for personal reactions, I find a little key to them in the complete persuasion that that kind of thing, a political contribution, no more affected Dean Rusk than it did the secretary of labor. We didn't play that kind of a game that way; we didn't play the game that way in those days.

RICHARD RUSK: Mmm hmm--(unintelligible)

WIRTZ: But I can't think, Rich, of any other situation in which--
RICHARD RUSK: (unintelligible)

WIRTZ: Oh, yes, I do remember one other, although it never, never became terribly important. I think both your father and I were very much concerned about the extent to which the AFL-CIO [American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations] affected the selection of foreign labor attachés. The U.S. labor attachés to almost all countries and the lesser representatives where there were not attachés came on nominations from the AFL-CIO. I didn't like it then; I don't like it now, if that's still the case, which I don't suppose it is today, but I remember talking with the people from the Department of State and probably some with your father about trying to put a stop to that. My guess is that we were both a little discouraged by the fact that the president, and at this point it would have been Lyndon Johnson, was so, in a sense, relying on the AFL-CIO support in a number of areas that he wasn't inclined to do anything about cleaning up this practice. As I say, I didn't like it. My recollection is your father didn't like it. And my further recollection is that we both recognized that it was so--probably, of such probably secondary importance that it wasn't worth making a big deal about. You see, the AFL-CIO was at that point probably the strongest private political force in the country, and they were doing a good job of using that power. They defended at that point--it seems strange now--they supported at that point the trade policies which were then quite different from what they are now. They were willing to go along with the elimination of tariffs if protection could be given the employees who were displaced by it. They supported the education legislation. They supported the housing legislation. They supported the civil rights legislation very strongly so that this little matter of having a voice in the appointment of foreign labor attachés, it wasn't a very big dispute [?].

RICHARD RUSK: If you weren't involved with my dad very much in a policy way, is there any way you could comment upon some of his more general qualities as a fellow cabinet officer, what you came to know of him.

WIRTZ: Oh, yes, the uh--yea, the uh, and uh--.

RICHARD RUSK: Incidentally, let me (unintelligible) might find some use--

WIRTZ: Well, let's see. Where were you? You were asking about general impressions, my personal impressions. Those start with the fact that there is, well, they start with the fact that the cabinet during the '60s was a very close-knit personal group. It's, I think there's been no other period in which that many people were to gather as long as that particular group was. In my own case, I didn't come in quite at the beginning, but almost. And, you see, there were six or seven of us who were there the last day, as most of us had been the first. And that resulted in a very close personal relationship. You move on from that to the fact that there was always part of the, uh, of the uh--well, protocol is too fancy a word. It was just part of the rules of the game that the secretary of state was the recognized, acknowledged leader of the cabinet, in formal ways, and your dad carried that off beautifully as far as the personal side of it was concerned. There was never any showing of, never showing, any showing of rank or anything of that kind. (unintelligible)
RICHARD RUSK: Was there any vigorous, was there ever any vigorous discussion of some of the more controversial issues of those times amongst the cabinet?

WIRTZ: You know, I remember almost no vigorous discussions at the overall cabinet level. I come back to the point of its being, the cabinet meetings being of a different nature. And, of course, those cabinet meetings, and the period I remember best, was the Johnson period because I was there only about a year, and I was the junior boy at the table as far as, when President Kennedy was there. So, my impressions are much clearer of the Johnson period, and, again, you have a personal factor. Lyndon Johnson was such a strongly dominant force that the cabinet meetings would be, would be pretty much one-person shows. And there wouldn't be a lot of occasions for, for an expression of the other, of what, of the other thing I was mentioning, which was the personal, the leadership of the cabinet. But your dad either was in the beginning or had become by the time I knew him a very, well, I can think of several words--professional, sophisticated, words of that kind--in the handling of those, of the personal equations (unintelligible). And then, of course, he had another characteristic, either developed much earlier or part of the responsibilities of that job, and he knew the right thing to say and the right way to say it. And if that implies sometimes a kind of professionalism--I can't think of the right word now--the right thing was said; the right things were done. And he was very good at that. I don't mean to imply that that was ever a compromise of the harder facts of the situation, but you know him a good deal better than I do.

RICHARD RUSK: Starting, I am starting to know him. (laughter)

WIRTZ: He knows how to handle himself in the best sense.

RICHARD RUSK: Mmm hmm. And so in that sense he was a good leader of the cabinet.

WIRTZ: Sure, sure.

RICHARD RUSK: Did he in fact lead the cabinet as a secretary of state? Supposedly, (unintelligible) his critics have suggested that if he did have a flaw, his major one was insufficient leadership, at least as far as the Department of State was concerned.

WIRTZ: I wouldn't know anything about that, but to whatever extent, and again we're back on this problem of there being so few cabinet responsibilities which are shared in common, but to whatever extent those would've showed up, my recollection is I don't know what they mean. There were no inadequacies of leadership as far as the common problems were concerned, but there weren't very many of those. I'm trying to think. There should've been some, some common problems in connection with the ILO [International Labor Organization] membership. But we had no big problems then as far as the ILO was concerned. They have developed since.

RICHARD RUSK: Industrial Labor Organization? ILO?


RICHARD RUSK: Okay.
WIRTZ: It's the oldest of the international organizations. It came out of the League of Nations. And there has since developed a set of problems involved in [involving?] that, but there weren't any of those. Let's see, I've thought of the Canadian, Hal Banks; I thought of the labor attachés; I can't think of any others.

RICHARD RUSK: You didn't really have enough official contact with my dad on issues of policy to comment, to evaluate him in the context of his office--.

WIRTZ: That's the problem. We came, Jane came to know your mother quite well and to hold just an unqualified respect for her--not respect, but beyond respect or admiration to real affection. The way she could show up at all these things that she was supposed to show up--. Course that's, I said something to your dad the other day and just a word used, we were starting at, the story that ought to be told is what those cabinet women meant, contribute, not just put up with, but I think contribute.

RICHARD RUSK: Mmm hmm. Mmm hmm.

WIRTZ: So that there just wasn't much of that. And when it came to the over-., probably the overriding issue of the Vietnam War and its continuance, as far as any official handling of that was concerned, that was not a Department of Labor business.

RICHARD RUSK: Mmm hmm. Mmm hmm. Did you ever talk to my dad about the Vietnam War? If not in an official way, just in a personal way?

WIRTZ: Yes.

RICHARD RUSK: Did you?

WIRTZ: Yeah. I didn't see it exactly as he did. He would remember that so that the, and the conversations about it were never formal. And as far as any personal conversations were concerned, he received my views with complete respect. Sure.

RICHARD RUSK: In what context were these views given? Just as you saw him at various functions?

WIRTZ: Oh, I dropped over to talk to him about it once or twice. Sure. I think probably, all that would be appropriate to say of those conversations was that although my even being there was presumptuous, he didn't treat it that way. He was entirely willing to listen to anything I had to say about it, and that's all I could ask.

RICHARD RUSK: Would that have been 1968?

WIRTZ: I suppose.

RICHARD RUSK: Yeah. After the Tet offensive.
WIRTZ: Yeah. The, uh, the uh, after what?

RICHARD RUSK: After the Tet offensive in February (unintelligible).

WIRTZ: Yeah--I can't place it exactly. But of course there were, well, there were three periods while we were both there. One was the Kennedy period, and the other was the Johnson period. That's in two parts. And then the first part extended through, until about the last twelve or eighteen months of the administration. And you will remember, too, that at that point the whole country got pretty mad at each other--

RICHARD RUSK: Sure. I was right in the--I was a student at Cornell University at the time.

WIRTZ: Were you?

RICHARD RUSK: Right in the middle of that stuff.

WIRTZ: Yeah. Well, you were in a terrible spot. (laughter) I didn't mean Cornell. (laughter)

RICHARD RUSK: Those were unhappy days I do remember.

WIRTZ: Why, sure. And they were, they were unhappy for the country, and there was divisiveness there, and there was unhappiness between the--quote--generations--close quotes. And they were, uh, they were not happy. That was not, the last eighteen months were not happy. The rest of it I remember with, all the rest of it with real, well, gratitude that I ever even got a chance to be any part of it, and which I never expected and with a real feeling of pride, which was in no sense individual, but things were being done the way they ought to be done there. And there was a, even as there were differences about various things, those differences were handled--well, the last eighteen months were gravel. I mean, it was just--

RICHARD RUSK: Gravel for everybody, not just the secretary of state.

WIRTZ: That's correct.

RICHARD RUSK: To what extent did that Vietnam obsession affect you as secretary of labor or affect your work?

WIRTZ: Quite a lot for another reason, which is that my closest working relationships outside the department, outside the government were with the AFL-CIO and particularly Mr. [George] Meany. And Mr. Meany and I saw the Vietnam situation very differently.

RICHARD RUSK: Did you?

WIRTZ: And it created real stress [?] from the private sector group with which I was supposed to be working.
RICHARD RUSK: Really?

WIRTZ: Sure. So it affected a lot. That's why I say (unintelligible) I wouldn't trade the rest of it for anything, [but] I'd be glad to give those last twelve or eighteen months away.

RICHARD RUSK: Yeah. Umm--

WIRTZ: (unintelligible)--Let me just repeat the substance of what, one element of the substance of what we talked about, that you've asked me about, whether I could illuminate in any way the relationship between the secretary of state and the president in those days, and I've answered you very candidly that I can't and that that implies something that's very important, which is that if there, if there were differences between the president and the secretary of state about matters involving Vietnam or other, any other foreign matter, neither of those men, the president or the secretary of state permitted that to show one single bit. And I can only refer to that out of complete admiration because they were, they were well, that relationship was about the most critical relationship this country had at that point. And it says something about both those two individuals and about the cabinet relationship at that point that there would never have been any reference to that, any crazy [?] letting down his guard or--. No, they played it like big people. There was never--I don't remember a smallness about any aspect of that whole experience on anybody's part. And so it's out of respect for them both that I say I admire that.

RICHARD RUSK: Yeah. I'll ask you a very general question that I've asked a lot of people, and I've had real trouble figuring out, that is, this business of responsibility of high position and particularly in time of war when people like the president and my dad are responsible for decisions that take men's lives, and in the case of Vietnam we're talking about thousands of American lives, up to a million Vietnamese lives--and how does that phenomenon alone affect, not only affect them personally, but what does that, what does that responsibility do to the decision-making process?

WIRTZ: Well, I don't know how it affected--

RICHARD RUSK: As a son at Cornell, I not only thought a lot about it, but, boy, I agonized over it.

WIRTZ: Sure, you did.

RICHARD RUSK: And I just, I've got to deal with that question with this book.

WIRTZ: You and your brother and sister must have gone through a form of hell. The McNamaras must have. And so did we. I was working for a man whom I expect, oh, I don't know, whom I expect our younger son pretty much despised.

RICHARD RUSK: Was he in college at the time?

WIRTZ: Let's see, well, Phil was eleven when we came to Washington in 1961, so in 1968, he was eighteen. So, uh, he sure knew what was going on, and I know it was very hard for him to
understand how I was part of an administration which was taking a position on these matters that he didn't believe it. And, sure, it's hard. Now, you asked what it does to the individual, and I can answer only in [a] small piece, and you could answer in much larger terms because you were closer to it in every way. And you also asked what it does to the decision-making process. It virtually destroys it as far as other matters are concerned.

RICHARD RUSK: Interesting.

WIRTZ: Because it had become so much the center of national preoccupation and so much the center of our individual personal feelings that it's all I remember from that period. I don't remember anything else being accomplished.

RICHARD RUSK: Are you talking about 1967-68?

WIRTZ: Sure. Sure.

RICHARD RUSK: Even as secretary of labor, you don't--

WIRTZ: Oh, sure, sure.

RICHARD RUSK: Isn't that amazing?

END OF SIDE 1

BEGINNING OF SIDE 2

RICHARD RUSK: (unintelligible) by the thing, especially during--

WIRTZ: Oh, those two things are compatible. You can square those two. Business went on, and as far as my own field is concerned, it was during that period that we introduced the legislation that subsequently became OSHA, the Occupational Safety and Health Act. I don't believe there were any major labor disputes then. There wasn't time for that at that point. But, sure, we went on. Well, we were trying to develop a new Manpower Program, and there would be other places in which you would find reference to the impact of my somewhat strained relationships [sic] with the president on the Manpower Program. But I'm saying, too, that although all of you [?] were just as busy as ever, and although those things went on, all of the verve that was reflected in the domestic legislation of 1940 [?] 1964 and '65--civil rights and all those other things probably the greatest period of domestic legislation except for the New Deal--all the verve was lost. The country was divided and bitter and you didn't get much else done of significance, so that you were just as busy as ever, but you were spinning your blooming wheels.

RICHARD RUSK: Ah, you said that that responsibility for those kinds of decisions destroys the decision-making process. What about in a personal way, what's it do to the men as you observed
it?

WIRTZ: Grinds them down. Sure. Sure. At that point that cabinet, that whole group was a bunch of seasoned veterans. They'd been there much longer than most cabinets stayed, either together, or, well, than most cabinets stayed together. But it gets in the way, there isn't any question about that. You don't get much done domestically when a country is divided about a foreign issue.

RICHARD RUSK: Sure.

WIRTZ: And, uh, so I can say it, with the one group that business went on, a lot had to be done and it was, but I can say with more complete persuasion that it didn't amount to very much. And then my illustration would be everything that was done on the domestic front in '64 and '65. I don't remember anything that was done in '66, or '7 or '8, particularly '67 or '8.

RICHARD RUSK: It must have been difficult as a cabinet member, being in the cabinet itself, seeing all this transpire, and not being able to really involve yourselves as a cabinet in a significant way.

WIRTZ: Well, I've probably overstated it, I'm sure, but the significant thing is that I don't remember what they were. I'm sure that there were, there were problems, there were congressional hearings going on about this, that, and the other thing, but it was, it really was a mistake [would be your worst mistake?] to in any way minimize the impact of the division within the country [at that time?].

RICHARD RUSK: Anything further?

WIRTZ: No. Except to express real admiration for the way you handled it.

RICHARD RUSK: (laughter) Well, I'll do my best with this book. Any comments about my brother Dave? I guess he did come in (unintelligible)--

WIRTZ: Sure. Actually as a matter of fact--

RICHARD RUSK: Could've talked about Dave instead of my dad.

WIRTZ: No, but we should--are we still on?

RICHARD RUSK: Yeah, sure, sure.

WIRTZ: That's all right. I should, that reminds me of some things that were going on, and that was the, and your brother was involved in one of them. The cities were about to burn.

RICHARD RUSK: That's right.

WIRTZ: And there were questions of trying to put together programs that would provide jobs for the--
RICHARD RUSK: That's right.

WIRTZ: --For the young.

RICHARD RUSK: And you put that, you started that after those cities were burning in '67.

WIRTZ: Oh, yeah, yeah. And he was involved in one of them, along with the now mayor of the District of Columbia, Marion Barry. And, uh, yeah, I'm glad we came back to that because that would be an illustration of the kind of thing that, on which we did continue to work very hard and, I think, fairly effectively. And that program that was put together called Pride in the city of Washington--.

RICHARD RUSK: I remember that.

WIRTZ: --Was a major, major piece of business, and it qualifies--as I said, I couldn't remember them, that's the important thing. That's probably because you and I were talking about these other, and I got a little distracted from it. But it would be an illustration of what those other people are talking about when they say things, life went on.

WIRTZ: I know, I think your time is up. You said you had about a half hour for this. One final question, and that was, did the fact that my brother had a secretary of state for a father in any way influence (laughter) what he did there in the Department of Labor or the fact that he got to where he was there? Dave and my dad tried religiously to stay out of each other's hair and not try to use one to substantiate the work in the other field. Did it have, did it make any difference?

WIRTZ: If it made any difference, it was that he had something of a job, he had something of a problem to overcome.

RICHARD RUSK: (laughter) That's cute, that's interesting.

WIRTZ: Why sure, oh, sure. He wasn't trafficking on it, and he knew that if he tried [unintelligible--it would be a mistake?].

RICHARD RUSK: Aw, I'm glad to hear you say that, I really am.

WIRTZ: Really, the--

RICHARD RUSK: The funny thing about sons and daughters of high officials, and it's probably happened in your own family, is how hard those sons and daughters work to live their own lives.

WIRTZ: Sure.

RICHARD RUSK: Not try to ride those coattails.

WIRTZ: Oh, sure, sure. No, no. He did a grand job. You've got it.