

Dean Rusk Oral History Collection  
Rusk ZZZZ, Side 1, Section A: Part 2 of 2  
Dean Rusk interviewed by Richard Rusk and Thomas J. Schoenbaum  
1985 April

Part 1 of this interview is Rusk VVV.

Rusk ZZZZ, Side 1, Section B: Part 1 of 2  
Rusk ZZZZ, Side 2: Part 2 of 2  
Dean Rusk interviewed by Richard Rusk  
1985 October

[SECTION A]

RICHARD RUSK: Okay, this is tape number two of the Middle East interview. Go ahead, Pop. Dorothy Fosdick--

DEAN RUSK: Dorothy Fosdick was our liaison to the European delegations. And each of these liaison officers were expected to be sure that their delegates were going to be on the floor when the vote was taken. And this foreign minister started out of the hall, and she went up to him and said, "You mustn't leave now. The vote's coming in just a very few minutes." And he said, "I'll be back in a moment." And she said, "No, no, no, no. You must not leave. It could come at any moment." And he said, "All right." And he went back to his seat. After the vote was taken he got up to go out and he passed by Dorothy Fosdick and said, "Now, Miss Fosdick, may I go to the men's room?" During this entire period, I came to know Abba Eban fairly well. He was, in those days, a brilliant staff officer for the Zionist group--eloquent in half a dozen languages. He and I got to be pretty good friends during that period because we saw so much of each other, because we and they were always comparing nose counts and things of that sort. But we also put in a lot of effort through diplomatic channels in national capitals trying to be sure that they instructed their U.N. [United Nations] delegates to vote the "right way."

RICHARD RUSK: My guess is Loy [Wesley] Henderson's position and those of you within the Department who were working on behalf of trusteeship, Pop, kind of had a lonely road to travel there. There wasn't much of an Arab lobby in this country, and I'm sure [Harry S] Truman's decision to recognize the State of Israel was a popular one. Were there repercussions against you people in the Department? Were there lingering bad feelings that carried over?

DEAN RUSK: More against Loy Henderson than he deserved, and more against Loy than against me. Because after all, I was part of a delegation that was trying to carry out President Truman's instructions. But if we did not go a thousand percent with the Zionists, they would heap the blame on Loy Henderson as being an insidious element, hostile to them, working away in the bowels of the Department of State. Well, that was an injustice to Loy Henderson. What Loy Henderson wanted was somehow to get a solution that the Arabs could live with and not

produce an almost permanent alienation between the United States and the Arab world. I, myself, never had a plan of my own with respect to Palestine. We were looking for any plan with which both sides could live. And had the Zionists and the Arabs come up with their own plan we would have bought it hook, line, and sinker.

RICHARD RUSK: That just wasn't on the horizon?

DEAN RUSK: I just wasn't there. I'm afraid I have this--

RICHARD RUSK: This has been a good tape, Pop. This has been a good one.

[break in recording]

[SECTION B]

RICHARD RUSK: This is Rich Rusk. We're interviewing Dean Rusk today on various topics relating to international law. This is October, 1985. Pop, my question is, this question of oil dependence and its relationship to international law: Can the western world strictly adhere to international law regarding past, present, and potential threats to its energy lifeline? How did this question involve you as Secretary of State?

DEAN RUSK: Often oil policies get all mixed up, as between the economic interests of local oil producers and the total oil situation. For example, during the fifties, during the [Dwight David] Eisenhower Administration, in the name of national security we imposed very severe limits upon imported oil. The idea was that imported oil would have to come across oceans, and oceans had submarines in them, and that we ought to develop and use our own oil resources as a safer source of energy. Well, actually if you sit back and look at it, if we were thinking about national security you would think that we would use up other people's oil first and keep our own oil in the ground. And even during the sixties, during my period there, if we wanted to get a little higher quota for Venezuela or Saudi Arabia, someone like that, it was like pulling teeth because of the pressures of these U.S. oil producers and their friends in Congress.

RICHARD RUSK: Did you, in fact, try for those higher quotas and run into this domestic problem?

DEAN RUSK: Yes. We tried on occasion to adjust a quota upward for someone like, say, Venezuela particularly. But the Secretary of the Interior was under great pressures not to increase our take from foreign oil supplies.

RICHARD RUSK: I recall that story you tell about a--I think it was a Texas senator. You came to ask him for some favors or support maybe for foreign aid bill and--

DEAN RUSK: Oh, that was Senator [Robert Samuel] Kerr of Oklahoma. And after he heard me he said, "Well, as you know Mr. Secretary I am interested in the price of cattle and the price of

oil. If you can do something for me on those two things, I'll try to be helpful to you on foreign aid." Now this was not just the interests of his constituents back home; he personally was heavily involved in both cattle and oil. That kind of thing becomes pretty disagreeable at times. I had the same idea in mind that I've just expressed about these pipelines to permit the Soviet Union to move oil to Western Europe. Oil is in finite supply. And if the Soviet Union is willing to share its oil with Western Europe, I think it's a good idea; and, again, keep North Sea oil where it is for a while, if that's what that means. But I've never thought that the use of military means to get oil is a very promising line of action. In the Persian Gulf, for example, we probably would use up an enormous amount of oil in any such military action. It would be very easy to destroy those oil fields so that nobody would get any oil out of them for a while--for quite some time to come. And then there's another element: Western Europe is much more dependent upon Middle Eastern oil than is the United States. I was talking to some German leaders a few years ago when this matter was on the front page. I reminded them that Western Europe had a greater interest in Middle Eastern oil than did the United States and that they must not expect the United States to send its forces to the Middle East to get oil for Western Europe unless there were British, French, German, Italian, and other troops alongside of us, that we simply weren't going to do that job alone. And he said, "Well, we can't do that." I said, "Well then forget it. Because it's not up to the United States to go out there and spend lives for your oil without your help."

RICHARD RUSK: Who did you have your conversation with?

DEAN RUSK: A couple of German leaders who I was talking to: German parliamentarians. But unless there are other flags flying, my guess is the United States simply is not going to play a lone role in any such enterprise. And, of course, nuclear war over oil in the Persian Gulf makes no sense whatever because there wouldn't be anybody around to need or use the oil after you got through. So I think we need to look at this with the greatest circumspection and not get too fanciful about what ought to be done in the event that that oil is somehow cut off.

RICHARD RUSK: It is true that loss of our oil supply and particularly Western Europe's loss of oil supply, and Japan for that matter, from the Middle East would have an enormous impact on the economy of the world and our own economy. Wasn't this threat and this issue a strong influence on our policies toward the Middle East, toward our efforts to try to win friends in that region, perhaps toward our policy toward Israel?

DEAN RUSK: Well we have tried, despite the Israeli problem we have tried to work out reasonable relations with Middle Eastern countries. For many years we and the Saudis, for example, simply recognized that we had a fundamental disagreement over the question of Israel. But we and they tried to put this issue over in a corner and then work on our relations in other respects because we and the Saudis need each other. And we were reasonably successful during the sixties in doing just that. The Saudi royal family is very bitter about Israel; and they have been among the most bitter of the Arabs about the very creation of the State of Israel, particularly Faisal [ibn'Abd al'Aziz], who was the first Prince and Foreign Minister and then became King in Saudi Arabia. He was at the United Nations at the time of the famous partition resolution which created the State of Israel. And he expressed in the strongest possible terms the reaction of the Arabs to the steps taken, as they looked at it, to make the Arabs pay for the crimes of Adolf Hitler.

RICHARD RUSK: That's the way he expressed it?

DEAN RUSK: Yeah. But the underlying fact to me is that these known oil reserves have only limited life. The Shah in Iran recognized that and was already taking substantial steps to prepare Iran for the day when his oil would run out. And he was talking about a period of maybe twenty or twenty-five years: Saudi Arabia maybe thirty or thirty-five years. So we in the West who have become industrialized and have a major dependence upon oil--and this would also include Japan--really ought to be going all out to find alternative sources of energy. You see, this thin crust around the surface of the earth in which life has existed, both animal and plant life, is very thin indeed. It's thinner than the peel of an orange around an orange. And it's, to me, wholly irrational to suppose that in that thin skin you will find unlimited supplies of oil indefinitely into the future. So when you think of Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, Mexico, these oil reserves are finite. They're going to run out within decades. And I feel myself that we should be going really as fast and as hard as possible to find alternative sources of energy including nuclear power, including solar energy, including biomass sources of energy. Some of the new developments in the field of microbiology, windmills, the possibility of drawing thermal energy from devices that would take advantage of differences in temperature in the oceans. We have a major experiment going on in Hawaii today on that source. We've got to find ways to put all these different sources together, not one of which will be decisive, but which all together just might get the job done. And on the other side of that same ledger, we should be working much harder than we are on conservation. These gas-guzzling automobiles mean that we're living in a fool's paradise here. My five-year-old grandson, your son Andy [Andrew Dean Rusk], is facing a pretty bleak situation before he gets to be your and my age.

RICHARD RUSK: Hey Pop, as a father, maybe I'll be spared the prospect of a teenager racing around in his own hotrod. (laughter)

DEAN RUSK: Possibly. But we've built our society now, constructed our national life, in effect, on oil in terms of where people live, where they work, transportation systems. My brother Roger [Rusk], who is a retired professor of physics at the University of Tennessee, illustrates it this way: He says if you draw a straight line representing the long history of the human race that there will appear a little pimple on it somewhere along the way which would represent the temporary period of oil and gas. And then that would be over and the human race goes on from there in whatever way it can. So I regret that we have been cutting back on the funds we are putting into experimentation on various synthetic fuels and things of that sort. To me it's a very urgent question.

RICHARD RUSK: Either as Secretary of State or as president of the Rockefeller Foundation, did you personally get involved in the search for alternative sources of energy?

DEAN RUSK: Not at the Rockefeller Foundation. Back in the fifties we were more concerned about the population explosion and the problem of basic food grains than we were with energy problems.

RICHARD RUSK: What sort of hackles would that have raised with the Board of Trustees if the Rockefeller Foundation itself had made some strong efforts to find alternative sources of energy?

DEAN RUSK: As one of our trustees at the Foundation once put it, he said he had finally decided that there was no problem in finding money. The problem was to find an idea that was worth a nickel. When I was Secretary of State there was one matter affecting energy on which I kick myself today. I was a statutory member of the Space Council as Secretary of State. This was chaired by the Vice President. We had general supervision of the activities of NASA [National Aeronautics and Space Administration]. We realized toward the end of the sixties that we were in fact going to put a man on the moon and we faced the prospect that at that point we'd be cutting back on NASA activities. Now NASA represented the most astonishing combination of management, science, technology, research, production that I think this country had ever seen: much more impressive than the Manhattan Project that built the atomic bomb. Well NASA came forward with a proposal to launch a 200 billion dollar manned flight to Mars. This would represent a two-year round trip.

RICHARD RUSK: Two hundred billion dollars?

DEAN RUSK: Two hundred billion dollar manned flight to Mars. Well I helped to veto that idea on the grounds that that kind of expenditure for that kind of purpose was something that the next generation could look at, that it wouldn't make any sense for us to take it on. But I also felt that rather than dismantle NASA or cut back on it sharply that we should give it other tasks. And one of the tasks that I proposed at that time was that it concentrate on the energy problem. But NASA was so keen on outer space activities that they weren't very enthusiastic about it. If NASA had brought to bear these extraordinary combined talents onto the energy problem, we might be much farther along today than we are.

RICHARD RUSK: Technically speaking, could they have shifted the focus like that?

DEAN RUSK: Oh yes.

RICHARD RUSK: Similar personnel?

DEAN RUSK: Oh yes, because they were drawing upon hundreds of campuses for research; they were drawing upon scientific talent of almost every kind. And they could have mobilized the same kinds of talents that they had done for the space program. And I am just sorry that I did not fight harder to turn NASA toward the energy problem back in the late sixties.

RICHARD RUSK: What was the context of your influence? In cabinet meetings?

DEAN RUSK: No, the Space Council was made up of about eight or ten people: the Secretary of Defense was on it, I was on it, the Vice President was the chairman, the head of NASA was in it, I forget who else were members of the Space Council.

RICHARD RUSK: This would have been in the late sixties?

DEAN RUSK: In the late sixties, yes. But I should have fought harder for more effort on sources of energy than I did.

RICHARD RUSK: What about the influence of this oil lobby on decision making and persons like the Secretary of State in Washington? Did you personally and officially feel the weight of the lobby as Secretary?

DEAN RUSK: Oddly enough, I did not. I think the role of the oil lobby, the so-called oil lobby, at least as far as foreign policy is concerned, has been considerable. At the moment I don't recall being visited by a single oil executive or oil company representative to talk to me about our foreign policy as related to the Middle East.

RICHARD RUSK: You had a few of those fellows working for you.

DEAN RUSK: There were times when the oil people would come in and talk to some people junior to me in the Department about getting, say, an increased quota for Venezuela, an increased quota for Saudi Arabia. And we did become involved in some of the negotiations, even disputes, between the foreign oil companies and the government of Saudi Arabia about the split between these oil companies and Saudi Arabia on Saudi Arabian oil and things like that. But these lobbies chiefly work on the Congress. And they launch public opinion kinds of campaigns one way or another. But the allegation by the Jewish interest supporting Israel that if we do not give Israel one thousand percent support it's because of oil lobbies, is just wrong.

RICHARD RUSK: You think so?

DEAN RUSK: I have no doubt about it because that was not a major part of our discussions when we were talking about our policies toward the Middle East. We have a considerable national interest in having good relations with the Arab world, not only in economic terms but in geopolitical terms. And the Israeli problem has been a great burden for us in terms of those relationships. But on the whole, if you look across North Africa from Morocco through Egypt and certain countries in the Middle East like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, we haven't done too badly in our relations with those countries. But there are certain ones like the Palestinian group, and Syria, and Iraq with whom we have had some real problems.

RICHARD RUSK: What about back during the Truman years, Pop, when Israel was very much the focal point of discussion? Was the oil issue a factor in our creation of the State of Israel or perhaps some of the arguments opposing the creation of the State of Israel? Was it discussed?

DEAN RUSK: Well I suppose oil is always in the background when you are talking about needing good relations with the Arab world. It would be wrong to deny that that was a factor. But that's not by any means the sole factor. No, the attitude of President Truman toward these problems, as I have indicated earlier, was a kind of a schizophrenic attitude. He on the one side felt very strongly that there should be a Jewish homeland in the Middle East; there should be a Jewish state in the Middle East where persecution of Jews would not occur. But on the other hand he wanted very much to find some kind of a solution out there that both sides could live with. And I think his interest in that kind of solution had very little to do with oil. It was simply a

desire on his part to see a solution which would not mean a series of wars between Israel and their Arab neighbors. Oil was a factor, but only one of many factors.

RICHARD RUSK: Say the worst happened, the worst case did occur, and all oil from the Middle East was cut off to its markets in Western Europe, Japan, the United States, and all of these economies were being drastically affected by this. Would the Western European countries, the United States, Japan, have the right to forcefully intervene in the Middle East to reopen that flow of oil?

DEAN RUSK: I would not think so under present standards of international law. I doubt that that situation would come about because after all, the oil exporting countries would be hurt very badly if they were to cut off the flow of oil to Western Europe, the United States, and Japan. Now for a short period one can contemplate that some of these countries with a little tinge of fanaticism about them might bear the economic shock of losing their oil exports. But in the longer run I think it's in their interest to continue to sell their oil. So I rather doubt that that would come about. There was a brief period, if you will remember, when there was an oil boycott. But these oil producing countries could not take that for very long.

RICHARD RUSK: Pop, what about the role of the political refugee in international affairs? What about these people who come to the United States, come to the Department of State either at home or abroad for whatever reasons to obtain political asylum?

DEAN RUSK: Political refugees have been an extraordinarily difficult problem since the end of World War II. In the first place, the war itself produced a very large number of displaced persons. There were Germans who had been living in areas that were taken over by Poland, overrun by the Soviet Union. Their repatriation was a real problem. There were Czechs and Hungarians and others who were displaced by the war. And so a major effort was made to find places for these displaced persons. On the whole, if you look at it in retrospect, it was handled not too badly because places were found for large numbers of them. The United States has been under special pressures when refugees occur in any situation, whether it's Chinese fleeing from the mainland through Hong Kong, or Cubans, or whatever it might be. And from time to time we have through special legislation made special provision for accepting refugees over and above our normal intake of legal immigrants. Sometimes they come here on a status that is called a parole status, where they are neither fish nor fowl. They are not thrown out, but they're not fully accepted as permanent immigrants for naturalization purposes. Over time that usually is modified so they can become American citizens. We have a very special problem these days with Haitians. Now we have had to adopt fairly special and tight rules with regard to political asylum in this country. You see, at any given time there are two and one-half million people standing in line around the world waiting for visas to come here as immigrants even though we can only take about 400,000 a year of them. But we get a good many groups that claim the status of political asylum. Well now, we don't give political asylum just because somebody does not like the regime of the country of which they are nationals. That would simply open the doors of immigration to almost unlimited extent. The simple truth is that there are many, many people in all parts of the world who want to come to the United States and they could flood us. We require for political asylum that an individual be the target of real danger: arrest, persecution, death, and not just a general theory of political disagreement. Now this is illustrated by the present difficult

problem we have with Haitians coming to this country. Now Haiti itself is the cesspool of the Western Hemisphere in terms of conditions. A good many Haitians want to leave the country because the situation is miserable and they look to the United States as a place where things might be better. But they are not eligible for political asylum even though they may not like the kind of regime that [Francois "Papa Doc"] Duvalier is running down there. So we do not take economic refugees into political asylum and that creates some very difficult problems for us. But I think we've done more than any other country has done in receiving refugees and displaced persons, people of that sort. But there's a limit to it and these can create some very painful situations in humanitarian terms.

RICHARD RUSK: Even when we have accepted political refugees particularly from, say, countries like the Soviet Union, that must create real problems in our relationships with the Soviet Union.

DEAN RUSK: Yes, to some--

END OF SIDE 1

BEGINNING OF SIDE 2

When Russians defect to the United States from the Soviet Union this always creates irritation, particularly if those defectors are key political people in the Soviet Union. But we have had other kinds of people defect: dancers, artists, intellectuals, a handful of scientists. That is a source of irritation between our two countries. The Soviets are very sensitive on this point. It's very damaging to them to have people vote with their feet and make it clear that they want to get away from the kind of regime they have in the Soviet Union.

RICHARD RUSK: I suppose the threat of defection is one thing that has impeded the efforts of both countries to promote more exchanges, people to people exchanges, than we have had in the past, huh?

DEAN RUSK: Yes. For example, we opened up tourism to the Soviet Union. And we have a handful of Americans who are visiting the Soviet Union as tourists. Well, trying to balance off that from a foreign exchange point of view, we have urged the Russians to open up tourism to the United States for their people. But they are very resistant to that idea because they apparently don't like to contemplate the possibility that a good many of these tourists might want to stay here. The same is true, generally speaking, and for most of the countries of Eastern Europe. But the Russians try to keep very close touch with any Russians that are in the United States for scientific, educational, or cultural exchanges. They are much more sensitive on this than the Chinese are. The Chinese communists are quite relaxed about this. I suppose if you have a billion people, you don't mind losing a few of them. But I've noticed here at the University of Georgia the sensitivity of the Soviets about such possibilities.



DEAN RUSK: Well, we had a Russian professor of law studying here at the University of Georgia for a year with me. And he was in pretty close touch with the Soviet Embassy in Washington about his movements and his activities and things of that sort. Whereas we have had a Chinese studying here and I have had very little impression that his government was nervous about what he did or what he might do. You see, it is still true that running from the Baltic Sea all the way through Central Europe to the Black Sea is what Churchill called that iron curtain. And the purpose of that boundary line is to keep people in: keep them from fleeing to the west. I've seen that in two or three spots. And when you see these two or three rows of barbed wire fences with watchtowers and dogs and cleared fields of fire and search lights and things like that, it's a pretty eloquent demonstration of the efforts that they go to to keep their people from moving out.

RICHARD RUSK: I think John [Fitzgerald] Kennedy was the one who said, "If anyone questions what the basic issues are between the west and the Soviet Union, let them come to Berlin."

DEAN RUSK: That's right. You see, in the Soviet system they are faced with a major dilemma. If they are to compete successfully, they've got to free people's minds in the field of science, technology, scholarship, all the rest of it. But if you free people's minds in one field, there is no way in which they can keep those minds from thinking about questions in another field. For example, their greatest nuclear physicist, [Andrei Dimitrievich] Sakharov, has developed some very strong views on political questions. And when people begin to think about these things and reflect that six percent of the Russian population that are members of the communist party control the other ninety-four percent with a pretty iron hand, dissidence is bound to develop. And this is a fundamental issue in the Soviet Union. And I think that they are stuck on the horns of this dilemma.

RICHARD RUSK: Can you comment on any of these specific individuals that defected to this country while you were Secretary?

DEAN RUSK: Well during my tour as Secretary of State there appeared at our embassy in New Delhi a rather dowdy woman with a battered suitcase, and she told the Marine guard at the embassy that she wanted to see our ambassador. Then she introduced herself as Svetlana [Alliluyeva], Joseph Stalin's daughter. And the Marine guard, at least, was sensible enough to know that this might be something important, so he arranged for her to go up to see Chester [Bliss] Bowles, our ambassador. Chester Bowles talked things over with her, and she was convinced that if she simply put herself back under Indian control that the Indians would return her to the Soviet Union. She had come to India for the funeral of her Indian husband, I believe, or something or that sort. So, Chester Bowles made the decision on the spot that he should help her to get to the United States. The first we heard about it in Washington was a message from Chester Bowles saying that she was on an airplane on the way to Italy and on the way to the United States. Well, the--

RICHARD RUSK: Was that the kind of decision that an ambassador such as Chester Bowles should be making?

DEAN RUSK: Oh yes. Yes. There are times when--He had the choice of helping her on her way or turning her back to Indian authorities who would send her back to the Soviet Union. So he was going to make a decision one way or the other whatever he did. And there was no time for him to do otherwise. But when we first heard about it she was already on her way. Well now, the defection of Joseph Stalin's daughter was roughly comparable to the defection of Bobby Robert Francis] Kennedy to the Soviets. And we knew this would be a considerable shock to U.S.-Soviet relations, at least in the short run. Well, we arranged for her to be talked to about whether she wouldn't really like to live in Switzerland or some other country instead; but no, she was determined to come to the United States. And so we--

RICHARD RUSK: Did she say why?

DEAN RUSK: -- received her here. I never quite knew what was really in her mind. As you know, she has gone back to the Soviet Union now in later years.

RICHARD RUSK: Did you personally talk with her?

DEAN RUSK: No. We asked George [Frost] Kennan, our former ambassador in the Soviet Union and one of our criminologists, to talk with her upon her arrival and see what the situation was. But I remember that--I think I recall that the Soviet ambassador, Mr. [Anatoly F.] Dobrynin came in to protest our reception of Stalin's daughter. And I said, "Look, we didn't lift a finger to suggest to her that she do this. If you wanted her to stay in the Soviet Union, why did you let her go to India? It was up to you to keep her in the Soviet Union if that's what you wanted to happen." But it blew over. I suspect that the Russians did not take her all that seriously and so I don't think it made big difference in the longer run. But these are sensitive questions.

RICHARD RUSK: That particular story has come full circle now that Svetlana Stalin has returned to the Soviet Union.

DEAN RUSK: Yes, she's returned to the Soviet Union.

RICHARD RUSK: She had a very unhappy time here apparently.

DEAN RUSK: Yeah. I don't know what her expectations were in the United States. She did rather well for a while. She wrote a book and she--

DEAN RUSK: No. No.

RICHARD RUSK: I did.

DEAN RUSK: But I'm sure that she was debriefed, as the expression goes, by our intelligence people after her arrival here. But I don't know whether she told them anything of any interest or not. During the late sixties Janos Radvanyi, who was the head of the Hungarian Embassy in Washington, decided he wanted to leave their service and live in the United States. He asked to see me in a remote home there in Washington, in fact Under Secretary of State Nicholas [deBellevilie] Katzenbach's house, where we began the arrangements for him to come here. He

told me at that time that he and his wife were the only members of the Hungarian Embassy in Washington who were members of their diplomatic service, that everybody else were members of the Hungarian Secret Police. He and his wife were living in a reign of terror within their own embassy. But he just found it too much to take and so arrangements were made for him to go to Stanford University and take a Ph.D. And then he became professor of history at Mississippi State University where he's done very well indeed.

RICHARD RUSK: What does he teach?

DEAN RUSK: He teaches Eastern European History. Although at the time the Hungarian government condemned him to death for his defection, there apparently has been no effort made by the Hungarians to wreak vengeance on him. He has lived a normal life over here under his own name, and he and his wife have been doing very well.

RICHARD RUSK: Was this sort of a cloak and dagger type of operation where you personally went to Nick Katzenbach's house and took part in this?

DEAN RUSK: Well he asked to see me in some out of the way place there in Washington. And Nick Katzenbach had a large house which was in an out of the way place. Nick and his wife were both out of town at the time, so I suggested his house. I had forgotten that they have about five children. And while Radvanyi and I were sitting in one room there were children running all over the house making all sorts of noises in the rest of the house. It might not have been the best possible place for that kind of meeting. (laughter)

RICHARD RUSK: Was that in the evening?

DEAN RUSK: No, it was in the afternoon.

RICHARD RUSK: Did you drive your official car to that house?

DEAN RUSK: I think so. This relationship inside these governments in Eastern Europe is almost a spooky one. I remember during the Truman administration when the U.N. was meeting in Paris, under our law we have only two people--or they did at that time--only two people accredited as our representatives to the Security Council. Of course the Secretary of State ex officio always has the right to go to the Security Council to represent the United States. But Warren [Robinson] Austin and Philip [Caryl] Jessup both became ill. And so I went to [Andrei Andreevich] Gromyko to get a postponement of the meeting of the Security Council and I explained to him that we have only two people under our law who are authorized to sit for us in the Security Council. And he said, "Oh yes, so they can watch each other." Now this idea that Warren Austin and Philip Jessup were there to watch each other was completely foreign to anything we might have had in mind. But Gromyko had gotten to where he could speak very good English. But when we would meet for formal discussions there would be four or five of us on each side. He would always use Russian so that his Russian companions, not all of whom spoke English, would know what was going on, was being said. And I'm sure that at least one of those people who were present in those discussions was, in effect, a KGB [Komitet Gosudarstvennoye Bezopastnosti] man.

RICHARD RUSK: Watching everyone?

DEAN RUSK: Sure. But for a long time in the postwar period at receptions, cocktail parties, things of that sort, if a high Russian official were offered a drink; his own personal secret service man would step forward and sample the drink before the official would drink it. And this was true even at parties they gave for each other. I mean, imagine living in that kind of environment. The--

RICHARD RUSK: I think you told us that story about Gromyko's wife and a comment on a ship.

DEAN RUSK: No, when [Nikita Sergeevich] Khrushchev was over here in 1959--and be careful about whether you use this or not--when Khrushchev was over here on his visit in 1959 they still were in this practice of sampling drinks before their principals would drink it. The Russian party went from Washington to New York on a special train. And when they got going the menfolk decided they wanted drinks. So they ordered them, and the porters brought them, and the security men stepped forward and sampled them. Mrs. Gromyko decided that she wanted a Coca Cola. And the porter brought her one. No one stepped forward to sample it. She looked around at Khrushchev and the others and said, "You do not care if I die." (laughter) But this conspiratorial life that they lead, even within their own governments, must be a terrible thing for them to bear simply as human beings.

DEAN RUSK: When I was at the Rockefeller Foundation during the fifties, I crossed the Atlantic once on the Queen Elizabeth and Gromyko happened to be on board. Well the captain of the Queen Elizabeth invited, just by chance, invited him and me to come to the captain's quarters before dinner for a cocktail. Captains of these liners usually do that for some of their so-called distinguished guests. And when the captain's steward brought Gromyko his drink a guy stepped forward to sample it. Right there in the cabin of the captain of the Queen Mary--or was it the Queen Elizabeth. Well this somehow got abroad among the crew and they were so infuriated at Gromyko for this insult to the captain they were in a mood to throw him overboard. (laughter) But it's a terrible existence for them to live.

RICHARD RUSK: This is interesting.

DEAN RUSK: One effect of this system in the Soviet Union is that life in our embassy in Moscow can be relatively dull. People in the embassy there live in a very limited community with a limited number of Soviet contacts. Their social life is usually with other embassies, like the British and the French and other embassies there in Moscow. Large areas of the country are barred to them, in terms of travel. They have to assume that when they travel anywhere that they are being followed, or guided, or bugged, or even photographed. I remember a story that when [Walter] Bedell-Smith was ambassador over there he looked out of his office one day and saw that the KGB car that was always in front of our embassy was changing a tire. So just for fun he called his own car and ran down and started driving off somewhere just to see what would happen. And within sixty seconds another KGB car picked him up and tailed him all the way. (laughter) Well, when your mom and I were invited by Khrushchev down to the Black Sea we

were put up in Mr. [Lavrenty P.] Beria's old villa. Now Beria had been executed by Khrushchev. Beria had been head of the secret police.

RICHARD RUSK: By Stalin?

DEAN RUSK: No. By Khrushchev. And when the Soviet attendant showed us to our quarters, he said, "This was Mr. Beria's villa. But," he said, "Don't worry. There are no ghosts here." But anyhow, Mom and I proceeded on the basis that we were not only being bugged in this villa but we were being photographed. And so we behaved accordingly. (laughter) That kind of life seems almost intolerable to us in the west, but it's there and it cannot help but have a strong influence on their attitude toward other countries. This conspiratorial life that they live among themselves cannot help but make them very suspicious of foreigners of all sorts.

RICHARD RUSK: It makes you wonder how that system of theirs is able to work. They must have enormous control over their own people.

DEAN RUSK: Sometimes this has odd repercussions. We learned--I'm not going to use a name here. We learned through intelligence that they had some very compromising photographs of a top American newsman. We knew that. The newsman apparently did not know that they had these photographs. But we would not give him permission to return to the Soviet Union because this was blackmail material. And this newsman was always puzzled. He didn't go to court and fight for his right to go to the Soviet Union. But we just didn't let him go back. Now he thought we were being kind of rough on him, but in fact we were protecting him.

RICHARD RUSK: You were involved in that one?

DEAN RUSK: Yes.

RICHARD RUSK: You were involved in the decision not to tell him why he was not being returned?

DEAN RUSK: Yes. Yes.

RICHARD RUSK: Did he ever find out?

DEAN RUSK: I don't know whether he did or not.

RICHARD RUSK: I obviously can't pry too far. Was this a journalist that is well known to the American people?

DEAN RUSK: Oh yeah. Sure.

RICHARD RUSK: Well there's a hole card that you can play someday, Pop!

DEAN RUSK: You learn a good many curious things about some of your own people in this world of conspiracy. Never a dull moment. During the Truman Administration I spent all one

night over at the FBI because there was a woman in the Justice Department--Judith [Coplon]--whom they suspected of having a Russian boyfriend in New York. And so they arranged to make some top secret documents available to her to see what she would do with them. And she in fact gathered these documents together and embarked for New York where she met her Soviet paramour. Well the FBI had about sixteen agents trailing the two of them, but this couple did a pretty expert job of shaking off FBI agents. They used subways and department stores and all sorts of things. And finally they got down to one FBI agent. The rest had been shaken off. And this agent sort of got nervous and arrested the two of them before she had passed the documents to the Russian. Well when I heard this over at the Justice Department where I was spending the night following this case, I just went on home. I said, "Forget it. You haven't got a case." But we did put those two on trial and in the trial court they were found guilty. But on appeal the case was dismissed.

DEAN RUSK: She had not actually turned over these papers to the Russian. But sometimes when you know that you have a spy in your sights, you leave them alone in order to see where they go and with whom they make contact. You let them lead you to other people and other sources.

RICHARD RUSK: How was it that you were involved in this matter in the Truman years? Why were you called over to Justice?

DEAN RUSK: Well I was either Assistant Secretary for U.N. Affairs or Deputy Under Secretary. I forget. But either way I would have been the logical person to follow it because this Russian was an employee of the United Nations. But this led to--I think this was the occasion when the then Soviet Ambassador, whose name I now forget, came in to protest to Dean [Gooderham] Acheson. And Dean Acheson explained to him our view of the law of the matter: that if an employee of the United Nations went outside of his duties at the United Nations he did not have United Nations privileges, immunities. And the Russian repeated his protest. Dean Acheson repeated the statement of the law of the matter. This happened a third time, whereupon the Russian shrugged his shoulders and said, "Mr. Secretary, the law is like the tongue of a wagon. It goes in the direction in which it is pointed." (laughter)

RICHARD RUSK: That was the occasion that this phrase was used, huh?

DEAN RUSK: Yeah. That's an old Russian proverb: "The law is like the tongue of a wagon. It goes in the direction in which it is pointed." But you see, if you have a Russian stationed in Washington, with diplomatic immunity, then if you catch him spying you simply declare him persona non grata and send him home. Up at the United Nations they would have immunity if they seemed to be doing this sort of thing as a part of their duties at the U.N., but if they go outside of their U.N. function then our view is that they are not covered by U.N. immunities. And that's been the view of successive Secretaries General of the U.N. And so they are subject to arrest, trial, or deportation: whatever we decide to do with them.

RICHARD RUSK: There's a lot of snooping and counter snooping on both sides of the iron curtain. As Secretary of State were you ever involved in our counter espionage in this country in

trying to determine who the Soviet agents might be or who the Americans might be who are cooperating with the Soviets?

DEAN RUSK: Only in the most general way. Only in this one instance that I talked about did I get involved in the operational side of the matter. But there's been competition in the electronic field. And you have to always be alert to what can be done through electronic means. For example, at the beginning of my tour as Secretary I had a scrambler telephone in my office. And we soon discovered that that scrambler telephone itself could pick up normal conversations in my office and that could be penetrated electronically from the outside. So we removed that scrambler telephone from my office. I won't go into details on some of the electronic capabilities, but it has become very sophisticated. And in a number of our embassies abroad we have special rooms which have been prepared to resist electronic penetration. I once invited the appropriations subcommittee of the State Department to come down to the Department and get a full briefing and demonstration on this electronic warfare: intelligence and counterintelligence. And they were fascinated by it. But at the end a couple of them said to me, "Well this was extraordinarily interesting but I wish you hadn't done this. We would prefer not to know." (laughter)

RICHARD RUSK: Didn't you tell me on an earlier tape that you assumed right from the beginning that our government had been penetrated to its highest levels?

DEAN RUSK: Well you have to assume for a variety of reasons that most conversations in government will become known either because of blabbermouths within your own group or because of the possibility of penetration, electronically or otherwise. I had a telephone in my official car, for example. But I never used it except to call in and say, "I'll be in the office in ten minutes. Have some coffee and donuts waiting for me." I never discussed business over that because there were lots of people all over Washington who could tune in on those frequencies and listen intently to everything that's said over these car telephones. It's fascinating, but it's a fairly unpleasant part of the scene, [interruption] John F. Kennedy was intrigued by the James Bond stories. The rest of us knew this and so we would read these things ourselves.

END OF SIDE 2